

BULLETIN OF
THE JOHN RYLANDS
LIBRARY
MANCHESTER

EDITED
BY THE
LIBRARIAN
(HENRY GUPPY)

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No. 1

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE following items of news relating to the University have been gleaned from the annual statement of the Vice-Chancellor (Sir John S. B. Stopford) for the Session 1946-1947, which reads as follows :—

THE UNI-
VERSITY OF
MANCHESTER,
SESSION
1946-1947

“Our prophecies about the size of the ‘post-war bulge’ were remarkably accurate. A year ago I stated that we expected 4000 students this session and the number of *full-time* students in all faculties to-day is approximately 4100. If we include part-time students the number reaches 4800.

“To meet this great expansion it has been necessary to increase the teaching staff considerably and very quickly and it is gratifying to report that we have been most fortunate in this respect. It has been possible to attract a larger number of well qualified and experienced teachers than at one time seemed possible. It is true that in several departments we are still short-handed and there remain a number of responsible positions to fill but on the whole we have fared much better than we expected.

“Since my last report no less than fifteen professors have been appointed or taken up their duties. In eight cases the appointments were to existing chairs which had become vacant through retirement or transfer to other universities but the other seven are to new professorships and at the moment we are taking steps to fill several more newly created chairs. The appointments to non-professorial posts far exceed 100 during the past twelve months.

“Whilst we have been more fortunate than was anticipated regarding staff, we have had many disappointments concerning accommodation. Greatly to our inconvenience the old High School buildings in Dover Street were not available for this

session and they will not be ready until September. This has delayed a general rearrangement which would have provided more extensive and satisfactory accommodation for the four faculties of Arts, Education, Music, and Economics and Social Studies. It will also be some time before we can transfer the Department of Metallurgy to the old Dental Hospital and so release much needed space for other Science departments. Fortunately, the new Dixon Laboratories for Chemistry have proved a great success and a further extension for that department is proceeding. A similar building is also to be erected for some departments in the Faculty of Arts.

"The provision of an additional large dining room in the refectory has eased the congestion considerably but there remain queues on most days in term time with a wait of up to twenty minutes. To remove this a further extension of the refectory is being planned. The four present parts of the refectory have been named after the four first Principals of Owens College—Scott, Greenwood, Ward and Hopkinson.

"Staffing and accommodation within the University have not been our only difficulties. The acute shortage of books has been most serious and I would express admiration for the way in which teachers and students have done everything in their power to mitigate this.

"The shortage of residential accommodation has also been a source of great and continuing anxiety. All our halls of residence are full to overflowing and report long waiting lists. We have now two wardens for students in Lodgings—one for men and one for women—and steps are being taken to procure at the earliest moment new halls and additional residential accommodation. We are most grateful to our Chancellor who is taking a personal and intimate interest in this most important matter. In spite of all that is being done it will probably be years before our residential problem is fully resolved owing to the shortage of man power and building materials.

"In spite of overcrowding and the difficulties which have just been mentioned the quality of the work is being fully maintained. Every one will agree that there has been no relaxation of standards, in fact I believe the reverse is true. It is to be

remembered that the students returning from the Forces are older and more mature than those coming direct from school. They are anxious about the future and eager to make up for lost time. They are keen, industrious and take full advantage of all the university offers without any considerable supervision. This greater maturity and seriousness of a high proportion of the present undergraduates has relieved the position and needs to be borne in mind when looking to the future.

"It is with regret that we have learnt of the resignation of Bishop Warman from the Council, on his departure from Manchester. We are pleased to know, however, that he is retaining his membership of the Court. The following resolution has been passed by the Council :

"That the resignation of Bishop Warman from membership of the Council be received with great regret, and that the members of Council wish to express to him their deep appreciation of the very valuable services which he has rendered to the University during his period of membership, which has extended over more than fourteen years. Among his many University activities Council particularly remember the great help which he gave whilst the post-war development of the University was under consideration, his special interest in residential accommodation, and also his Chairmanship of an important sub-committee of the Committee on Degrees not conferred by Examination or Thesis. Council are glad to know that as an honorary graduate of the University, and by the continuance of his membership of the Court, the Bishop will be able to maintain his formal association with the University, and they wish him and Mrs. Warman many years of health and happiness in which to enjoy the leisure which they have so deservedly earned.' "

Founder's Day was celebrated on the 21st of May, when the following Honorary Degrees were conferred by the Chancellor (Lord Woolton):

HONORARY
DEGREES

Doctor of Laws : Sir William Clare Lees, Bart. ; The Right Honourable Hugh Dalton ; Professor Sir Norman Haworth.

Doctor of Divinity : Professor John Pedersen.

Doctor of Science : Professor E. D. Adrian.

Honorary Degrees were also conferred by the Chancellor at the Degree Ceremony on the 4th of July, as follows :—

Master of Arts : Mr. W. H. Hayward ; Mr. Myles Kenyon ; Alderman J. McCurdy ; Sir Miles Mitchell ; Mr. Gordon Phillips ; Mr. Frank Pollard ; Mr. Harold Raby ; Mr. R. Wynne Jones.

It is with deep regret that the death of twenty-six graduates, honorary graduates and benefactors have been recorded, including : Mr. Alfred Haworth ; Mr. H. R. Clayton ; Sir Thomas Henry Holland ; Sir John Eldon Bankes ; Sir F. Gowland Hopkins ; Sir James Jeans ; the Rt. Hon. Ellen C. Wilkinson ; Sir Philip Hartog ; Sir Thomas E. Higham ; Dr. William Dyson ; Professor B. A. McSwiney ; Professor F. M. Rowe ; Rev. Dr. W. L. Wardle.

OBITUARY

A long list of distinctions awarded to past and present members of the University are recorded, including : *Baron* : Sir Ernest Simon ; *Knights* : Professor W. N. Haworth ; Dr. E. Woodhouse Smith, *G.B.E.* ; Sir Frederick West ; Professor Blackett has been awarded the Medal of Merit of the U.S. of America ; Sir Laurence Bragg one of the Royal Society's two Royal Medals ; The University of Dijon has conferred a Doctorate on Professor H. B. Charlton and the University of Leeds has conferred upon him the Lit.D. ; Professor C. H. Dodd, a former member of the teaching staff, has been elected a Fellow of the British Academy ; Professor V. H. Galbraith, a former Member of the Staff, has been appointed Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford ; Dr. E. F. Jacob, formerly Professor of Mediæval History at Manchester, has been elected a Fellow of the British Academy ; Professor Polanyi, who has received the Honorary Degree of D.Sc. of the University of Leeds and also of Princeton, has been invited to give the Gifford Lectures in the University of Aberdeen ; Professor H. H. Rowley, who has had conferred upon him the Honorary D.D. of the University of Durham, has been elected a Fellow of the British Academy, and is to deliver the Schweich Lectures in 1948 ; Lord Simon

DISTINCTIONS

of Wythenshaw has been appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors of the B.B.C.; Sir John S. B. Stopford has been appointed Chairman of the Manchester Regional Hospital Board.

A most comprehensive programme of courses and lectures has been arranged by the Extra-Mural Department of the University for the session 1947-48.

MANCHESTER
UNIVERSITY:
EXTRA-
MURAL
STUDY

Beginning with a Summer School on X-ray crystallography, which was given from 1st to 12th September in the College of Technology, the courses normally comprise not fewer than six lectures and deal with a wide variety of subjects, from Biblical and classical study, mediæval life and thought, to modern literature and education, public finance, and practical geology.

Lectures are also arranged in other parts of the Extra-Mural region, and the department is at all times willing to consider requests from responsible organisations. The six weeks' course for the training of discussion-group leaders held last session will be repeated this session if there is a sufficient demand for it by those for whom it is intended—the professionally interested in adult education.

Another important branch of the department's activities consists of the tutorial and sessional classes comprising 20 to 24 weekly meetings of two hours each, which are provided in collaboration with the Workers' Educational Association.

A good deal of educational work is still being done in connection with the forces, but since the end of the war the calls on the Holly Royde residential college have diminished, and it has been possible to admit to courses limited numbers of civilian students. As time goes on it is hoped that these facilities will be extended, and the warden is seeking the co-operation of employers in the region. So far seven firms have agreed to release employees so that they may attend courses. For the remaining months of 1947 the subjects include "The British Colonies," "The Press," "The Rights of Man," "What is Philosophy About?" and "Literature and Life in Twentieth-century England."

The Hermitage—a mansion set in 32 acres of grounds near Holmes Chapel, which was acquired by the University in 1946 to serve as a residential college—will be concerned mainly with the provision of short courses. It is hoped that it may start work early next year.

The hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Anglican Diocese of Manchester was commemorated on the 10th of August, 1947.

It has had six bishops of its own, but it was not until January, 1848, that Bishop James Prince Lee was consecrated the first Bishop of Manchester. James Fraser, the second bishop from 1870-1885, was appointed by Mr. Gladstone; James Moorhouse, 1886-1903, was appointed by Lord Salisbury; Edward Arbutnot Knox, 1903-1920, by Mr. A. J. Balfour; William Temple, 1921-1928, by Mr. Lloyd George; and Dr. Guy Warman, who retired recently after seventeen years' service, was appointed by Mr. Stanley Baldwin.

CENTENARY
OF THE
DIOCESE OF
MANCHESTER

The newly appointed Bishop, the Reverend William Derrick Lindsey Greer, who was enthroned on the 7th of October, is the hundredth bishop in the direct line from Duma, Bishop of Mercia (656-658).

Bishop Lee came to Manchester from the headmastership of King Edward's Grammar School, Birmingham, to a diocese with only 284 churches for its 1,123,000 people. As a school-master he was wonderful, as a bishop he attempted despotism, but he struggled manfully to organise his sprawling diocese, and the foundations laid by him have survived. No fewer than 130 churches, each with its day-school, were built in his time, another 17 were rebuilt, and 163 new parishes and ecclesiastical districts were founded.

It is said that Manchester failed to appreciate the virtues of Prince Lee, but by contrast the virtues of Bishop Fraser and the popularity and esteem he enjoyed were never surpassed in the diocese. He was Bishop of all denominations and the most potent public man in the district. He came from a quiet Berkshire parish of only 370 persons, to undertake the care of 1,893,500 souls and nearly 400 churches. At Oxford he had

won the Ireland scholarship. People loved his humanity and lack of side. He was everywhere at once, talking to cabmen, railway workers, theatre folk and cotton workers. His Manchester Mission of 1877 was a triumph. Half the policemen in Manchester were known to him by name. More than 100 new churches were built in his time, 22 were rebuilt, and 118 new churches were started. In 1870 he founded the Diocesan Education Society, then came the Bishop of Manchester's Fund to help poor parishes in Manchester and Salford, and the first Diocesan Synod in 1874. His Diocesan Conference of the following year was the first of its kind in England. In 1877 the Archdeaconry of Blackburn was created. A year later came the Great Lancashire Strike. With his own hand he answered nearly 4000 letters a year, and while Bishop he gave away £30,000 to charity out of his stipend. His death in October, 1885, was noted by his statue to "Our Bishop," erected by popular subscription, which still stands in Albert Square.

James Moorhouse, then Bishop of Melbourne, was away in the Victoria Bush when the Marquis of Salisbury's offer of Manchester reached him. He was somewhat brusque in manner, lacking Bishop Fraser's personal charm. He opened 57 new churches and rebuilt 18. He also founded the Diocesan Home Missionary Society in 1886, the Clergy Superannuation Scheme in 1887, the Diocesan Loan Fund in 1901. He did splendid work for church day-schools and elementary education. He made a great impression on the Church Congress of 1888. Three years later he stood firmly beside the shop assistants in their protest against the 85 hour week, and as early as 1889 he expressed sympathy with trade-unionism. He resigned in 1903, and died in 1915.

Bishop Knox had been for eight years Rector of St. Philip's and virtual Bishop of Birmingham before he came to Manchester at the age of 57. His best work was probably already done. He was very reluctant to delegate responsibility, which was a grave failing in a diocese of over three million souls, with 560 parishes. But for the Great War he would probably have divided the diocese into two if not three. Many people are alive who remember Bishop Knox's courage, his dash and his organising

ability, his fight for the Church schools against Birrell, with the Whitsun protest march of 10,000 Lancastrians in 1906, from Regent's Park to the Albert Hall, with the Bishop at their head, also the first days of the Blackpool Mission, started by him in 1905. Besides 58 new churches, his years in Manchester saw the building of the Diocesan Church House in Deansgate in 1911, the original Diocesan Dilapidation Scheme, the Church Levy, the birth of the Diocesan Finance Committee, and the reconstitution of the Board of Finance. He is remembered as a fearless churchman of great sincerity.

William Temple, his successor, worked for eight years in Manchester, and his work bore the same rare imprint which it later bore at York and at Canterbury. The separate diocese of Blackburn was created in November, 1926. Under him eleven new churches were built, and under Dr. Warman a further twenty.

On its hundredth birthday the Manchester diocese covers a population of two and a quarter millions and includes 377 benefices, staffed by 484 clergy and to Dr. Warman belongs the credit that its administrative machinery has never been in better order, so that Mr. Greer was able to open the second century with a firmer base and better lines of communication than any of his predecessors.

On Monday, the 29th of September, the Rev. William Derrick Lindsey Greer, lately Principal of Westcott House, Cambridge, was consecrated seventh CONSECRATION OF THE NEW BISHOP Bishop of Manchester in York Minster, by the Archbishop of York (Dr. Cyril Garbett), in the presence of a congregation of more than two thousand people from 384 parishes of his new diocese.

Nearly 150 robed clergy from the Manchester diocese took their places shortly before eleven o'clock beneath the central tower. A few minutes later the Minster procession formed in the south aisle of the choir, and the two-hour service of consecration began.

The new Bishop was presented to the Archbishop by the Bishop of Sheffield (Dr. Leslie Hunter) and the Bishop of

Newcastle (Dr. N. Baring Hudson), each a link with his years at St. Luke Evangelist, Newcastle-on-Tyne. No fewer than twenty-three bishops took part in the consecration—eight diocesan, nine suffragan, and six retired bishops, including Bishop Guy Warman, Mr. Greer's predecessor, each of whom, one by one, laid their hands on the head of the bishop-elect, having heard the oath of canonical obedience taken after the King's mandate for consecration had been read.

The enthronement of the new Bishop took place on Tuesday, the 7th of October, in the Cathedral Church of Manchester, at which the great congregation included the Lord Mayor of Manchester, the Mayor of Salford, and the mayors of other towns in the diocese.

ENTHRONE-
MENT OF
THE NEW
BISHOP

The difference between the splendour of York and this ceremony in Manchester was symbolic of the atmosphere of a parish church. Though not lacking in colour, and even drama, there was a subdued atmosphere which seemed to mark the unmistakable humility with which the Bishop has taken up his task.

It was the new Bishop's home-coming.

As the writer in the *Manchester Guardian* has so well remarked: "The points of drama which lifted the service to notes of triumph were three: the fanfare of trumpets, faintly but thrillingly sounding from outside the great west doors, which announced the approach of the Bishop's procession; the singing of the Brahms anthem 'How lovely is Thy dwelling place'; and the stirring 'Te Deum.'"

The fanfare was followed by the Bishop's threefold knock with his pastoral staff upon the west door and by his petition to the Dean (the Very Rev. W. Garfield Williams) "to be inducted, installed, and enthroned with the full episcopal rights in this cathedral church of Manchester, in accordance with ancient usage and prescriptive right."

As he moved to the choir entrance with his chaplains, the Bishop of Hulme, the Archdeacon of Rochdale, the Chancellor, and the Registrar, waiting to take the oath and to be led by the Dean to the throne, the Bishop's youthfulness and modesty of bearing were memorably pictured in the minds of all who watched.

The first words of his address emphasised this note. He spoke of his feelings of "pitiable inadequacy," and declared that when he thought of his predecessors he felt like "discarding these imposing robes and just running away." His only desire was to learn and to be of service. They must bear with him when he made mistakes.

Taking his text from the second Epistle of Timothy: "For God gave us not a spirit of fearfulness, but of power and love and discipline," he said we lived in an evil time. We had hopes but many of them had been disappointed. "We look for rest and we are asked for further effort. The fire tends to burn low. Life tends to get on top of us.

"We have cause enough for anxiety and fear. Can reasonable people do else but fear when they look at the present international scene? Are we to avert our eyes, bury our heads in the sand? How is it possible to escape from anxiety and fear?

"The answer of true religion is to look facts in the face, see them in all their brutality and ugliness; then it would be found that they were not to be feared. Sin was closely allied with caution and timidity. Often we lack power because we are too fearful, too timid to launch out with faith.

"But power which could so easily become corrupt and corrupting, is not enough. Love, too, is necessary, and love has very little to do with the way we feel. It has much to do with the motive from which our actions sprang. It means having a real care for one another. It has to do with honest work, civic and political responsibility, for that is our only effective way of loving those who are outside the sphere of our own personal contact. Courage, power, love, discipline to the spirit we need in our church, civic life, universities and schools, in the world of commerce and of business.

"The source of these qualities is the gospel of Christ."

The General Committee of the British and Foreign Bible Society has authorised the production of 200,000 German Bibles besides many thousands of New Testaments. Before the 1939-45 war these Scriptures were printed in Berlin. Owing to the destruction of the

BIBLES FOR
GERMANY

printing plates by the Nazis, it has been necessary to reproduce a first consignment of German Bibles from this country by the photographic offset process. By this method 50,000 copies will be produced. The type for 150,000 is being set up and plates made for future editions. Probably one million copies will be produced before the end of 1948.

The Bible Society was conscious of the urgency for supplying as many Bibles as possible and as quickly as possible. In December 1946, 11½ tons of paper were ordered and in the following month delivered to the printers. Pages were then photographed, negatives and plates made, and the Bible printed during the first three months of the year. Yet, in spite of the interruptions of the fuel crisis and transport strikes, the first bound copies were received at the Bible House during April.

In "Albert Schweitzer : the Man and his Mind " (A. C. Black, 18s.) Mr. George Seaver has given us a great book on Albert Schweitzer, which is based "ALBERT
SCHWEITZER" on his achievements as a missionary, doctor, theologian and musician, who is an authority on Bach.

It is great in that it is alive with the spirit of a modern man who has made a great renunciation, whose conception of Christ is different from that of nearly all his contemporary Christians, has more of the true Christian spirit than many who worship Christ as God, or who regard God's kingdom as the progressive realisation of social and other ideals.

Mr. Seaver devotes considerable space to Schweitzer the musician, and in his tribute quotes Schweitzer as saying that " In no other art does the perfect consign the imperfect to oblivion so thoroughly as it does in music."

Music does not depict the external universe, but is the image of an invisible world, which can only be expressed in eternal tones by those who see it in its whole perfection and can reproduce it as they have seen it.

It is of the essence of Bach's genius that he was able to communicate his experience, by means of his musical art, with surpassing clarity of expression ; and in this Bach is the greatest

among the great, according to Schweitzer, who says: "His music is poetic and pictorial because its themes are born of poetical and pictorial ideas. Out of these themes the composition unfolds itself, a finished piece of architecture in lines of sound. What is in its essence poetic and pictorial music, displays itself as Gothic architecture transformed into sound. What is greatest in this art, so full of natural life, so wonderfully plastic and unique in the perfection of its form, is the spirit that breathes out of it. A soul which out of the world's unrest longs for peace and has itself already tasted peace, allows in this music others to share its own experience."

The first issue of the "Soviet Woman" has just reached us. "A magazine devoted to social and political problems, literature and art, published by the ^{"SOVIET WOMAN"} Soviet Women's Anti-Fascist Committee and the Central Council of Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R." It is to be published bi-monthly in Russian, French and German editions. The first issue is dated January-February, 1947. The Editor in Chief is Zinarda Gagarina. It is printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The first article, "At the Helm of State", deals with the position of equality with men which women hold in the Soviet Union, and describes it as one of the greatest achievements of Socialist democracy. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. has given legislative enactment to the right of women to elect and be elected to all organs of State power on a par with men. It has not only proclaimed, but provided effective guarantees of the full exercise of these great civic rights.

Under Joseph Stalin's leadership the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have accomplished a great deal in fulfilment of Lenin's instructions and women in the U.S.S.R. have become a powerful social force. Their complete emancipation has enhanced their active participation in the administration of the Soviet State. Over 1500 women have been elected members of the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics, while 277 are members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and 456,000 are members of local Soviets. These are the

finest daughters of the peoples of the Soviet Union, women who have gained the renown that goes with exceptional proficiency at one's job in factory, mill, or collective farm field, outstanding scientists, engineers, doctors, pedagogues and women active in civic affairs.

As the writer of this introductory article points out, the bare enumeration of the names of the best of the Soviet intelligentsia shows what powerful creative forces the Soviet Government and the Communist Party have called forth in the country. The Soviet system, with its genuine people's democracy, its Socialist democracy, has proved fertile soil for the development of the talents of Soviet women.

This first issue consists of sixty pages, 12 × 10 inches, and is profusely illustrated. We congratulate the editors and publishers upon an excellent production. We shall look forward to subsequent issues.

An appeal has been launched for funds for the upkeep of the Keats-Shelley Memorial in Rome.

The memorial comprises both the house in the Piazza di Spagna in which Keats died in 1821, and the graves of Keats and Shelley in the Protestant cemetery.

KEATS-SHELLEY
MEMORIAL
IN ROME

Founded in 1903 by Anglo-American co-operation, the memorial commemorates not only Keats and Shelley, but Byron and Leigh Hunt as well.

In the house, together with an important collection of manuscripts, pictures and relics, there is a library of 10,000 volumes. During the war the chief treasures were removed for safety to Monte Cassino, where the monks concealed them from a German division, sent to plunder the Abbey, until the archivist succeeded in smuggling them back to Rome in the car of one of Goering's staff officers. Meanwhile in Rome itself, Signora Cacciatore had managed to preserve the house so that on the liberation of the city it could be re-opened.

Within a year some 15,000 visitors, among them men from all ranks of the British, Dominion, and Allied forces, had been through it. The house and the collections have thus survived

There has been some correspondence in the papers, notably in *The Times*, as to the endowment of a "Dickens Shrine," where all obtainable relics should be collected, and it has been declared by one writer that the absence of such a shrine lays us open to a charge of national neglect of an author loved throughout the world, who may be described as a very great Englishman.

The first proposal was the house in Doughty Street.

The other plea is for Gadshill, which was the house of Dickens' dreams, when he was nine years old—a very queer small boy. He died there and wrote his last lines there.

While he lived Dickens said he should like his name to be more and more associated with Gadshill.

Much of the house is unchanged and the study is exactly as it was when Dickens died.

The following is a list of the public afternoon lectures (the forty-sixth series) which are arranged for delivery in the lecture-hall of the Library during the current session, 1947-48, at 3 p.m. in the afternoon :

RYLANDS
PUBLIC
LECTURES

Wednesday, 8th October, 1947. "Shakespeare's 'Julius Cæsar.'" By H. B. Charlton, M.A., D. de D., Litt.D., Professor of English Language and Literature in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 12th November, 1947. "The Zu-bird in Ancient Mesopotamian Art and Literature." By T. Fish, Ph.D. (Camb.), Reader in Assyriology in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 10th December, 1947. "The Chinese Philosopher Mo Ti." By H. H. Rowley, M.A., D.D., F.B.A., Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 14th January, 1948. "Menander: Plays of Satire and Intrigue." By T. B. L. Webster, M.A., F.S.A., Hulme Professor of Greek in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 11th February, 1948. "St. Paul's Letter to the Romans—and Others." By T. W. Manson, M.A., D.Litt.,

D.D., F.B.A., Rylands Professor of Biblical Criticism and Exegesis in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 10th March, 1948. "The Relations between Psychology and Sociology." By T. H. Pear, M.A., B.Sc., Professor of Psychology in the University of Manchester.

Wednesday, 14th April, 1948. "King John and the Papal Interdict." By C. R. Cheney, M.A. (Oxon.), Professor of Medieval History in the University of Manchester.

The following is a list of recent publications, consisting of articles which have appeared in preceding issues of the BULLETIN :—

- "Patric Cumin, 1823-1890." By W. H. G. Armytage, Lecturer in Education in the University of Sheffield. 8vo, pp. 7. Price one shilling net. RECENT
RYLANDS
LIBRARY
PUBLICA-
TIONS
- "François Villon : a Note on his Manuscripts." By E. F. Chaney, M.A. 8vo, pp. 17. Price two shillings net.
- "Geoffrey of Monmouth's Use of the Bible in the 'Historia Regum Britanniae'." By J. Hammer, Ph.D. 8vo, pp. 21. Price eighteenpence net.
- "The Life of Jesus : a Survey of the Available Material. (5) The Fourth Gospel." By T. W. Manson, D.Litt., D.D., F.B.A. 8vo, pp. 20. Price eighteenpence net.
- "Deux étapes de l'Utopisme humaniste : le Château du Décaméron et l'Abbaye de Thélème." By P. Renucci, Chargé de Cours de Langue et Littérature Italiennes à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg. 8vo, pp. 19. Price eighteenpence net.
- "The Charter Room in the John Rylands Library." By F. Taylor, M.A., Ph.D. 8vo, pp. 17. Price eighteenpence net.
- "Ecclesiastical, Monastic and Local Seals (12th-17th cent.) from the Hatton Wood MSS. in the John Rylands Library." By F. Taylor, M.A., Ph.D. 8vo, pp. 26. Price eighteenpence net.
- "Menander : Plays of Social Criticism." By T. B. L. Webster, M.A., F.S.A. 8vo, pp. 56. Price half-a-crown net.

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SHAKESPEARE'S *OTHELLO*.¹

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UNDER the spell of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, of its people and of its poetry, the audience is impressed with the inevitability of Hamlet's end. As an imaginative apprehension, it incorporates itself with the whole stock of our cumulative awarenesses of life. It becomes a spiritual part of the hoarded body of our experience which impels the mind to seek some sign of shape and meaning in the mystery of mortality. The impressive and inescapable weight which imagination gives to the personal pain and to the world's loss in Hamlet's destruction increases the obstinacy of man's questionings of his fate. But perhaps the intellectual acquiescence which is part of our imaginative response to the play does not necessarily justify subsequent intellectual conviction. Or may be, if only to find consolation for our own lot, we must look for hints to mitigate the tragic sense of mortal existence. As the individual he is, and in his own particular phenomenal world, Hamlet is inevitably doomed. But is his doom demanded by the inevitable nature of things? May it not be the outcome of qualities and circumstances which are accidental and adventitious rather than of the essence of life itself? If it be not, is it yet essential to the human hope that man must push his moral imperatives till they reach to the uttermost zenith of human ideals? From another point of view, is the pressure of external circumstance exerted on Hamlet by his external world a factitious or a controllable force, or has it the authority of necessity? We are thrown back on the primary problem. What, indeed, are the essential elements of human

¹ The substance of a lecture delivered in the Rylands Library on the 10th October, 1945 and later, as one of the Clark Lectures at Cambridge. As it is included with other material in a volume, *Shakespearean Tragedy*, now being made at the Cambridge University Press, permission to print it here is due to the kindness of the Syndics of that press.

nature? Is man so fixed in spiritual form that he has always been and always must be exposed to the hazard of the tragic power within and without his own nature? Has such tragic liability an absolute universality? Or in the course of man's history, through the force of race, of tradition, of religion and of surrounding circumstance, has mankind assumed from time and place their needless accessory attributes? If he has, are they peculiar to time and place, or indispensable to his inherent nature? Does history warrant a hope that in some such way as this the absolute grip of tragedy may slacken its ruthless strangulation of human happiness? Is the tragic universe, indeed, an artificial structure of man's disordered dreams, an embodied and articulated fear, and not in fact a dispensation eternally invested with the compulsion of necessity? These are the thoughts which hurtle in the brain when *Hamlet* has become a living part of its content.

The next story which laid hold of Shakespeare's imagination, *Othello's*, brought questionings of this kind into the focus of his imaginative exploration. No doubt the story seized his attention at the outset by the vivid depth and breadth of its immediate human interest. But as his imagination warmed to the re-creation of the figures who enacted its incidents, he found himself confronting an imaginative universe in which forces dormant or inactive in *Hamlet* are the operative agents of its tragedy.

Othello is the only one of the four great tragedies which is built on a contemporary novel, contemporary, that is, in the fullest sense, not only put into circulation contemporaneously in the way in which Belleforest gave the *Hamlet* story its currency, but a tale told by a contemporary of Shakespeare's and made up of incidents from their contemporary world. It was a tale which had been told in his *Hecatommithi*¹ by the sixteenth-century Italian, Cinthio, novelist, critic, and dramatist himself,

¹ No Elizabethan translation of Cinthio's story is known. The original Italian was published in 1565 as the seventh story of the third *deca* of *La Prima Parte de gli Hecatommithi* di M. Giovanbattista Giraldi Cinthio (appresso Lionard Torrentino), pp. 571-586. A French translation, by Gabriel Chappuys, appeared in *Premier Volume des Cent Excellentes Nouvelles de M. Jean Baptiste Giraldy Cynthien*, Paris, 1584, pp. 323-333. This French version is very scarce. It follows the original with a literal fidelity rare in such translations. Its closeness

whose doctrine and practice inaugurated a determinative movement in the making of Renaissance tragedy. Cinthio urged his contemporaries to seek their dramatic material, not in ancient traditional myth, but in stories steeped in contemporary sentiment and orientated by contemporary outlook, such, for instance, as their modern love-stories were. Although Cinthio himself dramatised some of his own novels, he did not turn his *Othello* into a play. Yet as a story, it satisfied all the conditions he required in dramatic material. It was a love-story such as might have happened in his own day, and it told of such responsive passions and other motives for behaviour in its people as would strike its readers with the immediate effect of naturalness. It handled a particular problem of immediate contemporary interest, the situation created by the marriage of a man and a woman who are widely different in race, in tradition and in customary way of life. Though Shakespeare probably picked the story up because of the rich promise in it of passionate dramatic interest, his imaginative insight, once excited, pierced beneath the plot and its superficial circumstance to explore whatever essential dramatic substance might lie beneath. His genius sought to discover how far the composite stuff of the story shaped itself into a coherent human world. In the process, his imagination converts Cinthio's melodrama into tragedy.

The first impulse to the process is an instigation from Cinthio himself: for Cinthio made his Desdemona formulate a kind of moral to the whole tale. Lamenting the sudden change in Othello's attitude towards her, she unburdens herself to Emilia, telling her that she fears that her example will be cited to posterity for a warning not to marry a man whose nature, race, upbringing, beliefs and mode of life are so different from one's own. Desdemona's words in Cinthio are not quite so amply explicit as that; but what he makes her say seems to require

is such that it proffers not the slightest clue as to whether Shakespeare had the tale from the Italian or the French. The effective words in the passage from Cinthio cited in the text below (p. 31) occur as follows: 'i'ay grâde peur que ie ne donne exemple aux ieunes filles, de ne marier, contre la volonté de leurs parens, & que les femmes Italiennes n'apprennent de moy, de ne s'accompagner d'homme, que la Nature, le Ciel, & la maniere de vivre rend differens de nous' (p. 329v).

such amplification in a modern English context: 'io non sò, che mi dica io del Moro, egli solea essere verso me tutto amore, hora, da non sò che pochi giorni in quà, è divenuto un'altro; e temo molto di non essere io quella, che dia essemplio alle giovani di non maritarsi contra il voler de suoi; e che de me le Donne Italiane imparino, di non si accompagnare con huomo, cui la Natura, e il Cielo, e il modo della vita disgiunge da noi' ¹—'not to marry a man divided from us by Nature, Heaven and mode of life'.

This hint of Cinthio's is seized by Shakespeare and becomes a main motive in the thematic structure of *Othello*. Brabantio is completely mystified by his daughter's choice: "for nature so preposterously to err"

' . . . in spite of nature,
Of years, of country, credit, everything—
To fall in love with what she fear'd to look on!
It is a judgement maim'd and most imperfect
That will confess perfection so could err
Against all rules of nature'. ²

Iago has the sensualist's explanation of it, and the sensualist's sardonic expectation of the outcome of a union between two such complete opposites as are an erring barbarian and a supersubtle Venetian. Only one result is possible; it conforms so obviously to general truth that the putting of it as a truism will suffice to convince Othello that his wife must be false to him:

' . . . as, —to be bold with you—
Not to affect many proposed matches
Of her own clime, complexion, and degree,
Whereto we see in all things nature tends—
Foh! one may smell in such a will most rank,
Foul disproportion, thought unnatural'. ³

Shakespeare continues throughout to give far greater prominence to the motive than did Cinthio. In Cinthio, indeed, it is little more than a moral attached to his novel, and not really an operative agent in it; it is a circumstance taken for granted rather than a sequence exhibited as cause and effect. He seldom recurs to it or to its incidental implications. On one occasion only he mentions that Othello is black: he lets his Iago explain to

¹ *Hecatommithi*, p. 480.

² *Othello* I, iii, 96.

³ *Ibid.*, III, iii, 228.

Othello that perhaps Desdemona is pleading for Cassio's restoration because, finding now that her husband's blackness is loathsome to her, she seeks consolation in Cassio.¹ Only one further detail relevant to this racial nature is made explicit in the Italian version: Desdemona tells her husband that, like all Moors, he is of such hot nature that mere trifles stir him to anger and to thoughts of vengeance: 'ma voi Mori sete di natura tanto caldi, ch'ogni poco di cosa vi move ad ira, & a vendetta'.²

Such simple suggestions grew vastly in Shakespeare's imaginative re-creation of the story. Othello is the heir of a race and of a culture alien altogether from the society and the civilisation of Venice. To the refined social habits and the civil institutions of the Italian world he is a complete alien, an extravagant and wheeling stranger of here and everywhere. Its curled darlings, its manners of obsequious and ceremonial bondage, the elaborate graces of its social discourse, those soft parts of conversation which chamberers have, all these are foreign and unfamiliar to Othello. Its simpler amenities and its customary household comforts are luxuries which he has only come to know in the last nine moons since his military occupation brought him to Venice. Before that, and he is now somewhat declined into the vale of years, the young effects in him defunct, his boyhood and his adult life had been lived in the unhoused free condition of the soldier, in the tented field, a flinty and steel couch for his softest bed, inured to all circumstance else that pertains to feats of broil and battle. In his own distant homeland, he had fetched his life and being from men of royal siege, but his royal inheritance was the simple valour of those who have won leadership of men in an altogether more primitive cultural society, men of a

¹ 'per lo piacere, ch'ella si piglia con lui, qual'hora egli in casa vostra viene, come colei, a cui già e venuta à noia questa vostra nerezza' (p. 577). In the French version, 'pour le plaisir qu'elle a avec luy, quand il va en vostre maison, comme celle, qui est déia ennuyée de vostre taint noir' (p. 327). Whenever in the text above the people of Cinthio's story are referred to, they are given the names which Shakespeare gave to them. Cinthio gives only Desdemona a personal name. Othello is simply 'il Moro', and the others have merely occupational labels, e.g. Iago is 'l'alfiero', Cassio 'il capo di squadra', etc.

² Page 576. In the French version (p. 326 obv.) 'mais vous autres Mores estes naturellement tant chauds, que la moindre chose du monde vous incite a courroux & vengeance'.

race whose country has always been much nearer to the sun and on whose characters the heat of the sun whereunder they were born has exercised its influence, distilling and sublimating their fluid humours, and marking them off from other men distinctively by the outward signs of their countenance. For Othello is incontestably black, black with the blackness of a negro, not merely tinted with the sun-tan of the Hollywood sheik. 'Black as mine own face', he says himself; 'for that I am black', he repeats; and Brabantio refers in disgust to his 'sooty bosom'. Neither Coleridge nor Lamb could bring themselves to accept a negroid Othello. Coleridge would grant him a sort of indeterminate blackness, but nothing more negroid. Lamb would not even retain the colour, dissolving its momentary pictorial appearance into the poetic hues of Othello's moral brightness. But Othello is in fact negroid—'thick-lips' he is called. Another of Shakespeare's Moors, Aaron, in *Titus Andronicus*, is called by the Roman Titus 'a coal-black Moor';¹ and Aaron himself described a fellow-Moor as a 'thick-lipp'd slave'.²

Distinctive as his countenance is the soul of the man Othello. Feeling life as a thing to be lived rather than as a succession of experiences to be measured philosophically, his sense of values is built on the worth of moral qualities which inspire fitting and effective action, and hardly at all on the abstract compatibility of articles comprised in a metaphysical or a religious creed. He has adopted the Christian faith and holds it with unaffected sincerity. To describe the strength of Desdemona's power over him, Iago says that she, and she alone, might even move him to give up his most precious hopes—

'were it to renounce his baptism,
All seals and symbols of redeemed sin'.³

Implicitly he has accepted its essential dogmas. They are links to bind him in longed-for domestic happiness with the entirely Christian Desdemona. He adopts all Christianity's major articles of belief; for instance, belief in the immortality of the soul. It is the worth of man's eternal soul which makes

¹ *Titus Andronicus*, III, iii, 78.

² *Ibid.*, IV, ii, 175.

³ *Othello*, II, iii, 348.

him different from a dog.¹ In the dread solemnity of his putting Desdemona to death, he will destroy her body, but not her soul :

' I would not kill thy unprepared spirit ;
No, Heaven forbid ! I would not kill thy soul ' .²

But these pronouncements of accepted Christian doctrine spring vitally to his mind only in the stress of agitated feeling, and most often in immediate connection with some crucial action. He holds the threat of everlasting damnation over Iago to compel him to undistorted honesty :

' If thou dost slander her and torture me,
Never pray more . . .
For nothing canst thou to damnation add
Greater than that ' .³

What he chiefly finds in Christian practice is an ethical satisfaction, a pattern and an impulse to moral goodness :

' Are we turn'd Turks, and to ourselves do that
Which heaven hath forbid the Ottomites ?
For Christian shame, put by this barbarous brawl ' .⁴

But, in Othello's simple sincerity, his Christianity is mainly a gracious demeanour and a habit of noble conduct. When his innermost being is stirred to its depths, he breaks out into utterances of a remoter and more mystically articulated religion. First fully resolved on Desdemona's guilt, he pledges himself by sacred vow to the terrible act of condign vengeance : but he does so with gestures and phrases which are dues of a reverence belonging better to dim pagan cults than to any form of Christian worship :

' Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace,
Shall ne'er look back, ne'er ebb to humble love,
Till that a capable and wide revenge
Swallow them up. Now, by yond marble heaven,
In the due reverence of a sacred vow
I here engage my words ' .⁵

and Iago falls easily into the paganism of the ritual :

' Do not rise yet.
Witness, you ever-burning lights above,
You elements that clip us round about . . . '

¹ *Othello*, III, iii, 362.

² *Ibid.*, V, ii, 31.

³ *Ibid.*, III, iii, 368.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, iii, 170.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, iii, 457.

committing himself, as they kneel together, to obey Othello,

'What bloody business ever.'

Even the culminating scene of the tragedy, the deed of Desdemona's death, is wrapped about with a holy atmosphere of solemn sacrifice: but its solemnity is that of some universal rite, in reverence to the chaste stars, and belonging to a religion whose sacraments are not those of a Christian origin. So, too, at the end of the play, in the last moments of Othello's life, in full realisation of the deception which has been so destructively practised on him, and in full consciousness of the enormity of his wrong in slaying his innocent wife, he is agonised by piercing anticipations of his fate in an afterworld wherein the Christian elements are confusedly mixed with cruder old-world dreads; and even so, the deepest torment which is filling his mind is the feeling that from now and for ever he is irrevocably cut off from Desdemona's spiritual presence:

' . . . Where should Othello go ?
Now, how dost thou look now ? O ill-starred wench !
Pale as thy smock ! When we shall meet at compt,
This look of thine will hurl my soul from heaven,
And fiends will snatch at it. Cold, cold, my girl !
Even like thy chastity. O cursed slave !
Whip me, ye devils.
From the possession of this heavenly sight !
Blow me about in winds ! roast me in sulphur !
Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire !
O Desdemona ! Desdemona ! dead !
Oh ! Oh ! Oh !¹

Othello's religion is of a parcel with his whole nature. The elements of moral manhood are simple and unadulterated in him, and they exhibit themselves in their primitive purity and strength. He is 'of a constant, loving, noble nature'.² His response to life is simpler far than that of more civilised man: living has been for him a continuity of passionate experience and not a series of intellectual states. A spontaneous surge of feeling is the vitalising form of his being. As his instinct rouses feeling, he is compelled to express it in deed. But his nature has prompted him equally powerfully to seek self-mastery in the

¹ *Othello*, V, ii, 271.

² *Ibid.*, II, i, 298.

control of his passionate impulse. He has built for himself a simple moral ideal, and has schooled himself to realise its constraints in habitual practice. He has trained himself in settled habits of control which will act as his safer guides by impeding the onset of his blood as it rushes in to rule. For encounters with most of the incidents of life, this hard-won discipline serves him faithfully. At the very outset, a day of unique excitement unexpectedly culminates in distractions of another kind: on his wedding day, summoned at night to an urgent session of the Council, Othello meets in the street the clamour of Brabantio and his armed followers, angrily seeking to lay hold of the black scoundrel who has ruined Brabantio's dutiful daughter. Othello meets him with superbly calm poise and quiet dignity:

'Keep up your bright swords, for the dew will rust them.
Good signior, you shall more command with years
Than with your weapons' ¹ —

an assured calm which he maintains because he knows that he has acquired mastery of his impulses:

'Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it
Without a prompter'.

He has fashioned his moral standard by those conditions of discipline which his military life has taught him to be obligatory.

'Good Michael, look you to the guard tonight:
Let's teach ourselves that honourable stop,
Not to outsport discretion' ²

He has framed himself so that now the fullest happiness is no longer an intense pulsating sensation of vivid feeling, but an all-satisfying supreme emotional contentment:

'O my soul's joy!
If after every tempest come such calms,
May the winds blow till they have waken'd death!
And let the labouring bark climb hills of seas
Olympus-high and duck again as low
As hell's from heaven! If it were now to die,
'Twere now to be most happy; for I fear,
My soul hath her content so absolute
That not another comfort like to this
Succeeds in unknown fate' ³

¹ *Othello*, I, ii, 59.

² *Ibid.*, II, iii, 1.

³ *Ibid.*, II, i, 186.

The spiritual resource of which this moral demeanour is the outward expression is the impulse of his native nobility. He has through life relied hardly at all on the tutelage of intellect. Indeed, whereas his instinct and his nature strengthen themselves in the conflicts of a moral situation, an intellectual dilemma confounds his mind. He has neither faculty nor skill to resolve it. His reason is inadequate for dialectic, and his power of thought is not sufficiently acute to sift the likelihoods of problematic circumstance. He is inexpert in simple intellectual judgment; and the intellectual confusion which such effort induces in him gives further opportunity for his passion to break through its disciplined courses and submerge his whole apprehension. His mind is unequal to his soul. Hence his inevitable predicament :

' . . . no ! to be once in doubt
Is once to be resolved ' .¹

But resolutions taken in such manner are neither guided by reason nor directed by moral nobility ; they are determined and propelled by the sheer might of passion. Iago knows this and builds his evil schemes on it : he knows Othello's nature, and with consummately audacious artistry, dares to rely on a plot so simple that Othello alone of all mankind is the one man certain to be caught by it.

The downfall of Othello as the tragic hero is the core of Shakespeare's tragedy. But he is a tragic figure in a tragic world, a world which is the disastrous meeting point of two cultural and spiritual traditions. The story of the plot is the story of a marriage ; it becomes the tale of a frustrate human effort to link the two worlds together. In the setting divined by Shakespeare's genius as the one most suitable for the dramatic fulfilment of such scenes, the dramatist has at hand a means by which his hero may grow to full tragic stature. To those of his readers and audience who are trying to understand his artistic vision, and are therefore seeking to trace the artistic methods which it devises, the particular problem would seem technically to be this. His tragic hero is Othello, a man formed by nature so simply, and in some things (and those the things of the mind)

¹ *Othello*, III, iii, 179.

so much behind the men of Shakespeare's day, so obviously gullible in his guilelessness, that he is a perfect woodcock for any sort of simple springe. Such a person promises easy satisfaction of the author's and the audience's demand that his death shall be inevitable. But such a dissolution might easily evoke no greater response than 'Oh! the pity of it'! Like Richard II's fate, it might well seem lacking in momentousness. It might achieve no more than the logical universality inherent in the pathos of all weakness; and it might fail to engender the imaginative universality of that tragedy of human nobility which is inherent in the best life that man can contemplate as morally ideal. Moreover, in a human as distinct from a technical sense, Othello's tragedy might create no greater perturbation than a mildly pathetic regret at the rigorous law of nature which condemns to extinction the last relics of an outworn world, the inevitable fate of one who is an alien not only to our customs, our habits, and our shores, but to the very spirit of our time, another lamentable but familiar example of the evolutionary might which destroys the unadapted survivors of the past. The risk of this becomes greater as Shakespeare is seen plainly emphasising those traits in Othello which alienate him from our culture and from our epoch. But the marriage theme gave to Shakespeare's Othello his opportunity to grow to full tragic significance.

Though in the finished play Othello's undoing is still mechanically compelled by the flat logic of measured cause and effect, and though it is still apparent to cold reason that so much blind gullibility as was his must destroy its victim, the quality of Othello's love for Desdemona, and of her's for him, is Shakespeare's occasion for exalting the mechanics of mundane causality into the wider and the more mysterious dispensation of human fate at large. The figure of Othello is exalted as the theme is raised to higher imaginative planes. His gullibility recedes as a positive lack which must perforce make him less significant as a man; it takes on the appearance of an obverse reflection of those qualities which are the native nobility of his soul. So the story which was originally an example of lurid domestic melodrama is made anew to become part of sheer

poetic tragedy. The sublimation is largely done by Shakespeare's handling of the emotional and spiritual relationship which draws the lovers to each other.

Although to a cursory reader, there is little difference in the early part of Cinthio's story and Shakespeare's version of it, the modifications made by the dramatist, even in this preliminary part, are vital. One of them is especially important. There is no account of a wooing scene in Cinthio. In a few lines¹ he tells how a Moor of great merit and courage, happened to meet a marvellously beautiful Venetian girl. They fell in love with each other, she drawn to it not by sensual impulse but by the Moor's virtue, and he by the lady's beauty and by the nobility of her mind. They married forthwith, in spite of her parent's opposition. That is all Cinthio tells us about the preliminaries to the marriage. But, both realistically and poetically, Shakespeare felt the need of more substantial information: for the quality of the bond between them was vital to his imaginative apprehension of the facts. Shakespeare's own account of their wooing is given in the play as a statement offered in formal evidence, and as such it is confirmed by both parties to the compact which came out of it. First of all, Othello, in Desdemona's absence, tells his tale to the court of enquiry. It fills out the hint of Cinthio that their mutual magnetism was spiritual and not corporeal in its origin. But before it is recited, Shakespeare has presented forcibly the explanation which the wide experience of men well-versed in worldly wisdom would inevitably offer of such a union, whether they spoke as men of approved moral habit or as those who cynically were prone to see the beast emerge in most of the actions of men. One must be fair to Brabantio, and must see his fury as fully righteous wrath.

¹ Fù già in Venetia un Moro, molto valoroso, il quale, per essere prò della persona, & per havere dato segno, nelle cose della guerra di gran prudenza, & di vivace ingegno, era molto caro à que signori, i quali nel dar premio à gli atti virtuosi avanzano quante Republiche fur mai. Avenne, che una virtuosa Donna, di maravigliosa bellezza, Disdemona chiamata, tratta non da appetito donnesco, ma della virtù del Moro, s'innamoro di lui & egli, vinto dalla bellezza, & dal nobile pensiero della Donna similmente di lei si accese, & ebbero tanto favorevole amore, che si congiunsero insieme per matrimonio, anchora che i parenti della Donna facessero ciò che poterono, perche ella altro marito si prendesse, che lui' (p. 572).

If the modern earl of Westshire's daughter announced her intention to marry the negro general whom she had met at a Red Cross party, his perturbation would be easily understood: as would his frenzied wrath, if she had cut out the intimation and straightway eloped with the man. It is the situation of Desdemona. A daughter has made a gross revolt: she has abandoned duty, beauty, wit and fortune to fly to the gross clasp of a seemingly lascivious Moor: and even now, now, this very now, as the news of her flight is brought to him, an old black ram is performing the act of his kind with Brabantio's white ewe. Brabantio's astonishment, his incredulity and his wrath are natural responses. It is incredible that his own daughter, 'a maid so tender, fair and happy, so opposite to marriage'¹ that she shyly shunned the company of eligible young men, should have done what will inevitably expose her to general mock by flying to the sooty bosom of a middle-aged and loathsome-seeming negro. To fall in love so is to act in spite of nature, against all rules of nature. Even when, in the light of all the evidence accepted by the Duke, Othello's tale of his courtship is approved as legitimate love-making, the Duke condones the lovers without commending their action. The affair is, in fact, to him a misfortune:

'When remedies are past, the griefs are ended
By seeing the worst, which late on hopes depended.
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone
Is the next way to draw a mischief on'.²

But this indeed is cold comfort for Brabantio, who is still incapable of squaring the incident with any kind of fitness in the nature of things. For him, there is but one reasonable explanation of Desdemona's infatuation. Othello must have practised on her with foul charms by which the property of youth and maidhood is abused. He has enchanted her delicate youth with drugs and minerals, corrupted her by spells and medicines bought of mountebanks, and bound her thus in chains of magic. He has wrought upon her with mixtures potent to induce such vile corruption in the blood. It is plain practice of arts inhibited and out of warrant, rank witchcraft, and sans witchcraft, it

¹ *Othello*, I, ii, 66.

² *Ibid.*, I, iii, 202.

could never have occurred. Brabantio is, of course, speaking in perplexity and bitter sorrow. But, let the world calmly review the facts of the case, and his suggested explanation is very probable and palpable to common-sense thinking. And in fact the spell which struck Othello and Desdemona together was an enchantment. But it was not an operation of black magic with drugs and minerals. These two people, utterly different in race, in age, in appearance, in upbringing, in tradition and in experience, were mysteriously moved to mutual attraction. It is magic : but it is natural magic, the magic of the heart of human beings, the mysterious impulse which is mankind's behaviour in the love of man for woman.

Othello's story of his wooing recreates the scene in which were forged the first links of this spiritual affinity. It reveals the texture of them, and shows how tensile and how penetrating are the hooks they cast, and how unbreakably tight is their bodiless grip. Their substance is the stuff which has been growing gradually in the hitherto unrealised ideals of two human beings who for the first time are discovering a unique world common to both of them, a world realised in their imagination, and in it they recognise their spiritual likeness each to the other. It is a revelation of community in things entirely of the spirit. As Desdemona weaves her entranced sympathy into this imaginative world which the vivid recital of Othello's history has made their mutual meeting-place, a spiritual partnership is struck. They fall in love with each other. The whole thing can be seen in the making in the manner of Othello's retelling of his wooing.

He is cited to give the story as evidence in a formal judicial enquiry. His evidence is an account of what happened in the domestic calm of Brabantio's drawing-room. What had happened there was that Othello, admitted to a normal Venetian milieu of social converse, had been led by outer and inner impulse to recall the course of his adventures ; having no skill in the usual commonplaces of social talk, his own experiences were all on which he could fall back. As he tells the tale to the court, the feelings of the moment, and the recollection of what he remembered feeling as he had told his story to Desdemona and to Brabantio, and the resurgence of the excitement which the

episodes of which he then told once more moved within him, all crowd on each other in natural casualness and recover the creative vitality of the wooing-scene. His narrative reproduces a situation and an atmosphere in which, by imaginative sympathy, unguessed and unlikely spiritual affinities are discovered.

He starts in completely assured calm. 'Her father loved me ; oft invited me '. The father himself had first felt the spell :

' Still questioned me the story of my life
From year to year '.

But as Othello runs over the memory of battles, sieges, fortunes, which have filled his life since its boyhood days, the power of recollected feeling distributes its emphasis over the order and the choice of the things which memory recalls, this or that disastrous chance or moving accident, that hair-breadth escape from just that deadly breach. And the succession of crowded detail remembered suffers an additional diversification from the accompanying associations which had sprung from the intermittent presence of Desdemona at its first recital, as she had flitted eagerly from her domestic duties to resume her place in the magic circle—' Such was the process ' : in that way, their love revealed itself :

' My story being done,
She gave me for my pains a world of sighs :
She swore, in faith, 'twas strange, 'twas passing strange,
'Twas pitiful, 'twas wondrous pitiful ',

the timid innocent Desdemona trying to find the words which in part conceal and in part give way to her agitation as she clutches at phrases permissible both by social propriety and by moral sincerity. Then the half-recoiling and half-welcoming consciousness of her insistent sentiment :

' She wished she had not heard it ',

followed at once by her acceptance of its real import :

' And yet she wished,
That heaven had made her such a man ',

and then the innocent gaucherie with which in accents between the affected shyness of a husband-hunter and the naïve sincerity

of a love-stricken girl, she stammers her sincerity in ambiguous terms :

'She thank'd me,
And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
I should but teach him how to tell my story,
And that would woo her.'

Even Othello's diffident simplicity caught the meaning :

'Upon this hint I spake ;
She loved me for the dangers I had passed,
And I loved her that she did pity them.'

Desdemona adds her own testimony. To obey the irresistible inner call she adopted every resource, and willingly defied all the conventions which impeded her way to happiness : she loved the Moor, and she loved him to live with him.¹

That is how Shakespeare's representation of their wooing runs. He makes a dynamic scene out of a situation which Cinthio had recorded inertly in a line or two. The scene was indispensable to Shakespeare's sense of the tragedy inherent in the ensuing situation, The love of his Othello and of his Desdemona was to become a spiritual union of two noble souls. It was the sort of love which might well become an ever-fixed mark to look on tempests and be never shaken. But its worth at the outset is unknown ; its potential height is unlimited, but like all other human states, it is subject to the circumstance of time. Thus, time becomes a crucial element in Shakespeare's story of Othello ; for it is a story which enacts itself in a world like ours, a world within which temporal circumstance may stifle the fulfilment of spiritual impulse. Our world, the factual world, is subject to time's folly and to its incalculable whimsey ; it may refuse the material circumstance within which an ideal love such as that of Desdemona and Othello could find fulfilment.

So the element of time is the crucial factor in Shakespeare's transformation of Cinthio's melodrama into his Othello's tragedy. With unobtrusive thoroughness, he completely replans Cinthio's calendar, and imposes his own time-scheme on the episodes of the story. In Cinthio's novel, after their marriage Othello and

¹ *Othello*, I, iii *passim*.

Desdemona lived for some measurable period in settled matrimonial happiness at Venice: "vissero insieme di sì concorde volere & in tanta tranquillità, mentre furono in Venetia, che mai tra loro non fù non dirò cosa, ma parola men, che amorevole".¹ In due course, and not by reason of sudden military emergency, Othello was drafted to command the Venetian forces in Cyprus. This distressed him because it looked as if the happy domesticity which he was sharing so delightfully with his wife would be interrupted. But his fear was overcome, for Desdemona lovingly declared that she would eagerly risk the hazards of the voyage to accompany him to his new post. They travelled together on the same ship to Cyprus, the whole battalion, commander, lieutenant, ensign and other ranks embarking in one orderly transport. In this sizeable interval since the marriage, Iago had had time to fall lustfully in love with Desdemona, and to hope that in the oncoming months he might find occasion to gratify his lust; by now, he had begun to watch for suitable time and circumstance for such occasion: 'per la qual cosa si mise ad aspettare, che il tempo, & il luogo gli apprisse la via da entrare à così scelerata impresa'.² It was essential to await a propitious opportunity. He knew that, after settling in Cyprus, Desdemona had grown into the habit of visiting his wife Emilia at their own house, and of taking affectionate interest in their three-year-old daughter. It suggested to him the stealing of her handkerchief. Some days after the theft—'indi ad alquanti giorni'³—Desdemona realised that she had lost her handkerchief. In the meantime Iago was elaborating his plot. After waiting for an opportune occasion, he planted the handkerchief in Cassio's room. In his turn, Cassio, having now fallen into disgrace, was watching for a suitable time at which to see Desdemona in her house and to plead for her assistance. Unfortunately his visit coincided with the unexpected return of Othello, whose suspicions were increased. Othello determined to wait until he saw Iago, and to ask Iago to approach Cassio in order to sound him for information. To make the enquiry look as if it were prompted by a chance encounter, Iago put off asking it until 'one day' he ran into Cassio: 'et al Capo di

¹ *Hecatommiti*, p. 572.² *Ibid.*, p. 575.³ *Ibid.*, p. 578.

squadra parlò un giorno costui'.¹ In due course, Iago's report to Othello led to the next move. One day, after dinner, 'un giorno dopo desinare',² Othello asked Desdemona for the handkerchief. Her reply seemed to confirm his suspicions, whereafter he ruminated night and day to hit on a fitting revenge, 'pensando giorno & notte sopra ciò'.² Nursing such thoughts, Othello had to find all sorts of excuses to explain to Desdemona the new demeanour which he was displaying towards her; for his change had distressed her for some days, 'da non sò che pochi giorni in quà'.³ She took counsel with Emilia, who advised her to adopt a studied habit of affection and sedulously to avoid all cause of suspicion. Whilst she was practising this carefulness, 'in questo mezzo tempo',⁴ Othello was still looking for more conclusive proofs of her guilt. He sought out Iago and asked him to find such evidences. Iago had noticed that Cassio had handed the handkerchief to a needlewoman with whom he was familiar so that she could copy its pattern before he returned it. She did her stitching in the daylight which she secured by sitting up to her window, where, of course, she was in view of passers-by. Hence, and again in due course, Othello could pass the window of the house and see the apparently incriminating piece of muslin. He was entirely convinced by the ocular demonstration. He proceeded forthwith to plot with Iago a scheme of vengeance; together they thought out a plan which required a certain amount of preliminary preparation, and, of course, a further stretch of time between the planning and the execution.

That is how the time-scheme of Cinthio's novel ambles on. As a time-element, it is in no way a prominent feature of the story. The narrative proceeds with no particular demand on the calendar, and certainly with no deliberate compression of the tale into incidents which flare up all together in the events of a day or two. Cinthio's telling tacitly assumes that the things of which it tells happened in normal circumstance over an appropriate stretch of time. There were, for instance, the first months of unclouded happiness in wedlock, and then such lapse

¹ *Hecatommithi*, p. 579.² *Ibid.*, p. 580.³ *Ibid.*, p. 580.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

of time—days, weeks, months—as might suggest itself as a natural span for the incidents which made the plot.

Time is handled far differently in Shakespeare's *Othello*. There, the time-span is not tied to any measurement of the Greenwich mean calendar. But sufficiently positive data of clock-time are put into the play to indicate the scope within which imagination is imposing its own dramatic chronology. The fingers on the dial spin furiously, and sequences of action are geared to fantastic rapidity of motion. The pace is set at once. The voyage to Cyprus occurs on the very day of the wedding, and before its consummation. The tragedy follows in what seems to be but the second day after Cyprus is reached; and in the interval required for the sea-voyage from Venice to Cyprus, Othello and Desdemona had been sailing in different ships. The night and day of the Cyprus scene is an astronomical phenomenon existing only in a stellar universe of the dramatic imagination, the 'double-time' of the Shakespearian commentators.¹ But the persistent strokes by which Shakespeare's genius transmutes natural time into the ideal compass of dramatic moments reveal the circumstances which Shakespeare's insight had grasped as the compelling features of Othello's tragedy.

The cumulative effect of this imaginative handling of the time-lapse is palmary. It gives the sense of inevitability to a story which otherwise, as in Cinthio, must run on only as a striking succession of barely credible and but remotely possible events. It makes the episodes intelligible, deeds of intelligible human beings. In making the characters intelligible, it discovers in them a nobility of soul which Cinthio never looked for in Desdemona and of which he luridly deprived Othello. In thus exalting the moral qualities of his hero and his heroine, Shakespeare transmuted melodramatic accident into a universal idea of tragedy. He revealed the tragic fact within the finer spiritual substance of his imaginative world. Its roots lay neither in extraneous chance, nor even in the terrible malevolence of evil. The handkerchief became but a convenient mode, not an essential instrument. Even Iago serves as no

¹ See especially Granville Barker's superb handling of this in his *Prefaces to Shakespeare* (O.U.P.), vol. iv, *Othello*.

more than a means, not as an indispensable cause of the calamity.

The varied features of this complete sublimation can be more distinctly realised if Cinthio's novel is put in detail side by side with Shakespeare's play, the differences of factual incident noted, and the trend of these differences used as a clue for exploring the unconscious artistic purposes of Shakespeare's genius as it imposed the changes on his material data. Take, for instance, the remaking of the time-scheme. The wooing scene has disclosed the nature and the quality of the links which first bound the lovers together in imaginative and emotional sympathy. They are direct and immediate bonds of the spirit purely ideal in their nature. Each of the lovers is held by the impassioned idea of what the other is intuitively seen to be: it is the conviction of a bodiless affinity of two souls. But souls on earth dwell only within their bodies: and on earth intuitive revelations seek the sustaining corroboration of slower and more mediate cognition. Love of such ideal kind as that of Desdemona and Othello needs time and occasion to habituate itself to temporal and corporeal domesticity. Their love promises full power to irradiate a life-time of human wedlock: but it must have opportunity to learn its way amongst the household furniture and the social institutions in the midst of which all human life has its being. The lovers knew each other's soul in its pure essence; but they were ignorant of the temporal and habitual forms in which the other's soul responded characteristically to the particular circumstances of its material environment. They needed to learn to live together in what they must perforce make their actual world. But time forbade. They never lived together, as Cinthio's had done, in the settled mundanities of a domestic household. They were linked by a spiritual chain immensely strong in essence, but frail in work-a-day substance. The exigencies of the world denied them the home in which the spiritual power of their love could have pervasively informed the whole body of its material appurtenances. Their ideal union was not permitted to domesticate itself into wedlock. And thus, remaining an ideal creation in an ideal realm, being entirely a thing of the mind, it was exposed to the onslaught of intangible

suggestion : even the slightest hint of taint, and far more, the plausible suspicion of infidelity, would blast it entirely. The Desdemona who drew forth the passionate love of Othello was the Desdemona in his mind ; it was in his mind that she was to become an angelic-seeming ogre of putrescent flesh. The cause, the cause itself, on which all human goodness depends, demanded her sacrificial murder. Die she must, and at Othello's hands.

Within such an imaginative universe, clearly the inhabitants have become different beings from those of the same name who lived in the physical and mechanical world of Cinthio's novel. His Othello and Shakespeare's belong to entirely different human kinds. The differentiation need not be pursued in continuous detail, since it comes sufficiently to light in all that pertains to the ultimate situation which Shakespeare makes a scene of solemn sacrifice. Contrast the manner in which it is prepared for and enacted in Cinthio. At the very moment when Cinthio's Othello declares his final conviction of Desdemona's infidelity, he resolves to murder her ; but, in the very same breath, adds that the way of it must be such that no suspicion of his complicity will arise, ' si che à lui non fosse data colpa della sua morte '.¹ Othello pondered night and day on the most effective contrivance. He decides to kill both his wife and Cassio. He plots with Iago to achieve this, in the first place assigning to Iago the slaughter of Cassio. Iago needs a substantial bribe, ' buona quantità di danari ',² for he is afraid of the deed and of Cassio's bravery. In the end, Iago consents, but he bungles the job and only wounds Cassio. Desdemona, however, is the main object of Othello's vengeance. He confers with Iago, whether her murder shall be by dagger or by poison, ' se di veleno, ò di coltello si devea far morir la Donna '.³ Iago advises against both schemes ; they must find one which will not direct suspicion towards them,

¹ *Hecatommithi*, p. 580. In the first edition, there is a possible misprint. It reads : ' si che à lor non fosse ', etc. Of course, Othello may automatically have thought of himself and the associated conspirators he would need—' lor ', therefore. But his French translator took the ' lor ' as a misprint for *lui*—as later Italian editions (which may have been the ones the translator was using) had the phrase : ' de maniere qu'on ne le taxast de leur mort ' (p. 329).

² *Ibid.*, p. 582.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

“ non se ne haurà sospetto alcuno ” ; he has a plan to suggest. Othello's house is an old structure whose roofbeams are faulty. Let Desdemona be battered to death by a stocking filled with sand, then displace a beam and let it seem to have fallen on her head and so have killed her. The plot pleased the Moor ; ‘ *piacque al Moro il crudel consiglio* ’.¹

The whole situation is utterly incongruous with the character of Shakespeare's Othello. The plan is bestial enough, but the manner of its execution drags its perpetrator even deeper into human contempt. Othello watched for a ripe moment for the murder. He secreted Iago one night in a dressing closet opening on the bridal chamber. When Othello and Desdemona were in bed, Iago made some pre-arranged noise in his hiding place. Othello turned to his wife and asked her if she had heard anything. She replied that she had, and Othello commanded her at once to get out of bed and see what was afoot ! ‘ *Hollo sentito disse ella : levati, soggiunse il Moro, & vedi che cosa è* ’—a curious code of conjugal chivalry. As she went to the closet-door, Iago rushed out and struck her with the sandbag. Almost unable to speak, she managed to call to her husband for help ; he then arose from bed, only to tell Desdemona gloatingly that this was proper treatment for a faithless wife. As she lay stunned and prayed mazedly to God, she was struck a second and a third blow until she was dead. At this, the Moor and Iago lifted her corpse onto the bed, smashed its skull, and, dislodging a beam, lowered it down onto the skull. All this carefully accomplished, Othello rushed into the street and called passers by, informing them of the terrible accident which had just occurred and had deprived him of a dear wife. There is nothing in this whole episode which could have been done or said by the Othello who sacrificed his wife with the solemn invocation— ‘ *It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul !* ’,² and who performed the sacrifice with all the dignity of a religious ceremony. The nearest hint that Cinthio's Othello gets to an expression of a sentiment more moral than that of naked vengeance is put in phraseology which belongs rather to the streets than to a temple—

¹ *Hecatomithi*, p. 583.

² *Othello*, V, ii, 1.

'così si trattano quelle che fingendo di amare i loro Mariti, pongono loro le corna in capo'.¹

On such different planes do Shakespeare's Othello and Cinthio's Moor live: and so, appropriately, they come to their equally different manner of death. For Shakespeare's Othello, ' 'tis happiness to die '. He can be nobly spoken of as he nobly was, one that loved not wisely but too well, one who in perplexity

' Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe; one whose subdued eyes
Albeit unused to the melting mood
Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees
Their medicinal gum.' ²

The medicine has purged the soul of its contracted impurity; he dies of his own will no way but this, raining kisses on Desdemona who through his folly can no longer know them his,

' Killing myself, to die upon a kiss '.

He was of great heart: and as he passes, all that's spoke by us is marr'd.

But Cinthio's Moor has rightfully another destiny. Though the crime of murdering his wife is so far undisclosed, he sinks into madness through the lack of her presence. He grows to hate Iago, but is afraid to have him put to death, so strict in its enquiry would be the impartial justice of Venice. But he deprives him of his military commission. Iago thereupon discloses something of the crime to Cassio, and, in the upshot, Othello is cited before Venetian judges on a capital charge. He is put to torture but escapes death by the strength of mind which sustains him against proffering a confession of guilt. He was, however, sentenced to long imprisonment and then to perpetual

¹ *Hecatommithi*, p. 583. There is another phrase in Cinthio which may remotely have suggested some sort of vague principle behind the Moor's thirst for revenge. Even so, however, if a principle at all, it is no more than that of primitive intuition. When Iago has told him that Cassio is life and soul to her—'essendo colui l'anima sua', Othello replies—'Anima sua, eh? Io le trarrò ben io l'anima del corpo che mi terrei non essere huomo, senon togliessi dal mondo questa malvagia' (p. 582).

² *Othello*, V, ii, 347.

exile. In the course of it, he was slain vendetta-wise by relatives of Desdemona.

Iago is thus in the Italian account the primary and the effective cause of all Othello's trouble. He is first heard of as a member of Othello's regiment when it embarked for Cyprus. Othello had in his company an ensign of charming appearance and manner, but in character the wickedest man who ever lived. He was, however, very dear to the Moor, for the latter had failed to see any trace of his wickedness ; in fact, although the ensign had a most craven spirit, he had managed to cover his badness with such proud bearing and confident speech that he seemed noble as a Hector or an Achilles. Though he was himself married, he forgot all ties both to his wife and to Othello and fell violently in love with Desdemona and gave all his energies to devising a plan whereby he might enjoy her : ' voltò tutto il suo pensiero à vedere, se gli poteva venir fatto di godersi di lei '.¹ But he had to be extremely cautious, lest, discovering his purpose, the Moor should kill him. He tried in every indirect way to make Desdemona understand his passion. But her whole thought was on her husband : the ensign could not excite her interest at all, still less inflame her with desire. Hence he concluded that she must be in love with the lieutenant, and his passion changed from love of Desdemona to the most intense hatred of her. He thought of nothing henceforward except to kill the lieutenant, and, if he could not enjoy Desdemona himself, to prevent Othello from happiness with her. Hence the whole plot : to insinuate against her a charge of adultery.

Shakespeare's conception of Iago is more complex : he is not entirely, even not mainly, actuated by the simple motive of sexual desire. There is his resentment at Cassio's preferment, a motive which does not occur in Cinthio. There is also another feature with which Cinthio's novelistic or anecdotal art had no need to be concerned. In a drama, Iago has to enter the community of the human race. To be an embodied self-consciousness, he has to have his own personality ; his separate identity must assert its own autonomy. He can no longer be a merely

¹ *Hecatommithi*, p. 574.

Satanical agent of evil ; he must be an artist in his own evil creations. He must enjoy the human emotions which accompany their making. He must have his own æsthetic gratification in their structure and in their form. When Coleridge spoke of Iago's motiveless malignity, he meant that Iago's evil-doing lacked intelligible causality in any rational response to the circumstantial occasion. But Iago's malignity is propelled from within. He acts as he does to satisfy the cravings of his own person and of his own personality. He tries to fashion circumstance to the form in which it will most completely satisfy his own æsthetic and amoral nature. His motive is artistic and not moral. In one crucial episode, however, Shakespeare appears to be deliberately denying to Iago opportunity for a piece of craftsmanship which Cinthio had allowed to him. It is the handling of the handkerchief. In Shakespeare, Iago's possession of it is in the first instance an outcome of mere chance. Desdemona happens to drop it unwittingly. In the Italian novel, and traces of this original version survive in Shakespeare's *ex-post-facto* assertions that Iago had urged his wife to steal it for him, Iago foresees a purpose for using the handkerchief, and schemes a plan whereby he may acquire it. Desdemona regularly visits his house and caresses his three-year-old daughter. As one day she is doing so, the baby being pressed to her bosom, he filches the handkerchief from the sash wherein she carries it. His later use of it follows a similarly deliberate planning, a planning, too, ever ready to improvise on a chance occurrence, as when he finds that Cassio has loaned it for copying to a needleworker who does her stitching in the full view of passers-by and can therefore be seen in possession of it by Othello. But the part the handkerchief plays in Shakespeare is different. It falls into Iago's hands by mere chance ; Desdemona inadvertently drops it. It just happens to be the particular fact which most effectively serves a purpose which many another casual occurrence might have served in its own way. It is not in itself a first cause. Shakespeare is more concerned with the design of the moral universe than with the material instruments of Iago's technical craftsmanship. His Iago is a consummate master of villainy : but he shows it not so much by subtlety of intrigue as by astuteness in diagnosing the

situation and in daring then to put his whole trust in a device appropriate to that occasion, but to that occasion alone, knowing full well that what will infallibly trap Othello would be ineffective against any other man.

Othello's tragedy is Othello's and not the outcome of a chance which made him contemporary with Iago.

THE 'EBED YAHWEH SONGS AND THE SUFFERING MESSIAH IN "DEUTERO-ISAIAH".¹

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I

THE "Suffering Servant" problem always attracts the Old Testament scholar in a singular way, owing to a large extent to its difficulty, but still more to the indisputable rôle that the 'Ebed Yahweh figure and its ideological world played for Jesus and his messianic interpretation of himself and, therefore, also for the growth of the central dogma of Christian belief. For it should not be doubted that our Lord saw himself as the Messiah victorious and exalted by way of suffering, and interpreted his own situation and task in the light of this belief. Thus, from a viewpoint of value, we witness in Him the perfection of the deepest religious line of thought and belief that offers at the same time a background of imposing age: *the chief prophetic line, the messianic line* bringing home in Him its last and decisive victory in a revolutionary conception of the *suffering* Messiah, in what is probably best described as a combination of the 'Ebed Yahweh figure and the idea of the Son of Man—both of them derived, ultimately, from the old kingship ideology, freed, however, from the earlier national limitation.² Admittedly,

¹ The present paper is a revised translation of an essay in Swedish, published in *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, x, 31-65, 1945. I am much indebted to Professor H. H. Rowley for his kindness in reading and correcting my English manuscript.

² Cf. this with Fischer in *Alttest. Abhandlungen*, viii: 5, pp. 81 ff., 1922; J. Jeremias in *Deutsche Theologie*, ii, 106 ff., 1929; Stauffer in *Zeitschr. für System. Theologie*, viii, 212 ff., 1930-31; Sarachek, *The Doctrine of the Messiah in Medieval Jewish Literature*, p. 15, 1932; Staerk, *Soter*, i, pp. 77 ff., 1933; *ibid.*, ii, pp. 406 ff., 1938; Bonsirven, *Le judaïsme palestinien au temps de Jésus-Christ*, i, pp. 381 ff., 1934; Volz, *Die Eschatologie des jüd. Volkes*, pp. 228 ff., 1934; Arvedson, *Das Mystrium Christi*, p. 125, 1937; Procksch in *Abhandl. der Herder-Ges. und des Herder-Instituts zu Riga*, vi, 3, 146 ff., 1938; Johansson, *Parakletoi*, pp. 113 ff., 301 ff., 1940; Brière-Narbonne, *Le Messie souffrant dans la littérature rabbinique* (not accessible), 1940; Wolff, *Jesaja 53 im Urchristentum*, 1942; Leslie in *N.T. Studies*, ed. Booth, pp. 38 ff., 1942; Burkill in *Expos. Times*, lvi, 11, 305 ff., 1945;

Judaism later on avoids the idea of the suffering Messiah.¹ So much the more important, then, is the quite obvious fact that the conception of the suffering Messiah is to be found *within the Old Testament itself* as it was also no doubt originally existent in certain Jewish circles.²

While on the one hand the apprehension of the significant rôle played in this respect by the 'Ebed Yahweh figure, especially in the form it has been given in Isa. liii, seems to be coming out in recent research, on the other hand, certain religio-historical lines have also been drawn, more or less vaguely, backwards to "the Tammuz god" ever since the days of "pan-Babylonism". It was, however, reserved for the last few years' research to present new material and arrive at new knowledge likely to put the whole problem in a new light. Thus, much comparative material has been put together and placed at our disposal by Witzel in his significant collections and interpretations of Sumero-Accadian Tammuz liturgies.³ Secondly, the

Journet, *Destinées d'Israël*, pp. 70 ff., 1945, and lately, Riesenfeld, *Jésus transfiguré*, pp. 81 ff., 307 ff., 1947. I have pointed to the combination of motifs mentioned above in my (Swedish) work *Gamla Testamentet. En traditionshistorisk inledning*, i, p. 167, 1945. As to my conception of the rôle of messianism in the prophets I refer to the exposition in the same book which is to appear in the near future in an English edition. From a traditio-historical point of view, supplemented by comparative-form-literary, cult-historical, religio-psychological, and other arguments, I reject there the literary-critical removal of the messianic sayings as "secondary", and denote, on the contrary, the messianic line as the chief line in the prophets already in pre-exilic times. Cf. below, p. 67, n. 3.

¹ To a great extent owing to direct opposition to the Christian interpretation, with which cf. also Guillaume in *Theology*, xii, 67, 1926, and Riesenfeld, pp. 81 ff., who *inter al.* points out that the Targum's re-interpretation of Isa. liii into positive messianic categories must be an intentional anti-Christian transposition of an originally contrary conception.

² Thus e.g. the idea of the suffering Messiah still stands out quite clearly in the circle behind I. Enoch. Cf. Johansson, *Parakletoi*, pp. 113 ff., who is wholly right, vs. Sjöberg, *Der Menschensohn im äthiop. Henochbuch*, pp. 116 ff., 1946. Cf. lately also Riesenfeld, pp. 314 ff.

³ Above all his *Tammuz-Liturgien und Verwandtes* (*Analecta Orientalia*, X), 1935. In my dissertation *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East*, pp. 49, etc., 1943, I pointed emphatically to the importance of Witzel's editions. The work along these lines has since been taken up by Widengren (*Religionens värld*, 1945, etc.), and lately by Haldar (*Studies in the Book of Nahum*, 1947, *The Rôle of 'the Desert' in Sumero-Accadian and West-Semitic Religion*, 1947, both in *Uppsala Univ. Årsskrift*).

cultic texts from Ugarit have now definitely proved to us that "the Tammuz god" has played quite as important a rôle in the west-Semitic area in the 'Al'iyān Ba'al figure, the dying and rising god, depicted in the old, well-known categories. Finally, and in close relation to the fact just mentioned, the time seems to have come for placing the 'Ebed Yahweh figure in a special, internally Israelite context thanks to the discovery that the most important 'Ebed Yahweh song in Isa. liii is not so absolutely unique in the Old Testament as has hitherto been asserted, but belongs together with a suite of "royal passion psalms".¹

In principle, there is, however, at the same time a distinct difference between the two kinds of texts. For—in accordance, of course, with the now current cultic interpretation of the Psalter, which, following the experts of late years,² unanimous in the main though varying in details, we may safely denote as the only possible interpretation—in *their original situation* the psalms at issue are to be judged as rituals directly referring to the functioning in the cult of the sacral king. The 'Ebed Yahweh texts must on the contrary be characterized as a *prophetic re-modelling*

¹ Several relevant Ugaritic parallels are to be found in my *Studies*, and will be referred to in the following. Of such " 'Ebed Yahweh psalms " I have pointed especially to Ps. xviii, xxii, xlix, cxvi, etc., and Isa. xxxviii: 9 ff. (*Studies*, p. 176, n. 4). The same conception recurs in Widengren (p. 224), with reference to Ps. lxxxviii and lxxxix. Johnson in his very important paper in *The Labyrinth*, 1935, has shown us the picture of the *Davidic king* as humiliated and suffering in the cult without drawing, however, the line to 'Ebed Yahweh in Isa. liii or Tammuz, whose name is not mentioned. One of the main purposes of my own dissertation was to show that the Tammuz line and the royal cult line are in reality merely two aspects of one and the same thing; they are, ultimately, "identical". Cf. *Studies*, p. 113, etc., and later, concerning Ps. lxxxix, Widengren in *Religion och Bibel*, ii, 68, 1943. Further, the *mythological* line from Tammuz via Ras Shamra's *Krt* to 'Ebed Yahweh has been clearly seen and pointed out by Mowinckel in *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift*, xliii, 24 ff., 1942. Cf. my *Studies*, p. 152, n. 1. Some parallels from Ras Shamra are also given by Hyatt in *JNES* iii, 79 ff., 1944, a paper that did not come into my hands until recently. Hyatt is right, at least partly, in his working out of the motifs behind the 'Ebed figure, especially the Tammuz motif. But he has completely missed the really decisive fact in my opinion, the interpretation of 'Ebed Yahweh in the royal messianic terms, and the identity between "the Tammuz god" and the king (cf. below).

² Represented by names like Mowinckel, Pedersen, Bentzen, Oesterley, Johnson, Dürr.

of a liturgical composition belonging to the Annual Festival.¹ Owing to the indispensable and quite obviously strong Accadian influence upon "Deutero-Isaiah",² especially emergent in the 'Ebed Yahweh sections, one has no right in theory to infer simply from these texts an underlying *Israelite* cultic reality, and to assert that behind them lie "old formulas which show that the Israelite king too has been worshipped as the suffering and dying 'Tammuz'", nor without further notice to call 'Ebed Yahweh "the king", and so on.³ Personally I am anxious to stress that it is by no means my opinion that 'Ebed Yahweh is the king and divine substitute, suffering in the cult. As intimated already, he is *the Messiah depicted in these categories*.⁴

Bentzen's objection that "we have no evidence that 'the suffering of the king' plays any rôle in the Israelite ritual" is nevertheless invalid.⁵ We have such evidence, to wit, in the royal passion psalms just mentioned.⁶ And, thus, it is clear that the idea of the king as suffering in the cult has really played a rôle within Israel's own area, too. Therefore we have the

¹ This literary type of "Deutero-Isaiah" is nowadays commonly observed, as is, too, the connexion with cultic forms of expression as a whole. The ideological bond of union with "the enthronement psalms" was pointed out strongly and very meritoriously by Mowinckel already in his *Psalmestudier*, ii, 195, 229 ff., etc., 1922, and lately in *Det Gamle Testamente*, iii (in Norwegian), 188 f., 1944. The same holds true of Wensinck, Böhl, Bleeker, Dürr, and others.

² Especially from the stylistical point of view emphasized by Kittel, Gressmann, Jeremias, Zimmern, Stummer, and others. Cf., further, below, especially p. 59, n. 3.

³ I refer here to some modes of expression in Widengren who, however, elsewhere puts it in a way that I can accept fully, e.g. "The Lord's Servant, i.e., the saviour figure depicted in the motifs of the king ideology" (*Religion och Bibel*, p. 61), or "pictured as the king who in his person represents the whole people" (*Religionens värld*, p. 224). And thus when it comes to the point, I think Widengren and I are quite agreed in our conception of 'Ebed Yahweh.

⁴ Regarding the connotation of the term Messiah as used here, see below, p. 90, n. 1.

⁵ *Jesaja fortolket* (in Danish), ii, 100, 1943, with the typical addition: "unless one interprets all suffering psalms as royal psalms—which I am not in a position to carry through".

⁶ It is enough with some! As regards Ps. lxxxix, Johnson has already drawn attention to the matter, and after him Widengren in a paper in Swedish in *Svensk Exegetisk Arsbok*, x, 66 ff., 1945, *Konungens vistelse i dödsriket* (*The King's Sojourn in the Underworld*); as regards Ps. cxvi myself in a preliminary way in my *Studies* (p. 210, n. 2), and later in a detailed investigation soon to be published.

only belong to the same culture area and the individual forms as well as the whole underlying "cult pattern" and ideology are closely related, but where also the Israelite notion must have been directly influenced by the Babylonian environment.¹

On the other hand, such a comparative view must of course by no means encroach upon the elaboration of the characteristics of the Old Testament ideological configuration, but on the contrary serve as a medium precisely to this end.

II

Alongside the religio-historical and exegetical problem touched upon above, and in close inner connexion with it, the literary problem too offers itself, in a restricted sense comprising the question of the extent of the 'Ebed Yahweh songs and their relation to the surrounding texts. Of these questions the last is decidedly the most important, carrying us over in fact to a far greater problem of principle: the acceptance or non-acceptance of the literary-critical view and its replacement by a traditio-historical conception and method. To enter upon the whole scope of this problem is here out of the question. However, it seems necessary to bring the two conceptions of the Book of Isaiah into relief against each other.

The representatives of literary criticism—meaning the overwhelming majority of Old Testament scholars—as is well-known divide the book of Isaiah into three main parts, "Proto-Isaiah", chs. i-xxxix, "Deutero-Isaiah", chs. xl-lv, and "Trito-Isaiah",

¹ Though it is a matter of course that the influence is first and foremost a literary one (cf. p. 57, n. 2), we must, however, state a topical influence, too, to wit, that in this way an autochthonic Israelite ideological world, founded in its turn on a cultic background, *has been actualized* through the Babylonian milieu (cf. pp. 79 f.). Thus I cannot by any means accept Nyberg's declaration that it is "quite as absurd psychologically as historically unmotivated" that "Deutero-Isaiah" could be directly influenced by the Accadian milieu. I would judge precisely the opposite and thus rather be inclined to concur with Hyatt in his statement that "Deutero-Isaiah may indeed, have seen some portions of the myth enacted in Babylonian ritual" (*JNES*, iii, 84, 1944). And it is quite as obvious that he himself, as well as his fellow-countrymen, has been influenced by it.

chs. lxi-lxvi,¹ which are placed in pre-exilic, exilic, and post-exilic time respectively. The connexion between the three books is viewed as occasional or non-existent. And to the question why they are put together at all and by tradition ascribed to the prophet Isaiah one has no answer, since a reference to literary redactions is in reality no answer. Within the three parts of the book "primary" and "secondary" material is distinguished and separated off by means of the whole arsenal of literary criticism, not least the form-literary method and its foundation metrics. In accordance with more or less subjective rules and in historicistic interpretations the material is then localized in time and space in a hyper-ingenious way.² Naturally, in this connexion the 'Ebed Yahweh songs, too, are separated from their environment—Duhm was the first here as well as in the separation of "Trito-Isaiah"—in which they are held to be secondarily inserted, wherever they are judged older or, more commonly, younger than their context. This separation line is emphatically represented, e.g. by Mowinckel³ and Volz.⁴ According to Mowinckel's latest opinion the 'Ebed Yahweh songs denote a later correction of "Deutero-Isaiah's" original belief in Cyrus as the Messiah⁵ and come from a special "'Ebed circle"—influences from a more traditio-historical attitude are here active—gathered round the memory of "a Jewish prophet or missionary somewhere in the time after Deutero-Isaiah", but "whose name and closer conditions of life are unknown".⁶

¹ The separating of "Deutero-Isaiah" from "Proto-Isaiah" goes back to Döderlein (1775), that of "Trito-Isaiah" to Duhm (1892). The latter operation is called by Dahl a fatal mistake that has developed into "a mischievous Frankenstein of modern criticism" (*JL*, xlviii, 363, 1929). The unity of the Book of Isaiah is maintained only by fundamentalists like Lias in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, lxxi, 560 ff., 1915; *ibid.*, lxxv, 267 ff., 1918, and Kaminka in *Revue des Études Juives*, lxxx, 42 ff., 1925, etc.

² The absolute extreme of atomizing and logicism is achieved by Caspari in *Beiheft zur ZAW*, lxx, 1934.

³ Thus in *Acta Orientalia*, xvi, 1 ff., 1937, and *Det Gamle Testamente* (in Norwegian), iii, 192 ff., 1944.

⁴ *Jesaja* ii, in *Kommentar zum A.T.*, ix, 2, 1932.

⁵ Concerning the Cyrus problem, cf. (besides the commentaries) Kittel in *ZAW* xiii, 149 ff., 1898, Haller in *Festschrift Gunkel*, i, 261 ff., 1923; Barnes in *JThSt* xxxii, 32 ff., 1931; Simcox in *JAOS*, lvii, 158 ff., 1937. Cf. also p. 68, n. 4.

⁶ *Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 196.

However, there are also, it is true, scholars standing in principle more or less completely on the ground of literary criticism, who rather energetically stress the connexion with the environment. Here belong e.g. Condamin,¹ Dürr,² Torrey,³ Feldmann,⁴ and not least Bentzen in his new (Danish) commentary on Isaiah.⁵ Birkeland, claiming to represent in principle a traditio-historical point of view, emphasizes, it is true, that when viewed from the literary standpoint, the 'Ebed Yahweh songs belong from the very outset to the book of Deutero-Isaiah.⁶ He takes them, however, as tradition material of a specific kind and origin, his idea of their import being rather strange. Originally, they had an individual bearing, he thinks, though later on they became collectively re-interpreted within a smaller circle and at the same time supplemented with the idea of substitutional suffering. In connexion with the expectations actualized—though soon baffled—through the appearance of Cyrus the sayings spread into wider circles, and were interpreted as referring to Israel. This fictitious construction is concluded by Birkeland in the following words: "Wir können dafür dankbar sein, dass die Ebed-Gestalt und seine Worte (falsch) gedeutet wurden; denn sonst wären sie nie das Eigentum einer Gemeinschaft geworden, und wir

¹ *Le livre d'Isaïe*, 1905.

² *Ursprung und Ausbau der isr.-jüd. Heilandserwartung*, 1925.

³ *The Second Isaiah*, 1928.

⁴ *Das Buch Isaias*, ii, 1926, in *Exeget. Handbuch zum A.T.*

⁵ *Jesaja fortolket*, ii, 1943. Bentzen shows already in his *Indledning til det Gamle Testaments*, i-i, 1941, noticeable influences from the traditio-historical view, though he is not aware of the impossibility of combining it with the literary-critical standpoint. In a critical review of Bentzen's commentary in the *Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift*, ix, 142 ff., 1946, Mowinckel has remarkably enough styled it "partly a step backwards", advancing anew his atomistic view of "Deutero-Isaiah" that is said to consist of fifty small pieces between which there exists no connexion, either logical, or topical, so that instead "every one of them can be taken out or moved without the least change in the total impression" (p. 146). I think few scholars of standing would now be willing to consent to this statement. And the claims to "continuity" that Mowinckel raises here, pp. 148 ff. are, too, of such a modern-logicistical nature, that it will turn out very difficult to find any sections at all in the whole prophetic literature of the Old Testament satisfying them.

⁶ *Zum hebräischen Traditionswesen*, pp. 35 ff., 1938.

würden sie nicht überliefert bekommen haben".¹ Such a conception of the tradition motif behind our texts is *a priori* incredible, in itself a testimony of a remaining in the literary critical wishful dream: the layer interpretation.²

Scholars of most recent years tend, however, as indicated above, towards the incontestable factual connexion between the 'Ebed Yahweh songs and the surrounding textual sections from the point of view of language as well as composition and ideology. The very difficulties in the attempts at distinguishing the songs as literary units and the very different results should be sufficient evidence for the fact that they are from the first at home in their environment. This has been clearly seen by the author of the latest and hitherto probably best theological commentary on Isaiah, Kissane.³ Even though it does not result in a unitary interpretation of the 'Ebed Yahweh songs he nevertheless stresses this connexion very energetically and exactly by means of his viewing Isaiah liii in the light of its association with the sequence,⁴ he has rightly seen that we are here concerned precisely with the *Davidic* messianic king, the same Messiah

¹ *Zum hebräischen Traditionswesen*, p. 39.

² Conceivably, Birkeland is influenced by Rudolph (ZAW, xliii, pp. 111 ff., 1925), in his conception referred to here. The opposition between individual and collective, being a seed of dissension and one of the old exegetical bosom sins, the consequences of which are to be traced also in an interpretation like Birkeland's, has no support in the texts themselves, nor in the ideology they express. Their oscillating individual-collective view is fully understood from the royal-ideological interpretation. It is a characteristic manifestation of "the primitive type-thinking", "the corporative view", or whatever it may be called, according to which the king is the corporalizer of the whole people, its representative. This fundamental view gives a large element of truth also to the Jewish interpretation of 'Ebed Yahweh as Israel. At the same time, the messianic interpretation along the royal-ideological lines also explains the typical affinity, not to say "identity", between Yahweh and His Servant, that speaks to us out of the texts themselves. The king, and thus the Messiah, too, represents not only the people before their god, but also the god before his people. It may be added that Hyatt in his paper mentioned above justly reckons with "the idea of corporate personality", following Wheeler Robinson in *Beiheft zur ZAW*, lxvi, 49 ff., 1936, as the first of the motif sources of the Servant idea (pp. 79 ff.). He has overlooked, however, the ultimately decisive point: the special rôle of *the king* in this respect.

³ *The Book of Isaiah*, i-ii, 1941-1943.

⁴ Cf. Mowinckel's attempt in ZAW, xlix, 247, 1931, to show by means of association word arguments that the poem is secondarily inserted at its place. The weakness of the argumentation should be obvious, I think, to every reader.

who plays so important a rôle already in Amos, Hosea, and "Proto-Isaiah", and whose way to triumph and glorification thus goes through substitutionary suffering¹—all this the more remarkable as Kissane has no idea of the royal ideological line, nor any contact with recent religio-historical research in this area.²

My own conception of the traditio-historical problem of the book of Isaiah, implying *inter alia*, the denial of the mechanical tripartition of the "book" through literary criticism, has been laid down briefly in the Swedish paper underlying this one. It recurs in a detailed way in part II of my work "The Old Testament. A Traditio-historical Introduction" which in the near future will appear in an English edition. Owing to limitations of space I do not repeat my treatment here, but content myself with the following remarks of direct importance to our subject.

¹ Kissane, ii, 174 ff. In my above-mentioned book, *Gamla Testamentet*, I have myself energetically advanced a unitary messianic interpretation of 'Ebed Yahweh, in accordance with my conception of the real rôle of messianism in the history of Israelite religion. It may be noted that Bentzen still maintains the explanation of 'Ebed Yahweh as the prophet himself.

² This deficiency is the reason why Kissane has not reached a uniform conception of all the 'Ebed Yahweh songs, the first and second of which he interprets—though somewhat hesitatingly—as referring to Israel, the third to the prophet himself, and the fourth to the suffering Messiah. It was not until after the translation of this paper that I learned of Burrows' very stimulating essay in his *The Gospel of the Infancy* (Bellarmine Series, vi, 59 ff.). Burrows has many good observations in details, and above all he is right in emphasizing the intimate and conclusive connexion between 'Ebed Yahweh and the Davidic House. The Servant is to him "the House of David, the messianic house in the past, present or future as the case may be" (p. 60). He assigns these parts of the Servant thus, that in the first and second songs 'Ebed Yahweh is "either the house of David or the future ideal king", resolving, ultimately, upon the latter possibility, whereas the suffering 'Ebed of the third and fourth songs is the Davidic king during the exile, i.e. Jehoiachin (p. 67). This partition is unnecessary and impossible, however, the interpretation involving an historicistical presumption that is, as a matter of fact, noted as impossible by Burrows himself (pp. 69 ff.), in that neither the description of the Servant's suffering, nor his factual death tallies with what is historically known of King Jehoiachin. (Cf. II Kings, xxv, 27 ff., Jer. lii, 31 ff. As is well-known, Sellin once emphatically identified 'Ebed Yahweh with Jehoiachin.) None the less, Burrows has come nearer to the truth than most other scholars. But a wholly unitary conception of the Servant figure is, of course, the most preferable, and such an explanation is made possible thanks to the royal pattern interpretation, and to it alone.

"Deutero-Isaiah" is a prophetic collection of traditions of the type I have called *liturgy* taking the word in a strict form-literary sense, so that the question of its possible directly cultic connexion is left open, a question that has to be decided by means of other criteria. I have already intimated that "Deutero-Isaiah" is not a cult liturgy, but a prophetic imitation thereof. The "Deutero-Isaian" collection is organically related to "Proto-Isaiah" in so far as behind it stands a traditionist circle—possibly also an individual poet—with direct personal and topical connecting lines to the latter. The boundary line stands, however, conceivably already at ch. xxxv which is typically "Deutero-Isaian".¹ Our tradition collection has its own distinctive character in comparison with the rest of the material in Isaiah, not least owing to its strictly consistent composition, given by its very nature of an imitation of an actual Annual Festival liturgy. Of this unity the 'Ebed Yahweh songs, too, form integral and indispensable items. Thus it must be denoted as fundamentally erroneous to treat these songs without regard to the rest of the text, or still more, to treat one of them not considering the others. As for me, I join Kissane wholly in

¹ Thus first Olmstead, 1915 (see *AJS*, liii, 251 f., 1936-1937), then Köhler, Mowinckel, Torrey, and lately, Scott (*AJS*, lii, 178 f., 1935-1936). Chapter xxxiv, too, may possibly be counted in with "Deutero-Isaiah", since it has a great deal in common with xxxv, as has been pointed out from various points of view and with different solutions of the problem, e.g. by Duhm and Torrey (cf. lately *JBL*, lvii, 109 ff., 1938). See also Kissane, *Isaiah*, i, 380 ff., and Birkeland, pp. 33 ff. To the literary-critics the fact is a heavy stumbling-block, while from a traditio-historical viewpoint by no means surprising. Chapters xxxvi-xxxix form a special tradition complex the core of which is "the psalm of Hezekiah" in xxxviii: 9-20. This complex is of course not, as assumed by the literary critics, secondarily taken over from II Kings, xviii: 1 ff., re-modelled and increased by various "redactions", additions, etc. (thus e.g. lately Mowinckel in his *Det Gamle Testamente*, iii, 177 f.), but "Proto-Isaian" tradition material, typically enough handed down in the (or a) "Deutero-Isaian" traditionist circle, a variant tradition of II Kings, xviii: 1 ff. It is therefore fundamentally erroneous to raise the question of priority as between the two. If one asks on the other hand for the reason why the complex is found precisely here in "Deutero-Isaiah", the answer is near at hand in my opinion. The reason is the formal, and above all, the topical connexion between the royal passion psalm in xxxviii, 9-20 and the 'Ebed Yahweh songs. According to the common traditio-historical manner of proceeding the whole tradition complex was hereby taken over, not only the relevant passion psalm.

the following judgment: “The context is the guide to the interpretation, and disregard of the context leads to chaos”.¹ The comments of a topical and linguistic character to be given in the following have intentionally this exegetical main principle in sight, as far as the restricted space allows.

III

Already the first ‘Ebed Yahweh song, xlii: 1 ff., tallies very well with the definitely liturgic-formal context spoken of above and manifest in a characteristic way already in xl: 1 ff. with its “liturgic voices”, its “glad tidings” (xl: 9) of the divine epiphany (הנה אלהיכם, v, 9c),² its epithetical hypostatization so typical for the messianic style, and its shepherd metaphor. The organic connexion with the environment is also emphatically pointed out by Bentzen.³ Topically it is in the first place represented by מבשר in xli: 27, xlii: 1, constituting precisely the content of the “glad tidings” promised therein. It also opens with הן, “lo”, typically introducing an epiphany. Otherwise xlii: 1 ff. formally looks most like an oracular assertion in which the royal qualifications of the Servant are

¹ *Isaiah*, ii, p. lxviii.

² It may deserve noting that the adversative clause in xl: 8 ודבר אלהינו יקום לעולם shows that there was evidently a previous prophecy of weal to link up with.

³ Pages 29 f. (vs. Mowinckel). In an original but wholly subjective re-interpretation of “Deutero-Isaiah” in Pauline categories, Volz makes him an eschatological theologian and preacher, the founder of the synagogue and the mission. Rejecting lii: 13 ff., as an ‘Ebed Yahweh song because of its missing mission motif he reckons instead xlii: 5-9 as a distinct song, probably as a concession to the traditional number of four. In a similar way the ‘Ebed Yahweh figure in Isa. liii is separated from that of the other songs also by Staerk in *ZAW*, xlv, 252 ff. 1926. Cf. with this Rudolph in *ZAW*, xlv, 159 ff., 1928. In my opinion it is false method even to deal with a single song without paying regard to the others. (Thus vs. Nyberg, too.) The fact that the Servant’s death is mentioned in Isa. liii was the reason why Mowinckel gave up his former interpretation of ‘Ebed Yahweh as “Deutero-Isaiah” himself. He was reproached with this desertion of his colours by Sellin who solves the problem by assuming that Isa. liii is composed by “Trito-Isaiah” on the event of “Deutero-Isaiah’s” suffering martyrdom (*ZAW*, lv, 179 ff., 185, 1937).

accumulated¹: he is upheld, chosen, beloved, possessing the spirit; he also has his own תורה or משפט,² his royal judicial function, the discharging and extending of which is his special task. What is said here in v: 1 is an ideological shaping of the cultic reality given in Ps. ii: 7, בְּנִי אַתָּה אֲנִי הַיּוֹם יִלְדֶּנִּיךָ, "my son art thou; I have brought thee forth to-day". In v. 5 we meet with the so-called *auto-louange* style, well-known from Accadian texts. In v. 6 the call motif recurs, and v. 7, "to open blind eyes, to bring the captive out of the prison, out of the captivity place those sitting in the dark", offers a typical royal messianic ideology, almost wearisomely repeated in Accadian royal hymns.³ In vv. 8 f. the self-predicatory style recurs again, and vv. 10-12 give the hymnic conclusion in elaborate "enthronement psalm" style. This said, it is also said that

¹ Mowinckel asserts that the Servant is thought of here "as a prophet, not as a king" (*Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 195—from the erroneous starting-point that the idea of the suffering Messiah is not met with in Judaism but is "notionally a self-contradiction"), thus putting these two categories in opposition to each other. This is, however, not justified, as the king himself is, ideologically and in principle, "the primeval prophet". On the other hand, Mowinckel himself points out that the stylistic form is the typically royal one (pp. 210 f., etc.). The assertion is of course founded upon a *petitio principii*, to wit, that 'Ebed Yahweh is an individual historic prophet. Then it remains, however, to show that the forms are disintegrated. The royal-messianic interpretation, on the contrary, takes the form of expression verbally for what it is. As regards the kingship ideology alluded to here, and related questions, I have to refer the reader to my book, *Studies in Divine Kingship*.

² Cf. with this Begrich, *Studien zu Deuteronesaja* (*Beiträge zur Wiss. vom A. und N.T.*, iv. 25, 1938), pp. 161 ff.; also Burrows, *The Gospel of the Infancy*, pp. 65 ff. (משפט, "the right of the Messianic House of David, as in Ezekiel", n. 2, p. 66). With the king's epithet "Chosen", cf. my *Studies*, pp. 76 ff., especially n. 1, p. 77, with reference to Ps. xxii: 10, lxxi: 6, cxxxii: 11, Isa. xlv: 2, 24, xlix: 1. The idea is there traced back to a pre-Israelite, Canaanite royal ideology (cf. p. 94, n. 1), and it is also stated that the 'Ebed Yahweh ideology is originally "obviously nothing but king ideology".

³ In the light of this evidence, Mowinckel's conclusion appears an unwarranted historicism that "Deutero-Isaiah" cannot possibly have lived among the exiled because "dazu sind seine Vorstellungen von den in 'Löchern' und 'Gefängnissen' schmachtenden Gefangenen viel zu ungeschichtlich, vgl. auch 52.11, 47.9". (*ZAW*, xlix, 244, n. 1, 1931). With בְּרִיתָ לָם in xlii: 6 cf. Pedersen, *Den semitiske Ed*, p. 46, 1912, and, still better, with a reference to the rôle of sacral kingship (the king as *vōmos ἑμψυχος*) Östborn, *Tōrā in the Old Testament*, p. 77, 1945.

every drawing of a boundary line at v. 4 or 7 is completely mistaken.

The passage xlii : 13 ff., then, is directly joined to the preceding. Vv. 18ff. strongly remind one of an ‘Ebed Yahweh song, both stylistically and ideologically, the Servant here as so often in “Deutero-Isaiah” being Israel. It may be possible to understand the blindness, too, as a royal ideological item.¹ Further, xliii : 1 ff. offer another royal protection oracle. In v. 4 אדם may conveniently be taken in the meaning of “Man”, “Grand man”, i.e. the king, as Sumerian LU.GAL., Accadian *amēlu*. The collecting of the dispersed, vv. 5 ff., is one of the commonest royal-messianic motifs met with in numerous Accadian royal texts, though in the Old Testament almost historically interpreted as referring to the exile. Again, xliv : 1 ff. is still another protection oracle in the usual royal ideological style, here with strong features of “Tammuz ideology” especially in v. 3 where, typically enough, are to be found parallel to each other pouring of water and pouring of the spirit. In conjunction therewith should be viewed the occurrence of the name Jeshurun in v. 2. It is a “poetic” synonym of Israel clearly related precisely to “the Tammuz ideology”.²

Upon the introductory *auto-louange* style in xlv : 24 ff. follows then in xlv : 1 ff. the first direct Cyrus prophecy³ in

¹ As to Egypt, cf. Wainwright, *The Sky-Religion in Egypt*, pp. 76 f., 1938.

² From the same stem as אֲשֶׁרָה; see Naor in *ZAW*, xlix, 317 ff., 1931; Danell, *Studies in the Name Israel in the O.T.*, pp. 22 ff., 1946; Engnell in *Symbolae Biblicae Upsalienses*, vii, 19 f., 1946. It is worth observing that in v. 5 יַעֲקֹב and יִשְׂרָאֵל stand in the old meaning of divine names, synonymous with Yahweh (cf. e.g. Ps. xxiv : 6). One might feel tempted, on account of the sphere in which we undeniably find ourselves here, hypothetically to reckon with an auditory mistake or, may be, a conscious censoring of an original וְשִׁמְחוּ בְּבֶן-חֲצִיר, “and one rejoices over ‘the Son of verdure’” (“Tammuz”). But this is, of course, a mere suggestion.

³ In a sharp and just settling of accounts with Torrey’s impossible interpolation hypothesis Mowinckel points out (*ZAW* xlix, 100, n. 2; cf. *Acta Or.*, xvi, 3 f.) that *the attachment of the sayings according to the association word principle is a proof of their authenticity*. Of course, he is right in this statement. Then we may ask, however, why this is not valid also for the prophetic literature in its entirety, *where the positive, messianic sayings alternate with the prophecies of doom according to precisely the same association word principle?* But in this case we are always referred to a secondary scheme, ascribed by Mowinckel to the

which Cyrus, a foreign ruler, is called משיח, "Messiah", "the Anointed" (cf. also Dan. ix : 25). From this fact one should not, however, jump to conclusions concerning "universalism" in "Deutero-Isaiah". Thus in v. 4a the words למען עבדי יעקב וישראל בחירי, "because of my Servant Jacob and Israel my Chosen", must of course not be taken as a "gloss".¹ On the contrary, these words are most emphatically stressed. True, the mode of thinking in "Deutero-Isaiah" is all through very strongly *monotheistically* tendentious. Contemporaneously it is, however, strictly nationalistically limited²—a fact commonly rather unwillingly admitted by scholars.³ Together with the shepherd title in xlv : 28 and the anointing recur the standing royal ideological items of seizing by the hand and calling by name. In v. 6 the self-predicatory style starts anew. The "satiric theogony" (Volz) in xlvi : 1 ff. is evidence among countless others of the direct Babylonian background of "Deutero-Isaiah". Because here the drama of the Accadian Annual Festival (*akītu*) is clearly presupposed in which Bel-Marduk and Nabū, the High god and his son, "the young god", "the saviour god", were the two most prominent "acting" gods.⁴

redactors or "disciples". (I deal *inter al.* with this problem in a paper in *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, xii, pp. 110 ff., 1947, on *Prophecy and Tradition*.)

¹ Thus e.g. Volz, p. 59.

² Cf. in the following vv, 14b, 24b.

³ Cf. against this Pedersen's plain words in *Israel*, i, 527, n. 324 : 1. The latest treatments on the problem of "universalism" in "Deutero-Isaiah" are those by Blank in *HUCA*, xv, 1 ff., 1940, and Morgenstern in *JBL*, lxii, 269 ff., 1943.

⁴ Cf. with this section Winckler in *Altorientalische Forschungen*, 3 : 2, 212 ff., 1902. In reality Cyrus restored the cult of Marduk that had been neglected during the reign of Nabonidus for that of Sin. — "The eagle from the East, the Man of my counsel", refers, according to a common view, to Cyrus. The eagle is the "royal" bird *par préférence* in the Ancient Near East, a standing inter-medium in the ideological arsenal of divine kingship. In xlviii : 14b, too, most scholars think that "the Beloved of Yahweh" means Cyrus. (According to the Targum it refers to Abraham.) The epithet "Beloved" of the god, too, belongs to the standing requisites of the Near Eastern kingship ideology. The Hebrew יהוה אהבו is an asyndetous relative clause (cf. Nyberg in *Studien zum Hoseabuche*, pp. 33 f., 1935).

IV

Ch. xlix : 1-13, the second 'Ebed Yahweh song, forms an integral part of the tradition complex xlix : 1—lii : 12,¹ the motifs of which are the task of the Servant and the salvation of Zion. V. 1 refers in usual, typically royal categories to the Servant's election from his mother's womb and the mentioning of his name. The words in v. 2, "and he made my mouth like a sharp sword", do not in the first place allude to the prophetic art of speaking as Volz and others think, but to the royal pronouncing of judgments. We have to do here with very old conceptions bound up with sacral kingship, well-known also from the Old Testament. We need only think of Isa. xi : 4 : "But he judgeth the poor with 'righteousness', and reproveth with 'equity' for the meek of the land; and he smiteth the wicked to the earth with the rod of his mouth, slaying him with the breath of his lips".² It might deserve noting that in a "Tammuz hymn" it is said of Marduk who also as a "vegetation deity" corpor-alizes the universe : *aqrabu shapatshu mushēltu lishānushu*, "a scorpion is his lip, a grindstone his tongue".³ Other items of kingship ideology too are mirrored in v. 2 as well as in vv. 3 ff., e.g. the term Servant,⁴ the expression "my God", the gathering of the dispersed. Of the utmost importance is the close connexion between v. 7 and lii : 15 ff. Evidently the sphere of ideas is here wholly identical. Vv. 8 ff. constitute the hymnic

¹ The song is usually restricted to vv. 1-6, thus e.g. Duhm, Buhl, Gressmann, Köhler, Mowinkel. The opinions differ, however, considerably, and the connexion with vv. 7 ff. is justly stressed by Sellin, Fischer, Rudolph, and Bentzen (cf. below).

² צדק and מישור, "Righteousness" and "Equity" are the two constantly recurring hypostatized royal attributes, factually analogous to the Accadian tutelary deities *ketu* and *māsharu*, so often met with in royal texts. — רשע is the object to both halves of the verse; ארץ is the adverbial accusative form.

³ The text is dealt with in Ebeling, *Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Babylonier*, pp. 28 ff., 1931.

⁴ "Servant" is originally a royal cultic title. See provisionally, e.g. W. R. Smith, *Lectures on the Rel. of the Semites*, p. 69, 1927³; Cook in *CAH*, iii, 490 f.; Vincent, *La religion des Judéo-Araméens d'Éléphantine*, p. 428, 1937; Jean in *Mélanges Syriens*, ii, 705, 1939; Torrey in *BASOR*, lxxix, 27 f., 1940; Engnell, *Studies in Divine Kingship*, p. 152, n. 1, and lately, also Burrows, *The Gospel of the Infancy*, pp. 64 f.

concluding part, and must of course not be separated from the preceding.¹ It culminates in the exhortation to eulogizing in v. 13 (cf. xlii : 10 ff.). Extremely contested is the word **ישראל** in v. 3. Its *textual* authenticity has lately been defended by Birkeland,² whose above-mentioned reinterpretation hypothesis forces him, however, to declare it *topically* "secondary". According to Mowinckel it is "no doubt a gloss".³ The presumed support in favour of this opinion is the fact that the word is missing in some Septuagint codices and in the Massoretic MS. Kennicott 96. The former fact is, however, a rather worthless criterion, for, judging from all evidence, the LXX is tendentious on this point. And in what concerns MS. Kennicott 96 Bewer has shown its very restricted value as a text witness in a special investigation of it, obviously not observed by Mowinckel.⁴ Moreover, the word is *metri causa* defended already by Praetorius.⁵

V

The typically "Proto-Isaian" word in vv. 1 ff. is followed by the third 'Ebed Yahweh song in 1 : 4-11. It is nowadays usually judged of as an individual lamentation psalm, e.g. by Begrich and Mowinckel, whereas Volz is hesitating, typically enough, because of the missing missionary motif.⁶ The poem has like the preceding 'Ebed Yahweh songs its tenor wholly given through the style of the royal categories, though with a far stronger and more typical stress upon "the Tammuz ideology" than before. It may be best rubricated as a *royal psalm of confidence* (of course still in imitation of the original cultic

¹ Of late justly emphasized by Bentzen, pp. 83 f., as against Mowinckel and others. Bentzen also points to the connexion with xlix : 14 ff.

² *Zum. hebr. Traditionswesen*, p. 36.

³ *Det Gamle Testamente*, iii, 233. Bentzen argues, logicistically, that the word is a gloss (p. 80).

⁴ In *Jewish Studies (Kohut Memorial Vol.)*, pp. 86 ff., 1935.

⁵ In *ZAW*, xxxvi, 9 f., 1916. Cf. too, Torrey, *The Second Isaiah*, p. 381. The problem of **ישראל** in xlix : 3 is dealt with lately also by Burrows, pp. 62 ff.

⁶ Page 160. On the question of "Deutero-Isaiah's" attitude towards "the missionary problem", see Rowley, *The Missionary Message of the O.T.*, pp. 46 ff., 1944.

pattern) in parallelism with the Accadian so-called innocence psalms.¹ Already אָדָנִי in v. 4 gives an intimation of the royal categories.² In vv. 4-5 we meet with the Servant as diviner which tallies with the fact that the king was in principle the only oracle receiver, the divination often taking place in the morning after a foregoing night of incubation. V. 6 offers elaborate “Tammuz ideology” such as we know it both from Babylonia and Ras Shamra,³ in its suffering aspect, whereas it has nothing to do, not even as a metaphor, with “the thrashing given at school”.⁴ V. 7 brings the confidence and silence motifs (for the latter, see below), vv. 8-9 the characteristic “lawsuit motif”⁵ (cf. liii : 8 ff.), and the enemy aspect. In vv. 10-11b *‘Ebed-the king is still the speaking subject in the typical royal third person style.* The factual description of disaster in v. 10b is also typical of the royal suffering ideology in its special infernal aspect⁶ such as

¹ See on this point my *Studies*, pp. 45 ff., etc., and *Gamla Testamentet*, i, pp. 58 ff.

² Aboriginally it is the king alone who calls the god “my God”, with the first personal suffix. Torrey has seen something of this (p. 391). Cf. also Johnson in *The Labyrinth*, pp. 77 f., etc.—לְמוֹדִים in v. 4 has no doubt a special meaning, cf. ii Sam. i : 18 (Torrey takes it as an abstract, p. 391). The primary notion of the stem is “to stick, sting”, which would tempt one to connect it with xlix : 2 (see above). Judging from the context, it probably refers to divination. יַעִיר בִּבְקֹר and the following בִּבְקֹר is not dittography, but expresses distributive iteration : “morning after morning”. In v. 5 we should better read שָׁמַע, an “emphatic” or “precative” perfect. (Cf. my *Studies*, Special Note, No. 16, pp. 207 ff., *Gamla Testamentet*, i, pp. 20 ff. Pedersen has declared himself wholly in agreement with my psychological view of the tense problem, a fact that means a great deal to me. I shall revert to the problem in not too remote a future. It is out of the question that a doctrinaire formalistic view, e.g. Bauer’s, should satisfy, let who may defend it.)

³ See my *Studies*, pp. 35 f., etc., and cf. here especially Ps. cxxix : 3. Cf. also below, pp. 79 f.

⁴ Thus Bentzen, *Jesaja*, ii, p. 88.

⁵ The rôle of the king in the Annual Festival drama is often viewed as a lawsuit in which he appears accused, as the one who is responsible, not only for his own, but also for the sin of the whole people. After a confession the king atones for the guilt by way of various symbolic ritual acts, to which ideologically correspond his “suffering”, “death”, and “resurrection”. This “lawsuit motif” recurs in a standing phraseology, especially in many psalms of lamentation.

⁶ Cf. with this Graham-May in *Culture and Conscience*, pp. 131 ff., 1936 ; Robertson in *AJSL*, xlix, 316 ff., 1933 ; Staples in *lv*, 54, 1938, and Engnell, *Studies*, Topical Index, s.v. “Passion”, etc.

it is to be found in "the passion psalms" and related texts (cf. e.g. Isa. viii : 20 ff.). 'Ebed is still the subject, the English (as well as the Swedish) version thus giving a false translation with its "he that walketh in darkness . . . let *him* trust in . . ." whereas the right one should be : "Whosoever of you feareth Yahweh should listen to the voice of His Servant, who walketh in darkness having no light, but trusteth in the name of Yahweh and stayeth upon his God". V. 11c finally, is Yahweh's oracle promise, confirming the curse imprecated upon the enemies in 11a-b.¹

Owing to space limitations it is impossible for me to enter upon the section li : 1-lii : 12 though it offers several facts of utmost interest, e.g. concerning the idea of God (יהוה-צדק, li : 1), the highly effective unity of liturgical structure, the connexion with the 'Ebed Yahweh songs, the disintegrated cup motif of li : 17 ff.,² the great significance of lii : 1-10 for the enthronization rites with their "glad tidings" and "turning of the destiny" (מבשר, מלך אלהיך, בשוב יהוה ציון) (lii : 7 ff.), etc.³ May I only be permitted to point out one thing with regard to the introductory words in lii : 1, עורי עורי, etc. ? According to Mowinckel these words are "in keeping with the exhortation words (spell-words) used by the thaumaturges at their miraculous healings, revivifications, and the like".⁴ This

¹ Bentzen judges of the whole vv. 10-11 as such a closing oracle (pp. 87 f.). Otherwise these verses are almost exclusively taken by literary critical scholars as a "gloss" or a "redactory addition", thus e.g. by Duhm, Volz, and Mowinckel. The latter's motivation is "the vague style" of the verses, Yahweh being spoken of partly in the third person, partly "without transition" in the first person. By this he overlooks the typical and stylistical effect just pointed to above. The authenticity of the verses is on the other side defended by Kissane (pp. 146 f.). Bentzen points to the bonds of unity with the foregoing context, as well as with the rest of the 'Ebed Yahweh songs (pp. 87 f.). Cf. too, Van der Flier, *Jesaja*, ii (in *Tekst en uitleg*, 1926) who rightly stresses that "Dit derde lied geeft een soort voorspel op het vierde (vergl. vs. 4 en 53 : 1 en vs. 9 met 52 : 13) en herinnert tevens aan de twee voorafgaande (42 : 1-7 en 49 : 1-6)" (p. 107).

² Cf. with this my *Studies*, Special Note No. 18, p. 210; also Witzel in *Analecta Or.*, x, 220 : 14 f., 1935, etc.

³ I deal with the section rather closely in my book *Gamla Testamentet*, ii. As regards "the pronouncing of the glad tidings" and its cultic background, cf., lately, Haldar in his *Associations of Cult Prophets*, pp. 128 f., 1945.

⁴ *Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 243.

statement can hardly aim at any dependence on such spells, we may suppose, since texts of this kind are non-existent so far as is known before the fifth century. But imperatives of this sort spoken to Tammuz in connexion with his resurrection are known. Thus, e.g. is cited in a liturgy¹ "the word at which the hero is resurrected", to wit, the formula (Accadian): *tibi rikab, tibi rikab, bēlum tibi rikab*, "Get up, rise, get up, rise, oh Lord get up, rise!"² To this kind of text we should turn, of course, in order to get light thrown upon corresponding phrases in the Old Testament. However, to call them "spell-words" seems to me less appropriate.

VI

Ch. lii : 13-liii : 12, *the fourth 'Ebed Yahweh song* may without any exaggeration be called the most important text of the Old Testament, as it is probably the one most often dealt with.³ Here the 'Ebed Yahweh ideology culminates, the suffering aspect being developed to its apex. The latter feature is easily overdone owing to the usual overlooking of the organic bond of union between our text and its environment. But the fact

¹ Text in Witzel, pp. 133 ff.

² Pages 140 : 4, 20 f. In another liturgy we find the (Sumerian) formula : *shesh-mu ki-na-zu zig-ga*, "My brother, rise from thy couch!" (312 : 21 f.).

³ One agrees willingly with Torrey in the following statement : "This is a composition which no thoughtful student of history can read without a feeling of awe. It is the most wonderful bit of religious poetry in all literature" (*The Second Isaiah*, p. 409). Personally, I should like to add—even at the risk of being misunderstood—that in my opinion the scholarly task is not, however, in the first place to deal in detail, and in a more or less psychological manner, with the religious experience behind the text, as it is ultimately as such beyond description, though open none the less to everyone in possession of a religious sensorium. Of the most important and latest special literature on the subject may be mentioned : Gressmann, *Ursprung*, pp. 301 (321) ff., 1905 ; Sellin, *Die isr.-jüd. Heilandserwartung*, pp. 54 ff., 1909 ; Volz in *Festschrift Budde (Beiheft zur ZAW, xxxiv)*, 1920 ; Bleeker, *Over inhoud en oorsprong van Israëls heilserwachting*, 1921 (not accessible) ; J. M. P. Smith in *Journal of Rel.*, iii, 132 ff., 1923 ; Jahnow in *Beiheft zur ZAW, xxxvi*, 256 ff., 1923 ; Dürr, *Ursprung und Ausbau*, pp. 125 ff., 1925 (important !) ; Rudolph in *ZAW, xliii*, 90 ff., 1925 ; Guillaume in *Theology*, xii, 2 ff., 63 ff., 1926 ; Waterman in *JBL*, lvi, 27 ff., 1937 ; Pedersen, *Israel (Its Life and Culture)*, ii (iii-iv), 603 ff., 1940 ; Nyberg in *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, vii, 5 ff., 1942 ; Engnell, *ib.*, x, 32 ff., 1945. (Cf. also p. 92, n. 4, below.)

must not be overshadowed that 'Ebed Yahweh is here, too, above all the Messiah *victorious and triumphant* through his vicarious suffering (*vs.* Volz, Sellin, Nyberg, and others).

The treatment in what follows is in principle based wholly upon the Massoretic text.¹ The linguistic difficulties are great, but by no means insuperable. They are for the most part inherent in the text from the very outset, owing to the "mysterious" nature of the subject-matter itself.² The tense problem is of the utmost importance. Kissane justly says of the perfects in liii: 1 ff. that they refer to past time "only from the *ideal* standpoint of the servant's contemporaries" and that it is "surprising that some critics have been led astray by the use of the past tenses in liii: 1-8b into the view that the prophet is describing a historical figure of the past", especially as the introduction and ending of the poem make it quite evident that it is a question of future time.³ We are justified in stating that this fact in its turn is due to a false appreciation of the real import and use of the perfect in Hebrew poetic and cultic texts.⁴

When viewed from a form-literary standpoint the fourth 'Ebed Yahweh song is judged of in various ways. By Gressmann, Rudolph, and others it is taken as preponderantly of the nature of a penitential psalm.⁵ To Begrich it looks most like an in-

¹ On the very relative value of the versions, and their most remarkable re-interpretations, see the following fundamental works: Driver-Neubauer, *The Fifty-third Ch. of Is. acc. to the Jewish Interpreters*, i-ii, 1876-1877; Dalman, *Der leidende und der sterbende Messias der Synagoge*, 1888 ff.; Euler in *Beiträge zur Wiss. vom A. und N.T.*, iv, 14, 1934; Ziegler in *Alttestamentliche Abhandl.*, xii, 3, 1934; Seidelin in *ZNW*, xxxv, 194 ff., 1936; Nyberg, pp. 7 ff., and lately Fischel in *HUCA*, xviii, 53 ff., 1944. The value of the Septuagint has been justly judged of already by Ottley; see his *Isaiah acc. to the Septuagint*, p. viii, 1909. Cf. also Ziegler, p. 211 f.

² A fact pointed out also by Nyberg, p. 6. Cf. too, my *Gamla Testamentet*, i, 77 f.

³ Pp. 175, 178. Obviously, Kissane follows Feldmann, *Der Knecht Gottes in Isaías Cap. 40-55*, pp. 178 ff., 1907, and Fischer in *Alttest. Abhandl.*, viii, 5, pp. 58 ff., 1922. Cf. also the following admission by Mowinkel: "It is in itself possible that the whole poem is meant as a future description, that the Servant from the point of view of the writer belongs wholly to the future" (*Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 247). Cf. further Torrey, p. 410, and Volz, p. 174.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 71, n. 2.

⁵ *ZAW*, xxxiv, 296, 1914; xliii, 92, 1925.

dividual psalm of thanksgiving.¹ In Jahnow's strange opinion the song belongs to the *qīnā*, the dirge category, differing from it, however, in being wholly non-cultic.² Yet it is not a profane dirge either—a *contradictio in adjecto*, by the way—because it has been sung long after the death of the person in question! But in spite of all it belongs together with the dirge, Jahnow opines, to wit, because of its motif, its topic.³ Thus, in reality, the form-literary viewpoint is abandoned. According to Mowinckel, Isa. liii is “in its form a dirge with tunes from the penitential psalms, framed in by a promise; according to its content it is a ‘kerygma’, a ‘message’.”⁴ Bentzen, too, seems to hold this opinion.⁵ Judging from the change of speaking subjects the song is, conceivably, a *liturgy*,⁶ though, owing to its peculiarity as regards both motif and situation, it cannot be ranked with any of Gunkel's usual categories.

In lii: 13-15 we have the introduction, in the form of a promising oracle in which Yahweh assures the Servant of his exaltation. Owing already to this oracular character of the saying it is out of the question that הִנֵּה could be conditional.⁷ It is, no doubt, the common interjectional “lo” so often introducing oracles.⁸

However, the first great problem is offered by the term שָׂכִיל, translated “shall deal wisely” in R.V.⁹ In my opinion, the close analysis by Nyberg does not catch the decisive meaning of the word in our context any more than do preceding

¹ Studien zu Deuterjesaja (Beiträge zur Wiss. vom A. und N.T., iv. 25, pp. 55 ff., 1938.

² Cf. the quotation from Gressmann below, p. 87, n. 1.

³ Das hebr. Leichenlied, pp. 261 ff.

⁴ Det Gamle Testamente, iii, p. 247.

⁵ Jesaja, ii, p. 109.

⁶ As above taken in a purely form-literary meaning.

⁷ Vs. Nyberg, pp. 45 f.

⁸ Cf. xlii: 1 (הֵן עֹבֵדִי etc.).

⁹ Margin rendering: “prosper”. The Septuagint has σπνήσει, “will become wise”; the Syriac version ܫܠܡܐ, “will deal wisely”; and the Targum יִשְׁלַח, “will prosper”, or more probably, “will be exalted”, “will rule”, or the like. Torrey's rather strange opinion may be mentioned. According to him יִשְׁכִּיל is not a verb, but a *nomen proprium*, “the wise”, a poetic periphrasis of Israel! (*The Second Isaiah*, p. 415.)

investigations.¹ The connexion of the verb with the nomen מִשְׁכִּיל (e.g. in Ps. xxxii : 1) seems quite obvious. It may be true that the most common connotation of the verbal stem in the *wisdom literature* and related texts is "insight" in different nuances ; nevertheless, it is incontestable that it has another special meaning : it refers in one way or another to the category of "enthronization psalms", as is to be seen from passages like II Chron. xxx : 22, Am. v : 13,² and a series of Psalms, e.g. xxxii, xlv, and lxxviii³ to which may be added the two royal "Tammuz psalms" lxxxviii and lxxxix,⁴ both of which are called מִשְׁכִּיל. Other instances indicate a meaning of royal ruling, exercising of power with justice and righteousness, e.g. Jer. x : 21, xxiii : 5,⁵

¹ Pp. 41 ff. By a very intricate reasoning Nyberg comes to the passive-negative and somewhat surprising import of "take in chastisement" (Swedish : "undfa tuktan").

² Cf. Sellin, *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch*, i, pp. 239 f., 1929, who lays down that we are here concerned with the recital of an enthronement psalm, rendering לִכְן הַמִּשְׁכִּיל בַּעַת הַהִיא יְדוּם כִּי עַת רָעָה הִיא, "Darum verstummt der Hymnus in jener Zeit, denn es ist eine Unheilszeit" (p. 240, with reference to Ps. xlvii : 8 and xxx : 13). Cf., however, Isa. xli : 20, xl : 18, though here in quite another context.

³ Though commonly judged of as a "wisdom psalm" Ps. xxxii is a royal penitential psalm with "positive confession". It is impossible in detail to prove this statement here ; observe, however, especially v. 8. One might also ask oneself whether the combination of אֲשַׁכִּיל in v. 8 and רַבִּים in v. 10 is purely accidental. Ps. xlv is one of the most typical royal psalms in the Psalter, at home in the wedding ritual of the Annual Festival. As is well-known the king is here even titled אֱלֹהִים, "god", in v. 7. Ps. lxxviii is a cult-prophetic liturgy at "the covenant-renewal-festival" (Mowinckel), i.e. the Annual Festival. The way it closes in vv. 67 ff. shows a culmination in the kingdom of David, who in v. 70 is called 'Ebed (Yahweh).

⁴ On Ps. lxxxix see above, p. 56, n. 1. Ps. lxxxviii has been characterized already by Gaster in *Religions*, ix, 16, 1934, in a comparison with the Ras Shamra text, *II AB*. Cf. too, my *Studies*, p. 118, where I have referred to the parallel in Isa. liii : 7 and pointed to the occurrence of the substitute idea in *II AB*, viii : 15 ff., the lamb being the substitute for 'Al'iyān Ba'al-the king. The psalm is dealt with more recently by Widengren in a paper (in Swedish) in *Svensk Exegetisk Arsbok*, x, 66 ff., 1945, from the point of view of the royal *descensus ad inferos*. This motif is met with also in Ras Shamra, e.g. in *I* AB*, vi : 11 ff. (see *Studies*, pp. 119 ff.), and *II D*, vi : 43 ff. (*ibid.*, pp. 138 f.).

⁵ In Jer. x : 21 we meet with a reference to "the Shepherds" exercising of the royal saviour power (in the ideology there, recurs "the dispersion", too) ; and in xxiii : 5 the Davidic Messiah (צִמְחָה) to come, imparts the same authority. It is worth observing that the Targum of the passages cited, as well as of I Sam., xviii : 14 and Ps. ii : 10 has the same verb צָלַח, used here in Isa. lii : 13, too. Cf. p. 75, n. 9.

Ps. ii : 10,¹ and xxxvi : 4.² Finally, in the remarkable passage Dan. xii : 3, the word is topically combined with the resurrection. For **הַמְשְׁכִּילִים** are here among those who are going to rise from the dead, and the term is used synonymously with **מַצְדִּיקֵי הָרַבִּים**, “they that turn many to righteousness”. The latter connotation is close to hand in Isa. lii : 13 too, on which the Daniel passage is possibly directly dependent. In any case, the meaning of the word in most of the passages cited lies within the sphere of the royal functions to which also the aspect of suffering belongs (as in Isa. lii : 13, Ps. lxxxviii, lxxxix).³ Thus we have the right to assume that the contested **יִשְׁכִּיל** in our text means either “to execute a **מְשָׁכִיל**”, i.e. an Annual Festival psalm, or “take the throne, the power in (re)possession” or the like, to wit, after the passion and the resurrection. Judging from the parallels in the second half of the verse, **יָרוּם וְנִשָּׂא וְגִבָּה מְאֹד** (cf. Isa. vi : 1) the latter seems to be decidedly preferable.

As to the term **עַבְדִּי**, “my Servant”, the reader is referred to what is said above of xlix : 2. In v. 14 **רַבִּים**, “many”, recurring in lii : 15, liii : 11, 12a, c,⁴ is, as rightly pointed out by Volz,⁵ a technical term characteristic of the satisfaction doctrine.

To the expression “that his visage was so marred from that of man, and his shape from that of the sons of men”⁶ a long

¹ Another of the Psalter’s most typical royal psalms. Observe v. 11 : **עַבְדְּךָ**, “Serve (Yahweh) . . .”

² Also a royal psalm, to wit, a royal “protection psalm”; see, provisionally, Birkeland, *Die Feinde des Individuums in der israelitischen Psalmenliteratur*, pp. 140 f., 1933. Observe the rubric : **לְעַבְדֵי יְהוָה לְדָוִד**. In other cases **הַשְׁכִּיל** simply means “to rule”; thus sometimes even in Prov., e.g. xvi : 23, xxi : 12.

³ In my *Studies* I have pointed to the double inherent aspect applied to the messianic character : the life-victory-resurrection aspect and that of humiliation-suffering-death, the latter of them especially expressive in “the ‘Ebed Yahweh psalms” (p. 170, n. 4 ; p. 176, n. 4). The same two aspects appear in Ras Shamra, too, owing to “the identity” between “Tammuz” and the king. Cf. not least a passage like *III D*, i : 33b ff. (parallel to 22b ff.), with its typical royal treatment of ‘Aqhat who is struck on the pate, on the ear, whose blood is spilt as at a slaughter, etc. (pp. 139 f.). Cf. further the parallels quoted in the following.

⁴ Cf. Dan. xi : 33, xii : 3, Mark. x : 45, Rom. v : 19.

⁵ *Jesaia*, ii, p. 173, 1932.

⁶ Or, rather : “Sons of *Man*”, since **מִבְּנֵי אָדָם**, enhancing the foregoing **אִישׁ**, may possibly allude to this specially royal connotation of the expression as a technical term, the primeval royal-messianic title **בֶּן-אָדָם** “Son of Man”, the otherwise beautiful and gallant hero, now totally inverted during his time of suffering.

series of parallels is offered by the Sumero-Accadian Tammuz liturgies. Tammuz is here called "the bowed",¹ "the maltreated" (440 : 18 f.), "the distorted" (434 : 12 f.), "the one robbed of his figure's soundness" (438 : 11). That is why it is also said of Tammuz in a formulary way during the time of "humiliation": "who knows thy figure?" (Sumerian : *mu-lu ta-zu mu-un-zu*, Accadian : *kattuk mannu ilammad* ; 134 : 1, 308 : 1 ff.).² Further, the following parallels may deserve being quoted in order to illustrate the suffering of Tammuz in comparison with the Servant's "catalogue of suffering" in our text. Tammuz is called the one "stricken with suffering" (436 : Rs. 2), "survived by pain" (66 : 355), "smitten by agony" (92 : Vs. II, 7, 242 : 3, etc.), "visited with violent agony" (146 : Vs. I, 5 f.), "man of lamentation" (Sumerian : *mu-lu akkil-a*, 238 : 10, etc., cf. 66 : 358, 78 : 9), "man of tears" (*mu-lu ir-ri*, 48 : 71 f., etc.), "the bewailed, the lamented" (440 : 24 f.), "the feeble, the annihilated" (396 : text Nies-Keiser 26 : 11), "the bowed hero, beloved of heart" (64 : 352), etc. It is said of him that he "was seized by suffering . . . broken as a reed,"³ smitten . . . (440 : 1 ff., 11), he is "doomed to destruction, struck by an evil generation" (344 : 32), he is called "the shepherd thrown to the ground" (428 : Vs. 14 ff., cf. 286 : Rs. 7 f., etc.), "the imprisoned, the slain" (90 : 6 ff., 108 : III, 13, etc.), "the one washed over with blood" (398 : II, 25), whose "face is stained with blood" (438 : 10). At the same time Tammuz is said to be seized and carried away to the underworld (Accad. : *aralu*, often called *edinnu*, "the steppe"),

¹ Witzel, *Analecta Or.*, x, 64 : 352, 1935. To this work the numbers refer in the following.

² It must, however, be noted, that the same formula is used also of Tammuz "glorified" (e.g. 176 : 41 f., 204 : 35 f., 216 : 11), and that it alternates, seemingly, with "not seeing his interior" (Accadian : *qerebshu la atē*, 268 : 1, etc.), i.e. penetrate his heart, his will and intention, etc.

³ It looks very probable that by analogy קנה רצון לא ישבור ופשתה in Isa. xlii : 3a has a passive import with the Servant as the subject, as is also supported by v. 4a. It is the Servant who is "the smouldering wick that shall not be quenched", etc. This has been justly seen by Burrows, p. 65, who has also pointed to the נר דוד in I Kings, xi : 36, etc., "the eternal lamp" symbolizing the king. Cf. with this Oesterley in *Myth and Ritual*, pp. 142 ff., 1933, and Johnson, in *The Labyrinth*, pp. 74, 80 f., 1935.

where he lies imprisoned and sleeping in the dark : Tammuz is “ the steppe man ” (*lu edin-na*, 318 : 6 ff., etc.), “ set upon by the nether world ” (8 : 64 ff.), the one “ carried away to the place of darkness, the imprisoned ” (436 : 8 ff.), “ with fettered hands and feet ” (398 : 14 ff., cf. 30 : 22, etc.), “ lying in the dark ” (432 : 1 ff.), “ who sits in the dark, without being reached by light ” (147 : II, 11), “ laid in the grave alive ” (82 : 24), “ captive in the ‘ house of horror ’ ” (66 : 356), where he “ sleeps an overwhelming sleep ” (184 : Rs. 8, 190 : 8, etc.), but rules contemporaneously as “ lord of death, lord of the shepherd’s residence ” (236 : 15),¹ he who is “ the hero going the way with no return to the bosom of the earth, in the middle of the day to the land of the dead ”.²

These Sumero-Accadian parallels must be considered especially relevant precisely because the Ugaritic texts have now given us definite proof of the rôle played by “ the Tammuz god ” in ancient times, also among the western Semites. Referring to the detailed treatment in my *Studies in Divine Kingship* I content myself here with the following indications. In *I*AB* v : 11 ff. etc., is described the death of ‘Al’iyān Ba‘al and his descending “ into the house of the prison of the earth ”, as well as in vi : 8 ff. where it is said : “ Ba‘lu is fallen to the earth, dead is ‘Al’iyān Ba‘lu, perished Ba‘lu, ‘ the Noble ’ of the Earth ”.³ In the text *BH* ii : 47 ff. we are told that by this he “ puts on the blood of his brethren ”, i.e. that he fulfils his expiatory duty.⁴ In *I*AB* vi : 11 ff. (cf. *I AB Sup.* l. 2 ff.) we also hear of a maltreatment of ‘Al’iyān Ba‘al’s body, evidently rendered symbolically as an earthen figure or the like.⁵ In the Dān’il cycle where the Tammuz god is personified in the shape of ‘Aqhat a description is given in the typical Tammuz style (*III D* i : 33b ff., cf. 22b ff.) of the treatment of ‘Aqhat : he is “ struck on the pate, on the ear, his blood is spilt as at a slaughter ”, etc.⁶ Finally, according to the purely cultic interpretation of the *Krt* cycle, taken by me as a parallel of the series

¹ Cf. in the royal passion psalm in Isa. xxxviii : 9 ff., v. 12 אֶהְיֶה רֹעִי, “ the shepherd’s tent ” !

² Franck, *Kultlieder aus dem Ishtar-Tamūz-Kreis*, p. 67, iv : 1. f., 1939.

³ Cf. my *Studies*, p. 119.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 126 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 120 f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 139 ff.

AB, '*Anat*, and *Dān'il*, we meet with the same idea bound up with *Kārit*, *I Krt* l. 10: "Fallen is 'our Father', broken *Kārit* . . .".¹ It has been pointed out already that the positive aspect is also found: "the resurrection", the exaltation, and the enthronement.²

Keeping these facts in mind, we must acknowledge that every attempt at getting away from "the Tammuz interpretation" of the 'Ebed Yahweh figure, too, is bound to become a failure. The Tammuz interpretation has also recurred from time to time in the history of the 'Ebed Yahweh problem, lately with Irwin³ and Hyatt.⁴ We must add, however, that the whole perspective has become completely changed. We see now that it is not a question of a superficial influence from outside, from Babylonia, but of an idea autochthonic with the western Semites, too, inherently bound up with the sacral kingship pattern in Canaan, and taken over there by Israel. Thus, the adducing of Sumero-Accadian parallels here must not be misunderstood, and by no means put on a level with the working method of the so-called pan-Babylonists (a fatality remarkably enough easily met with by a "patternist"; also from competent scholars, who should know better). The parallels are not even intended to show a direct Accadian influence; they "merely" support, as pointed out once before, a factual internally Israelite world of thoughts with a distinctive cultic background.

We return to our text. *וה* in v. 15 is a real *crux interpretum*, admittedly still unsolved. One might be tempted to suggest that the matter in question is a libation offering.⁵

¹ *Studies*, pp. 149 f. Now that the impossible historicistical interpretation of the *Krt* text is being renewed (De Langhe, Ginsberg), I am glad to say that Pedersen in a paper read at Upsala November 2nd, 1945, proved to have modified in a conspicuous way his conception of this text, which he now calls a cult-text, bound up with the Annual Festival, even though he would still style it a "by-text"; whereas I keep to my opinion that it forms part of the *Krt* version of the Annual Festival text cycles, just mentioned above.

² See above, p. 58, esp. n. 5.

³ In Smith, *The Prophets and their Times*, rev. ed., pp. 232 ff., 1941.

⁴ In *Journal of Bible and Rel.*, x, 75, 1942, with special reference to the Ugarit parallels *I*AB*, ii: 12, 19 f., cf. *II AB*, iv: 44, where 'Al'iyān Ba'al is "the Servant of Mot, i.e. of Death". Also later in *JNES*, iii, 79 ff., 1944.

⁵ Nyberg translates "offer a purification sacrifice", but his conception of the character of the sacrifice is wholly dictated by his leprosy hypothesis.

Sacrifices and libations formed an indispensable condition for the resurrection of Tammuz. He is “ the hungry, the thirsty ”¹ who raises his cry for “ provision ”.² Here, too, the kings play a special rôle though different from that in Isa. lii : 15, as far as they are spoken of as bringing gifts (84 : 20 ff.). Comparing xl : 7 וקמו מלכים יראו, as well as Job xxix : 8, we do better, in spite of all, to take our point of departure in the parallel word שמם in v. 14 and translate “ cause astonishment ” or the like. It may be that the Septuagint’s θαυμάσονται is a guess. Even a guess sometimes strikes home. The arabic etymology خزا, to “ jump ”, often alleged as a support, is a little suspicious.³

עליו יקפצו מלכים פיהם, “ over him kings shut their mouth ”, to wit, dumbfounded because of the Servant’s *exaltation*—for, of course, there is an antithesis between vv. 14 and 15, the latter of which must be interpreted in the positive according to the aim of the oracular presentation,⁴ this interpretation being by no means, in my view, “ too abstract and pale ”,⁵ but entirely evident as is seen from Ps. cvii : 42, Job v : 16, and above all xxix : 9.

With liii : 1 the *corpus* of the song begins which gives the central “ cult word ”, “ the myth ”, the cult myth (Hebrew : שמעה).⁶ The problem of the speaking subject has been solved in different ways owing, of course, to the ‘Ebed interpretation of the scholars respectively. Thus, Gressmann has declared, though on insufficient grounds, “ dass man gar kein Recht hat,

¹ Witzel, 322 : 21 ff.

² 16 : 183 ff., etc. Concerning ‘Al’iyān Ba’lu of Ugarit in the same position, see my *Studies*, p. 112.

³ Peshitto’s ܡܚܒܗ, “ will purify ”, is probably an interpretation on the analogy of liii : 11 f.

⁴ Thus correctly Bentzen, p. 102.

⁵ Vs. Nyberg, p. 47. However, his interpretation is, here too, dictated by the leprosy theory. Cf. Bentzen : “ But 15b and liii : 1 rather give expression to astonishment, so that Nyberg’s interpretation seems uncertain ” (p. 102).

⁶ Bentzen objects to Nyberg : “ But how can an old myth be something no one has ever heard or seen before ? ” (p. 103). It may be that Bentzen has been misled through Nyberg’s too mythologizing interpretation. The statement implies, however, in itself a logicistical reasoning. For the mysterious message of the ancient cult myth is, contemporaneously, always new, i.e. experienced over and over again.

die Heiden für die Redenden zu halten".¹ Others are of the very opposite opinion, e.g. Torrey, Kissane, and Bentzen. Pedersen says, cautiously, that "it is difficult to say whether it is the Israelites or the other nations that appear (in Ch. 53) as witnesses to his fate and acknowledge that he suffered it for them".² The truth is rather, I am inclined to think, that the Servant's own countrymen first and foremost constitute the subject speaking, but that also the **גוים רבים** are included among them.

With v. 2a, **ויעל כיונק**,³ "when he grew up before Him as a tender plant", etc., we find ourselves in a Tammuz-ideological context clearer than ever. The scion is the tree or plant of life, a symbol of the king-Tammuz, here during "the time of withering", i.e. in the suffering aspect. This theme may now be considered so settled that we need not dwell any longer upon the subject here.⁴ In direct topical connexion herewith recurs in vv. 2b ff. the motif of "the marred one". Already from what has been said above, it may stand out quite clearly that every kind of leprosy theory is incompatible with the whole tenor of the text. From quite another point of departure an overwhelming settling of the accounts with this theory is to be found in Guillaume, from whom the following may be worthy of citing: "It is extraordinarily difficult to believe that a leprous figure could have been chosen as the ideal figure of a community wherein lepers were dreaded sources of infection, forbidden to associate with their fellows, and the object of a special section of the Law. Moreover, the Servant could not have been a leper

¹ *Ursprung*, p. 324. Thus also Mowinckel (*Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 246) according to whom the speakers are the poet himself and his circle, and Waterman (*JBL*, lvi, 30): "(This view) faces insuperable difficulties".

² *Israel*, ii, p. 605.

³ It should be noted that the Targum has read **ויעל**—a testimony of the uncertainty of the time aspect.

⁴ See my *Studies*, p. 25 etc., Topical Index s.v. "Tree (plant) of life". The theme has been further developed in a paper (in Swedish) in *Religion och Bibel*, ii, 60 ff., 1943, by Widengren who adduces additional text parallels. The oft-quoted text (lately by Nyberg, p. 65, by Witzel, pp. 228 ff.) from the *edin-na* series was advanced already in 1908 by Sellin (*Das Rätsel des deuteriojes. Buches*, p. 104). In the Ras Shamra texts, too, **יִנֵּק** refers to the "Tammuz" sphere; see *Studies*, p. 130, n. 6.

unless we assume—and we have no right to assume—that he developed leprosy between the time of his scourging and the plucking out of his beard, in the last poem, and his death. He could not have been touched by men if he had been a leper”.¹ However true it may be that נגע (נגיע v. 4b, נגע v. 8b) has, or rather has developed, the special connotation of leprosy, and however closely this may possibly be shown through an incisive philological analysis, it is also nevertheless indisputable that the word is often used of quite other kinds of pains than leprosy. Furthermore, we must admit that the description of the Servant’s disease in other respects is of a quite different character (e.g. מדכא מחלל in v. 5 etc.). But the decisive fact is and remains the definitely inevitable “Tammuz interpretation” of the text. The body of “Tammuz”, sometimes—as lately in Ras Shamra—corporalized e.g. in the shape of a figure of earth, was cultically-symbolically maltreated, “ploughed”, etc., but never visited with leprosy, as also the cult-symbolic and ideological suffering of Tammuz the king is never metaphorically represented in that way.²

¹ *Theology*, xii, 3 f., 1926, etc.

² Cf. *Studies*, pp. 119 ff. Cf. also Zech. xii : 10 (דקר) and Hvidberg, *Graad og Læter i det Gamle Testamente*, pp. 101 f., 1938. Torrey also says : “There is not the least indication nor likelihood anywhere in the poem, that the figure of a leprosy person occurred to the author” (p. 418). Cf. too, Rudolph in *ZAW*, xliii, 92 f., 1925, who rejects Duhm’s leprosy hypothesis, *inter al.* in the following words : “Und zwar muss sein Leiden irgendwie zum Volksganzen eine Beziehung gehabt haben, denn bei einer sozusagen privaten Krankheit wie Aussatz wäre מוסר שלומנו (v. 5b) oder die Aussage, dass er mit seinem Tod für die Frevler eintrat (v. 12b), nicht recht verständlich”. Kissane, too, states : “There is not the slightest hint that it was leprosy” (p. 186). Cf. also Feldmann, *Der Knecht Gottes*, pp. 111 f., *Das Buch Isaías*, ii, 166. Owing ultimately to his “prime ancestor interpretation” of ‘Ebed Yahweh, Nyberg has come to join company with the few adherents to the leprosy theory. “In him are concentrated the experiences of a people” (p. 75). The tacit premise is the rôle of leprosy in the historical life of Israel as one of its most severe scourges. The theory recurs, though not very emphatically, *inter al.* in Volz and Mowinckel. I beg to draw attention to the inverted commas around the word “Tammuz” above, as well as the fact that reference is made, not to Sumero-Accadian Tammuz liturgies, but to the Ras Shamra material. Since my argument here against the leprosy explanation is thus taken from west-Semitic material, I must find it rather strange that I have lately been accused by Nyberg of “pan-Babylonism in a worse form” on account of this argumentation ! I shall soon revert to the

V. 4 : אֲכֵן חֲלִינוּ הוּא נִשָּׂא, etc., "However, it was our diseases he bore. . . ." From these words on the Servant's expiatory deed through vicarious suffering is the main theme. It does not seem necessary to me to enter any closer upon this subject-matter either. We may content ourselves with a reference to the fact now manifest that the king's vicarious suffering in the New Year Festival by means of which he atones for the sins of the whole people, is one of the cardinal items of the ideology of sacral kingship all over the Ancient Near East,¹ a conception whose main foundations are the retaliation dogma, the substitute offering and the corporalization ideas.² Instead of וּבִקְבָּרְתוֹ in v. 5b the Targum reads בְּקְבָרְתֵנוּ, "through our gathering", and Waterman בְּקְבָרְתוֹ, "in (or through) his fellowship".³ However, the Massoretic text is no doubt to be preferred here too. In v. 6a is presupposed the metaphor of 'Ebed as the Shepherd, the ancient epithet of the sacral king as well as of Tammuz. Otherwise, too, the sphere of motifs of v. 7 is as typical as before. We meet with the lamb, known as a sacrificial substitute for "Tammuz-" the king both among east- and west-Semites (Mari, Ras Shamra).⁴ In the Sumero-Accadian Tammuz liturgies are repeatedly found such expressions of Tammuz as "the lamb carried off to the steppe" (Witzel, 398 : III, 5 ff.), "the lamb taken away to the underworld" (432 : 12 f.), "the lamb in the power of the Nether world" (48 : 67 f., 396 : 14 ff., 398 : III, 5 f., etc.). In Israel the most methodological questions in another connexion. I merely wish to stress here (1) that "patternism" is *not* "pan-Babylonism", and (2) that the comparative religio-historical method, rightly used within a restricted culture area, is surely a sounder and much safer one than a philological "method" based on single, more or less hazardous etymologies.

¹ I content myself again with a reference to my *Studies*, where a survey of the material is given. The fact has been clearly seen and pointed out by Dürr (*Ursprung*, pp. 125 ff., 1925).

² The last-mentioned fact has been upheld, e.g. by Eissfeldt in *Expos. Times*, xlv, 261 ff., 1932-1933 ; Wheeler Robinson in *Beiheft zur ZAW*, lxvi, 49 ff., 1936, and lately by Hyatt in *JNES*, iii, 79 ff., 1944, who has nevertheless missed the conclusive point : the special rôle of the king. As regards his exposition of the prophetic ideas of the Israelite sacrificial system (pp. 82 ff.) my opinion is almost throughout an opposite one. And here again he misses the point : the rôle of the king.

³ *JBL*, lvi, 29 f., with a reference to Job xxxiv : 8.

⁴ Cf. my *Studies*, p. 118.

important form of this substitute idea is met with in the ritual of the Atonement Day, Lev. xvi,¹ depicted all through in the categories of the old royal cult. To this context, too, belongs the cultic silence motif found also in our text. It is required of the king or his substitute to observe a dignified silence at certain moments of the ritual, as it is incumbent on him to lament and cry loudly at others.²

In v. 8a is *מעצר וממשפט* a *hendiadys*, the meaning of which is, however, not quite sure. Nearest at hand is perhaps the translation “a judgment of violence”.³ In that case the motif is the one well-known from “the passion” of the sacral king who is thought of as standing in a judicial procedure, in which he, though innocent, is “sentenced” on behalf of the sin of the people. The word *דורו* means “his destiny”,⁴ and *ננזר* in v. 8b (“how he was cut off from the land of the living”) is a parallel to the *נזול* of the Eshmunazar inscription,⁵ evidently a technical term for the “death” of Tammuz—the king, to wit, as the cutting off of the herb of life—still another link, and a strong one, in the demonstration of the ideological sphere of the text. *מפשע עמי נגע למו* means “from those to whom my people’s sin is a torment”, according to Nyberg’s convincing syntactic conception of the clause.⁶ V. 9: “and (that) they made his grave among the wicked, among the rich when he died” does not refer to a factual historic burial at the cemetery of

¹ Kissane states justly on Isa. liii : 6 f. : “The language is probably based on the ritual of the day of atonement” (p. 186). Cf. too, James, *Origins of Sacrifice*, p. 207, 1937. (The fact is dealt with briefly in my book *Gamla Testamentet*, ii, on Lev. xvi : 1 ff. and Ezk. xlv : 21 f.)

² In a strange but typical disintegrated form this motif recurs within the sacral kingship of the Nyoros of the young-Sudanese culture. See *Studies*, Special Note No. 22, pp. 212 ff.

³ Interpreting from the leprosy hypothesis Nyberg translates “legal exclusion” (pp. 52 f.). Guillaume has the “By oppression and judgment” of the R.V., interpreting it : “by a deliberate miscarriage of justice he was judicially murdered” (*Theology*, xii, 5). Personally, I believe that the meaning is quite a different one, but owing to space limitations I must refrain from a special investigation.

⁴ Cf. Driver in *JThSt*, xxxvi, 403, 1935, starting from Accadian *dāru* and Arabic *دور*, and referring to Ps. xxiv : 6. Thus also Nyberg, p. 43.

⁵ See *Studies*, p. 83, with the point of departure in Nyberg, *ZDMG*, xcii, 332, n. 1, 1938.

⁶ *ZDMG*, pp. 331 ff., *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, vii, 55 f.

“unsocial people”,¹ but is a new metaphor for the descending into the land of death, as will seem evident from the fact that the same thing is often said of Tammuz. Thus, e.g. Tammuz says: “my couch is the dust of the underworld; among its murderers I am lying, among the enemies there I am kept” (Witzel, p. 314: 15 f.). It is spoken of him as lying at “the place of plunderers” (318: 25), and he is said to be “imprisoned like a criminal” (105: 9, etc.) and the like. Besides it is very tempting, to say the least of it, instead of *בְּמִתִּי* to read *בְּמָתִי* (thus already Ibn Ezra—the reading does not imply any emendation!), “his *bāmā*”, his (grave-)height, as a parallel of *קבר*, “grave”. This reading is also preferred by Dürr with a reference to the Accadian *emēdu shadāshu*, “ascend one’s mountain”, i.e. die.² Since then the same idea and expression has turned up also in the Ras Shamra texts where we are told that Ba’al ascends “the Northern mountain”, in the scene of “the placing of the king-god in the mountain”.³ In v. 10b *החלי* should be taken as an intransitive *hif’il* from the root *חלה*, “to appease”.⁴ The meaning of v. 10 is thus that Yahweh gets appeased when the Servant gives his life as an *אשם*, a guilt offering. The idea of the appeasement of the god by means of sacrifices and libations is very ancient and especially typical within the Tammuz sphere, lately witnessed in the Ugaritic texts.⁵ And the expiatory sacrifice *par préférence* is the king’s self-sacrifice or the royal substitute offering. The sacrificial term used in our text, *אשם*, “guilt offering”, is directly interchangeable with *הטאת*, “sin offering”.⁶

¹ Cf. Nyberg, p. 76. But the rich were hardly buried there, even if they should—in the mode of view of the prophets—be identical with the impious and evil-doers. However, quite another view of wealth and the rich is represented, e.g. in the Book of Job.

² *Ursprung und Ausbau*, p. 150, n. 60. Cf. Albright in *AJSL*, xxxv, 190 f., 1918-1919.

³ Text *V AB*, A 21 ff. Cf. my *Studies*, pp. 110 f., and *I AB*, i: 27 ff. (*Studies*, pp. 121 ff.)

⁴ Cf. Nyberg, p. 58.

⁵ See *Studies*, p. 112 etc., and cf. Witzel, 6: 21 ff., 14: 170 ff., etc.

⁶ Cf. Dussaud, *Les origines cananéennes du sacrifice israélite*, p. 126, 1921. The connexion with Lev. xvi, where the term for the substitute bull is *הטאת*, is pointed out also by Kissane (p. 190).

With v. 10^b the aspect swings over in a characteristically abrupt way from the negative to the positive,¹ from suffering and death to resurrection and exaltation. Hence it is impossible to accept Nyberg's interpretation with זרע as the subject, inserted moreover, between two verbs.² As for myself, I am not aware of any difficulties in taking the 'Ebed as the subject. On the contrary, from the topical viewpoint it is no less than necessary that the Servant is the subject. It is he himself who, having performed Yahweh's will (חפץ), "after the travail of his soul"³ shall see, and see till he is satisfied, days and a numerous offspring. In the Sumero-Accadian royal texts this motif recurs in standing clichés in the hymnic blessing formulas, in itself reflecting the double aspect of the victory of life over death: the individual aspect with its "eternal" life, and the collective through the countless progeny to come. Moreover, the Ras Shamra texts have again provided us with the west-Semitic evidence on this point, too. Thus 'Al'iyān Ba'al creates life before his descent into the nether world through progeny, and after death through resurrection.⁴ The idea is bound up also with the royal figure 'Aqhat ġzr who "gives birth to a humanity" after passing through "suffering" and "death" to a new life and to whom is given "life and years".⁵ Finally, the same motif is associated with Kārit, too.⁶ Judging from this evidence it is no doubt too narrow an interpretation to see in v. 10 in an

¹ Cf. Gressmann, *Ursprung*, p. 326, who says of this immediate attachment without any connecting link: "Das ist die charakteristische Situation des Kultliedes". In Gressmann's opinion, Isa. liii goes back to "ein aus den Mysterien stammendes Kultlied, das am Todestage des Gottes von den Mysten gesungen wurde" (pp. 326 f.).

² P. 59. Nyberg translates: "The progeny shall see, experience, that it will be given long days".

³ Cf. with the mode of expression here, v. 18 of the royal passion psalm cxviii mentioned above: יסר יסרני יה ולמות לא נתני. Cf. also Ps. xxii: 30 f.

⁴ Cf. Pedersen in *Acta Orientalia*, xviii, 6, 1939, and my *Studies*, p. 119, where I have drawn the parallel to the 'Ebed Yahweh figure in Isa. liii: 10 (n. 7). Already Dürr has seen that we have to do with royal ideology in Isa. liii: 10 (*Ursprung und Ausbau*, p. 90, n. 11), though he too, erroneously takes זרע as subject in (the relative clause) יאריך ימים.

⁵ *II D*, vi: 38 ff., cf. 26 ff. See my *Studies*, p. 138.

⁶ According to my reading and interpretation of *I K* 31b ff., given in *Studies*, p. 152.

historicist way only a reference to the Servant's own corporal resurrection.¹ The matter in question is a cultic-ideological reality of a far wider scope and of a very ancient date, as is also to be directly seen from the words בְּדַעְתּוֹ יַצְדִּיק צְדִיק, "by the 'knowledge' of himself he maketh the righteous righteous" (i.e. maketh many righteous—cf. Dan. xii : 3 and I En. xlvii, li). For these words must be re-interpreted something like this : by means of the cultic-mystic unity with the Saviour every participant shares in the realized salvation. And thus the universality of the cultic drama is established by these words.

At the same time they are the last words of the *corpus* of the song, while v. 11c opens the conclusion. In its first words (עֲבָדִי לְרַבִּים, a nominal clause) Yahweh himself repeats and confirms what is just said : "My Servant is for (the benefit of) the many, whose iniquities he beareth". In v. 12a comes the succinct terminating oracle promise,² typically enough followed by a repetition of the Servant's vicarious contribution, he who

¹ Cf. Sellin, p. 211, and Mowinkel, *Det Gamle Testamente*, p. 249, where he says : "This can according to the context only imply the non-conviction verdict of the deed : that the Servant is resurrected to a new earthly life—that is the contents of the Old Testament belief in resurrection. It is, thus, here the question merely of a special wonder on behalf of the Servant ; a general resurrection belief is not postulated—on the contrary." As will be seen already from what is said above, my opinion on this point differs markedly from that of Mowinkel. I should like to note that it is the doctrine of the Persian origin of the resurrection belief (Bousset, von Gall, Bertholet, etc.) that has caused the false dating of the idea, down in the Persian era or later. But the roots of the idea are no doubt to be found in autochthonous cult usages, bound up with the dying and rising god, and with analogies from vegetable life. (Thus, scholars like Kohut, Spiess, Gröbler, Schwally, Lagrange, von Baudissin, Maynard, Nötscher, have, in my opinion, been more or less on the right track. Cf. especially the latter's *Altorientalischer und alttestamentlicher Auferstehungsglaube*, 1926, and further Ebeling, *Tod und Leben*, 1931.) Thanks to the evidence from Ras Shamra—referred to above—combined with the burial customs (cf. Dussaud in *RHR*, cv, 282 ff., 1932 ; Gaster in *Iraq*, vi, 116 ff., 1939 ; Sukenik in *Mémorial Lagrange*, pp. 59 ff., 1940) we must admit that the resurrection idea is an ancient, aboriginal Canaanite conception (cf. provisionally, in the Old Testament especially Hos. vi : 1 f.), even if it has not here the same individualistic character as later on, in Hellenistic and modern times. No clear boundary line exists on this stadium, between death, grave existence, and resurrection.

² The apprehension of its restricted scope is almost the only thing acceptable in Sellin's whole paper in *ZAW*, lv, 210 ff.

“exhausted¹ his soul in death and suffered himself to be reckoned² among sinners, bearing the sin of many, and interceded for the sinner”.

The passage liv: 1 ff. forms a hymnic conclusion of the ‘Ebed Yahweh song, as is so often the case with the tradition unities within a complex, also in the prophetic texts of such a clear liturgical character as “Deutero-Isaiah”, attached according to the association word principle: רבים in v. 1b.³ Here the consequences of the Servant’s resurrection and exaltation are depicted: the restoration of Zion and the erection of the new Jerusalem on the basis of the Davidic covenant,⁴ fulfilled in ‘Ebed Yahweh. Typical is the occurrence of a piece of prophetic parenesis (lv: 6 ff.) of “Proto-Isaian” type—a phenomenon that is by no means surprising from a traditio-historical point of view—before the last conclusive promise and the hymnic section that in an unaffected way ends the “Deutero-Isaian” collection of traditions.

Unfortunately, it is impossible for me to enter upon the problem of the relations to the “Trito-Isaian” traditions and the possible occurrence of “‘Ebed Yahweh songs” within these.⁵

VII

In conclusion, however, an attempt may be made to sum up in a few words the consequences which are to be drawn, in my opinion, from the preceding investigation.

In what concerns the traditio-historical aspect of the problem, it must be established that the treatment from this point of view directly occasions a stronger stressing of the unity and primary affinity, a result that is strongly corroborated by the purely

¹ On הערה see Pedersen, *Israel*, i, p. 180.

² נמנה is a tolerative nif'al.

³ The primary connexion between the ‘Ebed Yahweh song and liv: 1 ff., is justly and strongly stressed also by Bentzen (p. 109—*vs.* Mowinckel).

⁴ Already of Ch. liv Kissane says: “Although the name of David is not mentioned, there are some echoes of the promises made to him (3a-b, cf., xi, 10 ff.; 10, cf. 2 Sam. vii, 15-16; Ps. lxxxix, 28 ff.; 13 f., cf. 2 Sam., vii, 10-11), and it is fairly obvious that in the prophet’s mind the restoration of Sion is the return of the glories of the kingdom of David” (p. 192).

⁵ Cf. concerning Isa. lxi: 1-3, Cannon in *ZAW*, xlvii, 284 ff., 1929.

form-literary point of view. An indirect but necessary corollary is the originality of the messianic sayings in the prophetic texts on the whole. And, hence, the messianic¹ interpretation of the 'Ebed Yahweh songs in "Deutero-Isaiah" is in principle suggested as the most natural one.

Furthermore, the religio-historical elucidation along the lines of the sacral kingship ideology makes this messianic interpretation stand as the only possible one, as I opine, in so evident a manner that it seems indeed a riddle that Protestant scholars—with single splendid exceptions like Rowley in his above-mentioned work—have been able so completely to overlook its necessity. Obviously, the Catholic theologians who almost without exception maintain the messianic interpretation (e.g. Feldmann, Fischer, Kissane) have been less handicapped, as they join directly the old traditional Christian interpretation, founded in its turn no doubt on a primary tradition and, thus, representing a sound and just line of interpretation. For it should not be forgotten, as has so often been done within modern literary critical scholarship, that one is always on safer ground *with* tradition than *against* it—provided of course that tradition is compatible with a purely scientific view. However, the Christian messianic interpretation represents an interpretation of *faith*, whereas from a strictly scientific viewpoint 'Ebed Yahweh can, of course, not be considered a direct prediction of *Jesus* Christ. Yet, it must be stated that the former is in line with the religio-historical perspective of so imposing an age,

¹ I use here, as in my *Studies*, the term "messianic" not with the import of a belief directed towards an "eschatological" future, but in the wider connotation of "elaborate royal ideology", of course implying in itself also the idea of the king as "saviour", מְשִׁיחַ. This saviour belief can be directed towards an actual contemporary ruler, but also towards a "Messiah" waited for in a near or remote future, the boundary lines naturally enough being most fluid in this respect. Obviously, 'Ebed Yahweh as the Messiah has a future aspect attached to him. Nevertheless, is it a misuse of words, here as elsewhere, to put the equality sign between messianism and eschatology; needless to say, any attempt at distinguishing between a "cultic Messiah" and an "eschatological Messiah" is doomed to failure, owing to the genesis of the eschatology out of the cult, as shown not least by Mowinckel himself (against whom these words are directed) in his *Psalmstudien* ii, and especially, in *Jesaja-Disiplene*, pp. 110 ff. At the bottom of such an endeavour lies, conceivably, a judgment of faith and value that seems alien, in any case, to a cult historian.

revealed through the elucidation along the lines of sacral kingship.

As regards the peculiarity of the Israelite messianic idea, the elaboration of which was said above to be the final aim of the exegesis, it must be stated that—after we have recognized how much of it is really in common with messianic belief in the other Near Eastern religions—this distinctiveness is to be found on the one hand in the strength with which messianism has been developed in Israel to a dominating position, and on the other in the way in which this originally directly and exclusively cult-bound world of ideas has been given a consistently historic and national import thanks to the indissoluble connexion with the *Davidic dynasty*, the Davidic messianic line representing the central religious motif running through the whole historical life of Israel ever since its first appearance on Canaanite soil.¹

The distinctiveness of the "Deutero-Isaian" shape of messianism, corporalized in the 'Ebed Yahweh figure, lies in its turn in the strong emphasizing of the suffering aspect, an aspect that is, too, as we have seen, from the very outset a legitimate and integral item of the messianic world of thinking, belief, and cult, the traces of which are to be found also elsewhere in the Old Testament texts, partly more genuine and original than here.

The first ancestor or "primeval man" idea on the other hand, is contained as an inherent motif in the royal ideology,² a fact

¹ This dominating rôle of messianism in the life of Israel is rightly emphasized, e.g. by Kaufmann in *ZAW*, xlviii, 23 ff., 1930, and Journet, *Destinées d'Israël*, pp. 50 ff., 1945.

² Cf. with this Marmorstein in *WZKM*, xxxv, 242 ff., 1928; xxxvi, 51 ff., 1929. To me it seems clear that from the root of sacral kingship spring two, or rather, three, main ideological lines, to wit: (1) the "positive", more or less purely national, messianic line of thought, being at the same time, not least in Israel, the most common one. (2) The "negative" (at the same time the more "esoteric") aspect of the sacral king, in whom "the suffering" is also primary and inherent because of its cultic background. (See my *Studies*, p. 170, n. 4.) The ideological consequences of this negative aspect are drawn out on the one hand in the 'Ebed Yahweh figure, and on the other in the idea of "the Son of Man". In the latter the most important new feature is the eschatological and transcendental element. (3) The "primeval man" idea (on such stages of culture where sacral kingship is non-existent, represented to a certain degree by the "prime ancestor" figure), the most typical trait of which is, in later times, its gnosticization.

that does not imply that it is of any special interest with regard to the 'Ebed Yahweh figure. So much the less can it serve as a foundation of the interpretation of the 'Ebed whose typical problems it does not solve at all.¹ Still less does a collective reading into the texts of the prophetic class or the like belong here.² Nor is there any reason for assuming direct influences from individual prophets. In any case is it impossible to state such an influence by means of any criteria in the texts.³ Finally, in what concerns the linking up of the 'Ebed Yahweh ideology with the person of Cyrus, it is undeniable, as stated above, that such a connexion is at hand in certain sections. But it does by no means play a very great rôle. On the contrary, the application to Cyrus remains a by-motif, and must not obscure the only fundamental conception: 'Ebed Yahweh—the Messiah. And above all, this acknowledgment of the application of the ideology to Cyrus must not lead to a layer interpretation of the texts, with the illusory view to constructing an "evolution" in the conception of the 'Ebed figure for which in reality all criteria and possibilities are lacking.⁴

Lastly, I want to stress that it is self-evident to me that the "Deutero-Isaian" conception of Messiah-'Ebed Yahweh has

¹ As is clearly to be seen from Nyberg's attempt at solving the problem of the 'Ebed figure along this line in his paper in *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, x, 1942. And naturally enough, the cultural conditions for this solution are not at hand here. (Cf. the preceding note.)

² The second source of the Servant idea according to Hyatt (pp. 81 ff.), and a strong by-motif also in Nyberg (pp. 79 ff.). From this presupposition Hyatt, too, misinterprets, e.g. מלאך, "the Messenger", in xlii: 19, xlii: 26, "the mouth" (p. 82), and "the tongue" motif in xlix: 2, 1: 4, as well as the תורה-imparting in xlii: 4.

³ Again, both Nyberg and Hyatt reckon with such influences, especially from Jeremiah (pp. 80 and 82, respectively).

⁴ The latest work on "Deutero-Isaiah", S. Smith, *Isaiah, Chs. xl-lv: Literary Criticism and History* (Schweich Lectures, 1940), 1944, is not yet available to me. Judging from Rowley's review in *JThSt*, xlii, 215 ff., 1945, it is, however, of a rather strongly historicizing character, which causes the following sound reservation on the part of Rowley: "The real difficulty about the application of the principle is that the allusions to contemporary history are mostly so indefinite and lacking in precision that the details of history have to be brought to them, rather than found in them" (p. 215). It should also be noted, however, that Smith (according to Rowley) interprets the 'Ebed Yahweh songs "strictly in relation to their immediate context" (p. 216).

a concrete foundation in a distinct circle of pious people. This is a matter of course already from the traditio-historical point of view, and I have pointed to it in other connexions. It is, further, quite clear also from the emphasis laid here by me so strongly on the fact that 'Ebed Yahweh is none else than the *Davidic* Messiah himself. This fact is in reality so decisive that it is neither necessary nor possible to indicate more strongly the importance of the foundation in real life that supports the 'Ebed Yahweh messianism, a form of the most central line of faith throughout the history of Israel.¹ To stress the fact that this Messiah is pictured throughout in the ancient categories of the sacral kingship ideology out of which the messianic idea itself has grown, does then, of course, by no means imply "a volatilization of the great religious experiences into cultic schemata".² It is quite as erroneous to play off form *against* contents as it is to mix them up.

¹ In a comment on the Swedish paper that lies behind this one, Nyberg has asserted that I have denied this foundation in real life. This is, of course, by no means the fact. On the contrary it would seem very questionable how Nyberg's own, newly-repeated interpretation of 'Ebed Yahweh as "a prophetic collective" or "Isaiah as a collective figure" could imply a stronger and firmer "foundation in real life" than the interpretation of the 'Ebed as the Davidic Messiah. When Nyberg states that the circle within the people, that is the bearer of the 'Ebed Yahweh ideology, "cannot have had anything to do with the king—for there was no king then, the house of David being overthrown and the temple ruined", this statement must be characterized as in the teeth of the historical evidence down to the time of our Lord. Should the facts mentioned be a hindrance to the belief in the Messiah and the expectations for him? *That much* dependent upon the binding up with an historical human being is not an idea, that it dies immediately together with the actual temporary object, I suppose? To me a statement like this is really unwarranted historicism. Furthermore, the house of David was not dead. It may be enough to point to the rôle of Zerubbabel in the immediately following years. Cf. also Matt. xxii : 42 ff., etc.

² Quoted from the comment by Nyberg just mentioned.

ST. MARK VIII. 33 : A MISTRANSLATION FROM THE ARAMAIC ?

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In previous issues of this BULLETIN¹ we have put forward evidence which goes some way to suggesting an Aramaic background to St. Mark. We believe that further evidence is available from the well known saying, "Get thee behind me, Satan" (St. Mk. viii. 33).

At first sight the word *θαρανᾶς* might appear to be a transliteration of the Hebrew *טור*, or to be dependent upon the LXX. When we turn to the LXX, however, we find that *טור* is usually translated as *διάβολος*,² and very occasionally transliterated as *θατάν*.³ It is not until the end of the second century B.C. when Ecclesiasticus is being rendered into Greek that we find the form *θαρανᾶς*.⁴ By this time we know that Aramaic was making itself felt in the Greek translation of the Scriptures.⁵

In St. Mark it is always the transliteration of the Aramaic form of the name which is found. And that it prevailed seems likely from its occurrence in Greek in the Paris Magical Papyrus as *θαδανᾶς*, c. 300 A.D.⁶

If one word in the command of Jesus comes from the Aramaic, it is possible that all his words were originally in that language. First we may note that the saying is not only used to Peter but also, in Q., to Satan himself.⁷ In this last passage the Sinaitic

¹ April 1937, October 1946.

² 1 Chron. xxi. 1, Job. i. 6 and throughout the book; Ps. cviii. (cix.), 6 and throughout Zechariah.

³ 1 Kings xi. 14, 23.

⁴ c. xxi. 27.

⁵ Swete, *Introduction to the O.T. in Greek*, p. 319, n. 3; Thackeray, *Grammar of the O.T. in Greek*, p. 28.

⁶ Milligan, *Greek Papyri*, p. 113; Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, p. 250.

⁷ St. Matthew iv. 10.

Syriac renders ܡܕܝܢܐ ܕܚܝܬܐ, i.e. "Get thee behind thee". This is a normal Syriac idiom, found elsewhere in the New Testament ¹ meaning to withdraw or retire.

We suggest therefore that this idiom was misunderstood by the Greek translator. He should have rendered literally ὀπίσω σοῶ. And, indeed, in Codex Bezae, this is found in Matthew iv. 10. It should be read here also.

Jesus urged Peter not to stand behind him but to withdraw : he uttered the same command when confronted by Satan at His Temptation.

¹ Professor T. W. Manson kindly draws my attention to this in Merx : *Evangelien nach ihrem Altesten Bekannten Texte*, ad loc. The idiom may be found in the Sinaitic Syriac of St. Mt. xxiv. 18 and St. Mk. xiii. 16.

KNOWLEDGE AS REVELATION.

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“IT is more important”, writes A. N. Whitehead, “that a proposition be interesting than that it be true”.¹ As Whitehead expounds it the dictum is valid; but taken out of its context it sums up one of the most pestilent of heresies. Not only Hitler and Stalin but propagandists in all ages have assumed that men should accept as knowledge certain propositions which stirred their emotions and guided their thoughts and actions. Men’s right and duty to seek truth as such were consequently either definitely flouted or speciously frustrated. The results of this attitude towards knowledge have been, not merely false or questionable beliefs, but the degradation of truth to a means of attaining political or other extraneous ends. The unprecedented use of old and new forms of propaganda in our own day has made the manufacture of opinions one of our foremost industries, and few of us are wholly immune from its effects.

We are to some extent predisposed to tolerate this industry because we live in a largely man-made world and put our trust in our own power and cleverness rather than in obedience to the world order and its demands. In imagining that we can subject things to our purposes without listening to what they tell us, we are guilty of what the Greeks called *ὑβελς*, and Bertrand Russell calls “cosmic impiety”. One form of this sin against reality is our tendency to think of knowledge, not as revealed to us by the things about which we learn, but as a product of our own activity, an instrument we forge for our own advancement.

Our pride in the knowledge we appear to gain by our own efforts has further led us to undervalue types of knowledge which are revealed rather than laboriously acquired, for example, our knowledge of personal worth or of beauty. We have taken

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 313.

the factual and scientific knowledge, of which the revelational aspect is less apparent, as the standard type to which, if they are to vindicate their validity, other types must conform.

Happily, these intellectual sins and weaknesses are now more clearly and widely recognised than ever before as diseases which call for remedial treatment. In the most varied fields, and not least in our schools, efforts are being made to encourage men and women and boys and girls to learn by their own experience what knowing really means. They find that they cannot effectively know persons and things unless they in some way live with them. For knowing is one aspect of the comprehensive activity of living. They therefore do not merely think of things as external objects, but interact with them by asking them questions and listening to their replies. They ask them, for instance, what is your importance for human life? and by understanding their answers gain value-knowledge of them. They come to realise also that in order to live rightly with things and truly know them, we must have insight into their intrinsic worth; we must, that is, have worth-knowledge of them.

The close connexion between living with things and knowing them is illustrated by G. F. Stout's example of what I do when I blow out a candle. My activity in living the situation then involves doing three intimately related things. In the first place, I interact with the external situation, with the result that it becomes a lived situation in which a candle is to be blown out. Both I and the situation are transformed by thus interacting.¹ On the one hand, I should live differently if the external situation were other than it is, and in my feelings I experience the difference the situation makes to me. On the other hand I convert the external situation into a lived one, and organise it from a particular stand-part.² If I wanted to read by the candle's light, the situation as I lived it would be different. Secondly, in order to live satisfactorily in the situation thus called into existence, I must know what activity on my part it demands in order that its possible value for me may be realised in actual

¹ For a discussion of the process, see B. Petermann: *Das Gestaltproblem*, esp. p. 230.

² See F. C. Bartlett: *Remembering*, p. 231.

fact. The situation is a system or pattern of actual and possible activities in which I and my fellow-members, such as the candle and the air, co-operate in effecting my purpose. Into this pattern what I do must fit by being co-ordinated with what my co-members do. I must not only blow ; I must blow hard enough in the right direction. If I am not to trust to luck, my blowing must be guided by a thought-pattern of the situation, which reproduces in my thinking the situation's pattern as it really is. I form this thought-pattern by asking the candle and the air : What will you do if I do so and so ? I ask this question, for example, if I give a trial puff. In reply they tell me how I must think of them as behaving, and I develop my thought-pattern by fitting in their replies. I then know what to do, and in the third place I do it.

The candle is a real object to me just because it tells me how I must think it ; for the same reason things like justice, or the Norman conquest, or even the ghost in *Hamlet* are in their own ways real. For if they are definite enough to be thought of at all, they have, as H. F. Hallett puts it, wills of their own. We cannot think of them in any way we like ; they dictate their own properties.¹ All knowledge is therefore in this sense a revelation made to us by the things we know.

Again, when I blow out the candle my getting to know the situation is one aspect of my whole life in it ; the kind of knowledge I want is determined by the particular kind of life I am trying to lead, or, roughly speaking, by what I want to do. Now we not only live in a great variety of situations, but we live them on what we may call different levels. A young child lives mainly by reflex and instinctive reactions to his environment. When he grows older he tends to live in situations in which his co-members have definite value for him. He thinks of things as friends or foes. At the same time he comes to live more and more in situations which have their places in the external world of actual and possible facts of which he must take account. Lastly, though not in order of time, he lives situations which have intrinsic worth. There may be something right to be done ; his mother is there to be loved and obeyed. In order

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. xx, no. 77, p. 236.

to live satisfactorily on these levels he needs corresponding types of knowledge. But he lives a situation fully only when he lives it on all levels at once ; though as a rule he lives it predominantly on one particular level. He therefore needs adequate knowledge of all four types, each of which plays an essential part in enabling him to live aright.

In the first place his whole life is based upon his reflex and instinctive responses to situations in which knowing is not clearly differentiated from feeling and striving. This elementary instinctive knowledge which his responses involve is not less essential than knowledge of higher types. Instinctive knowledge may be only a vague awareness of the situation's importance. If I lay my finger on a baby's hand, the hand clasps it and holds it tight, presumably without the baby being clearly conscious of what his hand does. But we often react in the same reflex way to situations of which we are more definitely aware. For instance, we shut our eyes when we see a fly near them. In rather more advanced activities our reflex reactions develop into instinctive responses of much wider range without, however, essentially changing their character.

In all reflex and instinctive responses we do something which the situation, as we experience or live it, tells us to do. Our body-minds are active in responding to its demands, and therefore conform themselves to its pattern. It is true that we do not reproduce that pattern in thought, and say to ourselves we must do so and so. Our thinking is still an inseparable aspect of our whole activity. Nevertheless, that activity is guided by our awareness of the situation as real in so far as it impresses its pattern upon us, or by what we may call our instinctive knowledge of it.

The character and function of instinctive knowledge are illustrated by experiments with rats learning to escape from a maze. A rat after many trials may find his way out and by practice come to take the right course without hesitation ; but we can hardly suppose that he forms a thought-pattern of the relevant part of the maze. He is, however, guided by instinctive knowledge of the pattern. as is shown by his taking the corners like a motorist who prepares to take a turn before he comes to

it. He does not determine his course from moment to moment by what he sees ; for if his familiar path is blocked, he runs head-on against the obstruction.

Instinctive knowledge has obvious limitations. It leads us to respond immediately to situations whose momentary importance we feel, but of whose wider meaning and implications we take no account. On the other hand, just because we do not definitely think of the situations as external and so do not view them from outside, we live them without our body-minds in a uniquely intimate way. We, so to speak, take root in them, and so gain a stable basis for our whole lives. A child lays the foundations of a healthy life in the instinctive intimacies of the home ; a community's common life ought to have the roots from which it draws its strength in the instinctive bonds of kinship and neighbourhood, such as we find in rural life at its best. Our urban and industrial civilisation is threatened by disaster and even dissolution because it loosens these bonds in their old forms and has not yet succeeded in renewing them in a modified shape. If the people perish for lack of knowledge, it is not least for lack of the instinctive knowledge which is one aspect of the organic togetherness with people and things from which right living must start.

Young children and primitive peoples live largely on the instinctive level ; but they live also in situations centering round definite objects of whose importance they are definitely aware.¹ They do not, we are told, think of things primarily as objects in the given external world, but as friends or foes, helpers or antagonists. This implies that the things with which they have to do are thought as active or even alive. A child's teddy bear is a live friend, and primitive animism is an extension of the same mode of thought. But when children and primitive men think of things as alive they do not necessarily think them as independent objects leading continuous lives of their own. Teddy ceases to rank as alive when his owner grows tired of him, and primitive hunters, we are told, cannot think of deer

¹ On the thinking of children and primitive man, see e.g. H. Werner, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development*, and P. Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*.

as existing when they are not being hunted. At this stage of mental development an object's importance on a particular occasion is reproduced in thought by imagining it as alive in that specific situation. The thinker lives in a little personal world of things important for his own and his comrades' lives ; and outside that world things have no existence for him.

This mode of thought seems strange to us because we habitually transcend the limits of our personal worlds by living also in a wider external world of actual and possible facts whose reality does not depend upon their importance for us. This world of given facts forms a continuous and stable background and basis for the successive situations in which we live. For it is a coherent and comprehensive scheme of things in which we and all our co-members play our appointed parts. We have factual knowledge of situations in this world when our thinking reproduces their factual pattern viewed against its wider background.

These two ways of living and knowing a situation in the end imply each other and are connected aspects of the comprehensive activity of living. But one or other aspect should dominate our whole activity according to the type of situation in which we live. An astronomer observing the stars is bent on knowing the external physical universe and seeks and uses factual knowledge. He looks at the stars from outside ; he asks them : what are you doing in the given scheme of things ? and what makes you do it ? He listens to their answers without thinking of the practical importance of his discoveries. On the other hand a farmer needs much factual knowledge, but he does not think of his crops primarily as having their places in the external world ; he thinks of them as having value for him because they are themselves of value for life. He lives with them, taking pride in their well-being and trying to give them all their healthy growth demands. His attitude is not primarily that of mastering them by scientifically understanding them or shaping them for his own purposes ; it is rather one of co-operative fellowship with them inspired by his sense of their value.

We can roughly delimit the special spheres of factual and value-knowledge by saying that we gain and use factual knowledge

when living as members of the ordered world of actual and possible facts. Such knowledge is impartial and universally valid; it is fully developed at a later stage than value-knowledge because it demands a more complete transcendence of personal interests. But for that very reason it enables us to understand and increase our mastery over the external world. The world in which we live is not, however, simply one of ordered processes which we know as facts. It is also a world in which there is an upward movement towards higher and more varied activities, exemplified in biological evolution and social progress. Of this movement living creatures are at once the agents and the product. In so far as we live by playing our parts in the upward movement things have positive value for us when they help us to do so more fully, negative value if they obstruct us. Our business is to increase their positive value, and for that purpose we must think rightly about their importance for life, that is, have value-knowledge of them.

We need not dwell at length on the far-reaching effects of our increased factual knowledge in transforming the conditions under which we live. Stern experience and the dissemination of scientific patterns of thinking have combined to make us grapple with many problems by facing the facts they involve, and so discovering how the problems themselves demand to be solved. We are, that is, in some cases more ready to gain knowledge by listening to what things themselves reveal. But this truly scientific attitude is characteristic of the best minds among us rather than of the community as a whole. In a spirit of "cosmic impiety" we are apt to give heed to our own preconceptions and desires instead of finding out what things really tell us. The result is the wishful thinking which has been branded as our besetting intellectual sin.

Our preoccupation with factual knowledge has also led us often to underrate the importance of value-knowledge. We have got so much into the habit of dealing with things from outside in the light of our factual knowledge of them, that we hardly think of them as having value in themselves. We therefore do not ask them: Being what you are, how do you help or hinder life? and listen to their answer. Rather we ask ourselves, not

them : If we do so and so with these usable things, what results shall we get ? We thus gain factual knowledge of their utility ; but this is worlds apart from value-knowledge of the things themselves. It is the kind of knowledge possessed by the car-owner who knows where he wants the car to take him, but has no thought or care for the car itself ; by the workman who knows how to earn his wages, but takes no trouble about his job ; by the jerry-builder, and the manufacturer of trashy goods.

The evil effects of this impiety are only too apparent in our national life, and many efforts are being made to overcome them. The change of attitude which alone will enable us to gain the value-knowledge we need demands little less than a revolution in our habitual outlook on the world. It will, however, be brought nearer if more of us have directly to do with things whose value we appreciate. Dwellers in the country have opportunities of doing so denied to those living in the man-made world of urban and industrial civilisation. One problem is how to lead the business man or factory hand to feel the same respect for the things with which he deals as the farmer feels for his crops. A promising contribution towards the solution of this and similar problems is being made by schools that concentrate less on imparting factual knowledge as such, than on giving their boys and girls first-hand experience of things whose value they appreciate and on leading them to learn about other things in the same spirit. The Ministry of Education's recent pamphlet on *The New Secondary Education* is in effect a plea for more value-knowledge to vivify the factual knowledge which is equally essential.

Factual and value-knowledge, however, are not enough. We live not only as members of the phenomenal world and as heirs of the upward movement in it ; we live also in a world in which persons and things have intrinsic worth. The evolution of the world as the source and scene of life has brought it about that there are right things to be done, beautiful things to be enjoyed and made, and persons to be loved for their own sakes. We may differ about what things are good and beautiful and true, and about what persons claim our love ; but it is as much a part of men's normal life in the world to respond to the

intrinsic worth of certain persons and things as it is to interact with external objects. We know that our own lives are in varying measure intrinsically worth living. Were they intrinsically worthless all value and progress, all purpose and effort, would be delusions, and suicide the obvious means of escape from a world of tragic shams.

All conscious activity implies an underlying sense of the actual or possible worth of things. This sense is generally part of the vague background of our thoughts and feelings and efforts. In some situations, however, it inspires all our activities and determines our dominant attitude towards the situation and our co-members. We then do not try to master the situation, nor to increase its value for life ; rather we become absorbed in it without any thought of ourselves. We live in and for it in response to its overmastering claims, and gain what may be called living unity with it and with the objects to which its special worth is due. When a mother is tending her sick child, her activities are outward expressions of her self-identification with the child she loves. She lives in and for him, feeling his suffering and rejoicing in his returning health at least as keenly as if they were her own. The same attitude of living unity with persons or objects to whose worth we respond is exemplified by the workman bent above all things on doing a good job ; by the wholehearted supporter of some great cause ; by a man who speaks the truth at any cost ; by poets and artists, scientists and other thinkers in all walks of life, who unreservedly obey the call of truth and beauty ; and pre-eminently by the saints and martyrs of all religions.

We respond so wholeheartedly to the worth of things with which we have living unity that, as in our instinctive activities, our knowledge of them can hardly be distinguished from the feelings they arouse and the strivings they inspire. Our worth-knowledge of things cannot therefore be adequately expressed in words. For as soon as I make statements about anything I think of it as external. Teachers who ask their pupils : Why do you like this poem ? are apt to interrupt the wholehearted enjoyment of it. It follows that worth-knowledge cannot be communicated in the direct way in which we communicate

factual knowledge. It is one aspect of our living unity with things, and therefore comes to us as a direct personal revelation from the things themselves. We subordinate all we do to their claims and open our ears to what they say. A situation may tell us the one thing we must do. A man may inspire our love and admiration by showing us the man he is. We respond by new insight and deeper conviction, not merely by increased actual and value-knowledge. But factual and value-knowledge have their parts to play. For persons and things of worth are objects in the external world, and they reveal their worth by playing their part in it surpremely well. Our worth-knowledge of them must therefore be based on our factual and value-knowledge to which it gives deeper meaning. It may be figuratively described as the transformation of our thought-patterns of the bodies of things into thought-patterns of them as embodied souls.

We constantly help other people to develop worth-knowledge by telling them about the doings of persons and things that suggest to responsive minds the inward being or soul which these doings reveal. If I say : He gave his life for his friends, I state a fact ; but I suggest the man's intrinsic worth. We also often make statements which have symbolic but not factual truth in that they lead us to appreciate a thing's intrinsic worthy by describing what it would do and be if freed from the limitations of the world of actual and possible facts. When Wordsworth speaks of duty as the "stern daughter of the voice of God", his symbolic language quickens our insight into the nature of duty by transporting us into a realm other than that of time and space.

Very early in life we begin to have worth-knowledge, for instance of our parents and of things as in themselves beautiful or right. As we grow older our worth-knowledge develops in close connexion with our other types of knowledge, from which it gradually becomes more definitely distinguished. Unless a child knew by personal experience what it feels like to be good or naughty, no amount of social approval or disapproval would give him the direct insight of worth-knowledge into the inherent rightness or wrongness of certain actions. He would only learn that to do certain things was advantageous, while doing other

things would lead to undesirable results. While, however, a child could not know the real difference between right and wrong unless he had living unity with ethical situations, what particular things are known to him as right depends at first almost entirely upon his family's social standards and his value-knowledge of them. As he grows older, largely by his mother's suggestions, he comes to distinguish for himself between obedience to accepted standards and doing what itself calls to be done. By degrees he also learns to know the worth not only of particular persons and situations, but of patterns of life, wide purposes and ideals. His worth-knowledge then largely determines his whole outlook upon life, and just because it is so specifically worth-knowledge deepens the meaning of all he knows.

We can trace the same process of development in the progress of civilisation. But both in our individual lives and in the life of large and small communities the advance is generally very far from attaining its goal. In our own time and country we admittedly lack the worth-knowledge that would unify, stabilise and inspire our whole common life. We no doubt lack this vitally important knowledge primarily because we do not seek it. In our "cosmic impiety" we are so busy about our own affairs that we do not heed the call of things of intrinsic worth; in religious language, we do not listen to the voice of God speaking through our own experience and the world in which we live. But the call would sound more insistently in our ears if the development of our worth-knowledge had not lagged behind that of our factual knowledge. We have not yet learned definitely to distinguish the two types, but are often like children who confuse doing what mother tells them with doing what in itself is right. This confusion of thought has tended to weaken our faith in worth-knowledge as such. We ignore the fact that worth-knowledge is a personal revelation; and are apt to think it is discredited when the traditional standards assumed to be its authoritative source can no longer be accepted. In the field of religion some theologians have increased the confusion by claiming that certain doctrines are a high form of worth-knowledge, and yet must be known to be true because they are vouched for by the Christian churches.

Again, we have not been as successful in widening the range of our worth-knowledge as in extending the field of our knowledge of facts. Most educated people understand the meaning of evolution, even if they know little about the details of the process. But popular education in the schools and elsewhere does not lead to develop a wide outlook upon what have been called the eternal values, such as the fundamental principles of right action ; nor are we systematically encouraged to understand for ourselves the wider implications of such worth-knowledge as we possess. For example, we hear a great deal about religious instruction in schools ; but not many schools aim primarily at helping their boys or girls to develop their own theologies on the basis of their personal religious experience, enlightened, but only enlightened, by the wisdom of their teachers. We cannot, however, live as rational men and women, instead of as victims of irrational propaganda, unless our whole outlook is shaped by convictions which embody the knowledge gained by our personal experience of the intrinsic worth of persons and things.

If we think of the various kinds of knowledge, instinctive, scientific, value-knowledge and knowledge of the intrinsic worth of things, we see that knowledge is one main means by which we realise our membership of the wonderful world into which we are born. In spite of our weaknesses and sinful aberrations, and in manifold ways adapted to our needs, God calls us to live as His children by the revelations which His works convey. By reproducing the patterns of situations and their wider backgrounds our thinking embodies in our limited human way what we may symbolically call the thoughts of God Himself. The high office of knowledge is, in A. A. Milne's words, to help us to live the good life and to see into the mind of God. But in order that knowledge may fulfil its purpose we must not only widen its range and co-ordinate the messages it brings us ; we must also learn to reverence truth as the revelation of things as they really are and therefore of the supreme Reality to which they owe their being.

Though a mere tyro in these high matters I venture to suggest that recent discussions of the character and aims of scientific knowledge exemplify the conception of knowledge which I have

sketched in untechnical terms. Physical science is the most specific and developed form of factual knowledge, and, as Eddington and other scientists tell us, it looks at things so exclusively from outside that it does not ask what things are themselves like but what logical patterns are exemplified in the changes they undergo. "Our account of the external world", writes Eddington, "must necessarily involve unknowable actors executing unknowable actions. . . . The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in the actions. Perhaps we may say that the differential equations in which this knowledge is embodied are elaborate statements of the same kind as the statement that $2x + 3x = 5x$, whatever x may be".

This abstract knowledge of the physical world's structure is revelational in that it is gained in the first place by observers listening intently to what the world tells them. When using their exactly measuring instruments they ask appropriate questions. Secondly, the observers interpret the answers they get by means of mathematical process strictly determined by the logical laws laid down by the world itself.

At the same time, the principle that we can know things only by living with them is illustrated by Milne's basing his reconstructed physics upon our experience of events as following each other in time. Moreover, scientific knowledge, however remote from our direct experience of the external world, enables us to predict verifiable facts. It therefore in the end widens and systematises that experience and so promotes our living with things.

Even this extreme form of factual knowledge, however, implies some value-knowledge of the advantage which gaining it confers. The physicist is concerned only with factual knowledge, but his activities are prompted by his sense of the value to himself and others of the work in which he is engaged. For the biologist value-knowledge is explicitly important. For while seeking factual knowledge, he deals with living organisms as possessing a reality and value of their own. He gains value-knowledge of them, for instance, by studying their life-histories.¹ Finally, the ultimate inspiration of seekers after scientific

¹ See J. A. Thomson and P. Geddes, *Evolution*, ch. viii.

knowledge is the call, in Milne's phrase, to see into the mind of God. So Einstein tells us that scientific religious feeling, a rapt amazement at the memory of natural law, is the strongest and noblest incitement to scientific research.¹ Scientific knowledge, that is, like all other factual and value-knowledge, in the end owes its deepest meaning to the worth-knowledge which it enables its votaries to attain.

¹ *The World as I See It*, p. 276.

FRANCIS RICHARD JOHN SANDFORD,
FIRST BARON SANDFORD, 1824-1894.

By W. H. G. ARMYTAGE,

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(i) 1824-1886

AS a corollary of the article on Patric Cumin, secretary of the Education Department, in the last number, a short note on his predecessor is necessary in order to complete the assessment of the administrative contribution to the evolution of the English Educational System. We know of the great part played by Sir James Kay Shuttleworth, the first secretary, and of the influence of the second, Lord Lingen. About Francis Sandford, however, there is the briefest of notes in the *Dictionary of National Biography* which tells us nothing of his work.¹

Francis Richard John Sandford, eldest of a family of ten children, had a brilliant father, who at twenty-three had become a professor of Greek at Glasgow, and was twenty-six when Francis was born. He later was knighted at thirty-two, and became an M.P. for Paisley, but his brilliance did not extend to the political field and he resigned his seat a year later. Young Francis, on leaving school, was educated at his father's University and later went on to Balliol College, Oxford, where as Smith Exhibitioner, he graduated B.A. in 1846, with a first in greats (the same time as Thorold Rogers) at the age of twenty-two. He spent the next two years first as a tutor, then at his old school in Sunderland. Two years later he entered the Education Department as an examiner, and shared a room with Lingen, later to become secretary of the Department and Temple, later to be Archbishop of Canterbury. The grant administered was then £70,000 a year, and the Department was contained in three rooms at the Treasury. The year after joining the Department,

¹ See *D.N.B.*, vol. 1, p. 271, by Henry Craik, himself a close associate of Sandford, and *ibid.*, p. 269 for his father Sir Daniel Keyte Sandford.

he married. Unfortunately the union was childless. Six years after he joined the Department he was made assistant secretary.

From 1854 to 1861 he discharged the duties of assistant secretary with Lingen as his chief, and as the dispute over payment by results was occurring, he left the Department on appointment as organising secretary of the International Exhibition, for which Henry Cole was general advisor. His brother, H. B. Sandford, was also associated with the work. His labours were appreciated by the award of a knighthood on 2nd June, 1863. His interests extended, and in November, 1868 he became assistant under-secretary to the Colonial Office, which appointment lasted till 30th January, 1870.¹

He was appointed to the post of Secretary of the Education Department by W. E. Forster on 2nd February, 1870. It was a momentous time, and Forster was intent on introducing his Bill setting up School Boards to supplement the work of the voluntary societies. It was laid before the House of Commons just over a fortnight after Sandford's appointment. This Bill, with its impact of the administrative hand on the private life of every English citizen, needed above all a competent administrator and Sandford's work in this direction was rewarded by the C.B. on 5th August, 1871. Sandford was not only competent, but in a series of appointments he amassed more administrative power over education than any civil servant has had before or since. On 16th January, 1873, he was appointed secretary to the Committee of Council for Education in Scotland (the last person to combine these two posts), and in the February of the following year he became secretary of the Science and Art Department at South Kensington, the body which virtually controlled what technical education there was in the country. Since he was in charge of the administrative strings whereby the State controlled educational policy, he was now a person of considerable importance and consequence in view of the debates which raged as to who should control the schools. Perhaps one of the most reassuring things about his personality was that he was a close friend of Matthew Arnold, who at this time was

¹ Boase, *Modern English Biography*, vol. iii, p. 402.

pleading for a better organisation and more enlightened State control of English education.¹

He is the exemplar of this age of reform, the civil servant extending and enlarging the scope of the *droit administratif*. We do not see much of his personal point of view in the first ten years of his appointment, largely because he was being carried swiftly along in the surge of each fresh legislative addition to the system.

But by 1880, when the legal additions to the work of the Education Department seemed to have been completed with the establishment of full compulsion to attend school, Sir Francis Sandford found that more of his work was taken off his shoulders by his energetic assistant, Patric Cumin. Sandford himself served on the code reform committee, and, to the great disgust of Mundella, was not very helpful. Mundella wrote to his friend Leader, describing the newspaper reports of his code proposals,

Nearly all the press praised my scheme, the *Globe* gave the best and most intelligent article, the silly *Daily News* the worst. It actually ascribed my reforms to Sandford, who (although I praised him and all the permanent officials in order to secure their co-operation) I have dragged along with me.²

When Mundella was in virtual control of the Education Department from Lord Spencer's departure for Ireland in March 1882 till the definite appointment of Lord Carlingford the following year, Sandford was most helpful. Just before Lord Carlingford was appointed, he submitted to Mundella some notes on "impending organic changes" in the Department, pointing out how difficult it was for the permanent official to serve two masters—the Lord-President and the Vice-President, and suggesting that the responsibility should rest with the one who did the work, i.e. the Vice-President. He approved the suggested separation of the educational duties of the Vice-

¹ He brought Arnold's daughter a doll's dressing case in 1866, and was the recipient of Arnold's confidence at times (see G. W. E. Russell, *Letters of Matthew Arnold* (1901), vol. i, p. 400, and vol. ii, p. 261). He edited Matthew Arnold's reports in 1889.

² Editor of the *Sheffield Independent*. Mundella's letters to Leader are in typed transcript form in the library of the University of Sheffield. This is dated 14th August, 1881.

President from his other obligations (such as veterinary administration).¹ The project, however, came to nothing, and though the select Committee that was appointed under H. C. E. Childers to consider the desirability of appointing a minister of education, reported favourably on such an innovation, Gladstone's disapproval prevented anything being done. Sandford left office in the following January to serve on the Charity Commission. On his appointment in 1870 the government grant had stood at £840,000, on his departure it was £2,700,000, an index of the growth of his office.

For the next two years, from January 1884 to February 1886, Sandford was employed by the Government as a Commissioner. One appointment was as a Charity Commissioner. This appointment, which he held with Mr. James Anstie, Q.C., was necessitated by the passing of the London Parochial Charities Act of 1883, and was important in that it was concerned with the reorganisation of the Parochial charities of the City of London.² No longer were charitable doles to be administered to the poor of 52,000 but the money was to be used for the benefit of 4,000,000 Londoners in the form of polytechnics, libraries, and similar educational amenities. He supplemented this activity in 1885 by acting as vice-chairman of the Boundary Commissioners under the Redistribution of Parliamentary Representation that was going forward at that time. He was also sworn of the Privy Council. Two months after he left the office of Charity Commissioners he wrote to Lord Rosebery (addressing him as "my dear Primrose") suggesting that Fearon, a government inspector and friend of Matthew Arnold should succeed Sir Henry Vane as secretary of the Charity Commission. "He is just the man for the place", wrote Sandford, "methodical, accurate and very industrious".³ Whatever his views on voluntary schools, Sandford insisted on the scrupulous working of the educational endowments. Indeed, he saw that it was only by such scrupulous working that they could challenge criticism.

¹ This memorandum is in the library of the University of Sheffield.

² *Life of James Bryce* by H. A. L. Fisher, vol. i, p. 187.

³ British Museum Add. MS. 44497, f. 33. (Gladstone Papers.)

When at the Education Office his chief asset had been his capacity to deal with the Scottish as well as the English prejudices. Lord Dalhousie, as soon as he heard that Sandford was retiring, went to Mundella's office and, finding him out, wrote him a note on a sheet of Privy Council notepaper to ensure that in future administration of Scottish education should be separate from the English. He closed with

The Scotsmen stood Sandford because they knew what an enthusiastic Scotchman he was, but they won't stand anyone else interfering with the head of the Scotch Department whoever he may be.¹

This high esteem in which Sandford was held by the Scots was perhaps responsible for his appointment in the Conservative ministry of September 1885 to February 1886 as Under Secretary of State for Scotland. It was a new appointment, as the Secretaryship for Scotland had only been set up that year. When the Conservatives returned to office in September 1886, Sandford retained the appointment for two more years to get the office working and on its administrative feet. He also, as befitted his experience, became a member of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland at the same time, an appointment which he retained till 1892.

It was only with his retirement from the Education Office that his political sympathies began to show themselves. He was against Home Rule, and was generally regarded as inclining to the Conservative cause. But his work in the educational field was by no means finished, for he was nominated a member of the important Royal Commission on the working of the Elementary Education Acts, known as the Cross Commission, which sat from 1886-1888, and was the most searching examination of the working of the Educational System since the Newcastle Commission "signed its report on 18th March 1861".

(ii) 1886-1894

Hitherto we have merely considered Sandford as the servant of the State, obediently translating into action a policy framed by his minister. It is after 1886 that his real opinions reveal

¹ Lord Dalhousie to A. J. Mundella, 1883 (Mundella Correspondence).

themselves, and illumine much that might otherwise be obscure as to his relations with A. J. Mundella, his chief from 1880 to 1884, and may perhaps explain why he left the Education Office. This revelation of where his true sympathies lay is first apparent in the opinions he voiced as a member of the Cross Commission.

He signed the majority report with a series of reservations which he put forward. These reservations show that he was a much greater supporter of the voluntary schools than even Cardinal Manning, for Sandford was the only one of the twenty-three Commissioners who objected to a review of the accommodation of existing schools on the ground that "some of our best and most popular voluntary schools would be the first to suffer".¹ Many of the reforms that were undertaken during the Vice-Presidency of Mundella were condemned by Sandford, among them the central system for training pupil teachers and the raising of the age of half-timers to eleven and full-timers to thirteen. In the latter connexion his words are worth quotation, illustrating as they do the opposition to the raising of the school leaving age that was demanded by the Liberals like A. J. Mundella, A. H. D. Acland, Sir Henry Roscoe and Lyulph Stanley.

"In the present condition of our labour market, and the prevalence in this country of early and fruitful marriages, it appears to be very unwise to increase the existing pressure upon parents, by preventing children of ten, who have reached a reasonable standard of proficiency from beginning to contribute to their own support. . . .

"And I strongly object to the abolition of all passes to full time work before thirteen, in the employments not dealt with by the Factories and Mines Acts, if a reasonable standard of proficiency has been attained."

But what lays bare the essential outlook of the man is the opinion he expressed later on the system of payment by results.

"I am sorry that anything in our report should seem to under-rate the value and importance of standards, to cast a slur upon the principle of 'Payment by Results', introduced by the Revised Code, or to imply that under the present code, sufficient freedom of classification is not secured to managers and teachers. I fear that if some of our recommendations are acted on, we may see revived the scandals disclosed by the report of the Duke of Newcastle's Commission."

¹ Cross Commission. Final Report 1888 (C 5485), p. 226. This was fact which was eagerly seized upon by the supporters of the Board School system like Lyulph Stanley, who never tired of pointing this out as late as 1893. See his letter in the *Times* for 3rd February of that year.

He signed, with these and other reservations in favour of the voluntary schools, a majority report which was in itself in favour of the voluntary schools, so much so, that a minority group, led by Lyulph Stanley, drew up a report to express the viewpoint of those who supported the School Board system and its extension. With this knowledge of his outlook, it is hard indeed to agree with Professor Adamson when he hails Sir Francis Sandford as the father of the 1902 Act¹ although certain elements in that act were dictated by the motives that inspired Sir Francis Sandford. These opinions can be traced in the recorded divisions of the Commission that took place from the 15th November, 1887 to the 8th May, 1888.²

But it was in the closing years of his life as a peer that he revealed most clearly his position *vis à vis* other figures in the educational world. Created a Baron on 21st January, 1891, he reserved his speeches in the House of Lords entirely for educational topics coupling them with letters to the *Times*. He had drifted so far away from his one time associates that we have the curious spectacle of Lord Lingen writing to A. J. Mundella³ on 21st June, 1893 warning him to be "on the lookout for a certain Bill, as soon as it appears in the House of Commons". He continued:

"Besides its episcopal author, its two most active advocates are our friend Sandford and another Scotchman—a certain Lord *Shand*—though what the deuce he has to do with English Education I don't know. All my amendments are rejected and Sandford's are adopted. Nothing really can mend this Bill which is an attempt to reverse the policy of 1870. The report in to-day's *Times* is a very inadequate one of what passed."

By the 24th Lingen was less anxious and wrote:

"I have managed to get the offensive preamble dropped. A challenge should always be couched in polite terms."⁴

The absorbing interest in Sandford's brief career as an educational spokesman in the House of Lords from 1891-1893, is that he represents the point of view which ultimately triumphed in the administration of Sir Robert Morant. Sandford had no

¹ J. W. Adamson, *English Education, 1789-1902*, p. 468.

² Cross Commission, pp. 446-488 (Final Report).

³ Then President of the Board of Trade.

⁴ Mundella Correspondence, June, 1893.

love for the Radical plan for secondary education, the higher grade school and the intermediate school were in his opinion distractions from the real business of erecting a secondary system. It was for this reason that he spoke against the proposal in the Elementary Education Bill of 1891 (which abolished the payment of school fees) to give fee grants up to the age of fifteen. Sandford's argument was based on "the educational canons" of the schools inquiry commission of twenty-five years before. He maintained that the bright pupil in the elementary school should be encouraged to pass into the secondary school as soon as possible, and that if the pupil was not capable of doing this, the sooner he went to work after he was fourteen the better. This attitude on the part of Sandford and those of his sympathies reflected the sharp division which was taking place between the secondary school and the elementary school containing all the residue after the secondary school had "creamed" it. Sandford's amendment in this case was not adopted. He was an effective critic of the Bill in other directions and spoke eleven times during its passage through the upper house.¹

But his outlook was not always so limited. He introduced the Charity Commission's scheme for remodelling the Sunderland charity at Bingley, converting a series of two doles into a good educational foundation.² He also supported the lowering of the qualifications for entry to the Scottish Universities.

His critical speeches against the Liberal educational policy are best exemplified in the year 1893. A.H.D. Acland had become Vice-President with a seat in the Cabinet, and had promulgated a series of exacting requirements to which elementary schools must conform before they received the government grant. It meant that many of the voluntary schools would go under in face of them, since, with their limited funds, they could not hope to put into effect the structural and sanitary arrangements required by this circular. Sandford took up the struggle on behalf of the voluntary schools, pointing out that the rules were too severe. He illustrated his remarks by referring to the Jews School in London, where if the rule was observed that hat pegs had to be at least one foot apart, they would have to have

¹ Hansard, 20th July, 1891.

² *Ibid.*, 13th May, 1892.

1000 feet of corridor, four feet wide, as the school had 4000 pupils.¹

He was also extremely critical of the Radical plan for county governing bodies of schools, which was avowedly being set up in Wales as an experiment before being set up in England. *Proximus ardet Ucalegon* declared Sandford, as he moved for an address to the Queen to withhold her assent from the proposed scheme to set up such bodies at Carnarvon, and warned his listeners that it was but a prelude to future legislation. The mischief, as Sandford saw it, originated with the Radicals like Lyulph Stanley who, at the meetings of the National Educational Association, prompted government legislation along these lines.²

The tendency of the Education Department to create ad hoc administrative bodies he attacked once more when it applied to Scotland, for the Education Department had appointed by minute on the 1st May, 1893 a committee which impinged on the statutory functions of School Boards. Sandford moved for an address to Her Majesty praying that her consent should be withheld from this minute. He was unsuccessful.³

His struggle for recognition of the voluntary principle in the elementary education of the country was illustrated in the two important measures that the Liberal Government passed this year, The Blind and Deaf Children Act, and the Act raising the school leaving age to eleven. In the first, he moved two amendments, one that the Education Department should only inspect these schools not control them; the other was to limit the power of the school attendance committees as far as these schools were concerned. Both were defeated.⁴ In the second measure, he suggested that making a hard and fast prohibition of work before a child was eleven, might be relaxed in the case of healthy employment in the fields.⁵

He died four months later. The *Times*, recording his death, referred to him as "a model of that special type of character

¹ Hansard, 10th February, 1893. For A. H. D. Acland's work see *Journal of Education*, vol. 79, No. 939.

² Hansard, 21st March, 1893.

³ *Ibid.*, 8th June, 1893.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31st July, 1893.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 28th August, 1893.

which is the salt of the civil service",¹ and referred to him as "one of the men who provided ministers with the raw materials for their policy". In view of the fact that civil servants are supposed to have no prejudice, it is indeed interesting to find one who, after doing so much to carry forward the extension of State authority in Education, should, when released from office, spend what should have been his retirement in stating the case of the voluntary schools and agencies, which, by the consequences of the acts of 1870, 1876, and 1880, were in such great difficulties.

¹ *The Times*, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th January, 1894. *Blackwood's*, March, 1895.

PEACE, WAR AND CULTURE-PATTERNS.¹

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THIS is the tenth lecture which I have had the honour to give annually in this Library. The themes treated in them have many inner connexions, and as the general argument has developed, it has become more and more concerned with questions concerning the nature and the relationships of Personality and Culture.

It was, however, when reading Professor Ralph Linton's chapter in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*² that I learned how interest in the study of these twin subjects has developed in the United States: indeed, they may perhaps be regarded as forming a special branch of study: "Personality in Culture".

Such a discipline might link up psychology, individual and social sociology, anthropology, ethnology, geography and economics with linguistics, phonology, history, philosophy, art, music and the study of manners and morals. A life work for the fortunate professor of this future 'subject'! A John Rylands lecture, "Personality in its Cultural Context"³ attempted to indicate part of its scope.

In this series, the last few discourses have often mentioned war as a new problem for social psychology. Such references are new features in publications concerned with social psychology, and this fact is psychologically interesting.

Obviously, psychologists ought to examine or extend the idea in Dr. Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*⁴ that war itself "is a social theme that may or may not be used in any culture" (p. 30). The purpose of this lecture is to discuss this suggestion.

¹ Amplified from notes of a lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, on the 12th March, 1947.

² Columbia University Press, 1944.

³ BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXX, no. 1, 1946.

⁴ New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., London, Methuen, 1934.

In the limited time, I can offer only brief definitions of terms and they will be used in order to focus our minds. Complete and formally satisfactory definitions would be far from brief, but in partial compensation references will be given.

To-day I ask, "Can *modern* war (the adjective is emphasised) and the types of warfare, if indeed they can be so called, which now threaten us, be understood better by the aid of the culture-pattern theory in some form? May not warfare only, but the state of uneasy peace which we have suffered since 1910 be the expression of a vast culture-pattern, or a relatively minor pattern, superimposed upon a major one, in which the many varieties of behaviour called war have grown, slowly or quickly? If so, to what extent may even recent psychological, sociological and ethnological attempts to explain war be already out of date? And if the culture-pattern theory is helpful, then since culture-patterns can be changed quickly (cf. the Maoris, the Japanese, the Russians) there may either be hope that the next war could be postponed indefinitely, or fear that it may come sooner even than most people expect. Moreover, since culture-patterns not dominated by the idea of the 'naturalness' of war still exist, can we study them with profit? For reasons I have never quite understood, certain expounders and students of religion in this country also delight to describe and study sordid crimes: could militarist-nationalists be persuaded to examine non-warlike cultures in a similarly ambivalent way? The experiment seems worth trying.

Let us consider a brief definition of 'culture-pattern' (fuller accounts are given in my two preceding Rylands lectures).¹ Culture-pattern is the general principle of integration by means of which the customs, institutions and dogmas, the sentiments, interests and values of a culture are woven into a more or less coherent 'pattern'. As Dr. R. H. Thouless writes: ²

The motives to which men may respond and the goals towards which their behaviour may be directed are multitudinous, and every society makes use only of a certain selection of these. The particular selection of potential human purposes that any particular society employs may be said to give it its

¹ "Psychological Implications of the Culture-Pattern Theory", BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXIX, no. 1, 1945 and the 1946 lecture (above).

² In *The Study of Society*, ed. by F. C. Bartlett and others, Kegan Paul, 1939.

characteristic 'pattern'. Different cultures may differ both in the extent to which their activities are subordinated to a single pattern of motivation, and in the kind of pattern they have adopted.

We may focus attention upon this last description, especially upon 'selection' and 'pattern'. The pattern may be woven about different 'centres', such as the ego, age, sex, property or power. Possibly many of the inter-weavings that an arm-chair theorist's ingenuity could suggest may be found working fairly well in some part of the world. After all, a female film-star functioning as colonel of a regiment of fighting men might seem too fantastic to have been invented by any sane person.

As time (about thirteen years) has gone on, the concept has taken more complicated forms, some of which are due to psychological re-thinking of implications of the original idea. A useful distinction is between explicit and implicit culture. To borrow from Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn,¹ explicit culture comprises "all features of a group design for living which might be described to an outsider by participants in the culture".

To illustrate this from war, a Bren gun is an object of explicit culture. The uniform of a unit of the fighting forces might suggest itself as another, were it not for the fact that combatant officers sometimes suddenly refuse to recognise certain uniforms, and 'execute'—using whatever euphemisms may occur to them; to be vehemently rejected by their enemies—certain wearers of explicit badges. This ambiguity in practice, attached to a distinction understood and accepted in theory, strengthens my central argument: that war is rapidly ceasing to have rules.

Implicit culture is "that section of behaviour of which members of the group are unaware, or minimally aware". In many countries the connexion of the Churches with warfare shows both explicit and implicit elements. A British army chaplain may wear combatant officer's uniform with a priest's collar. The first of any letter-group which may follow his name,

¹ "Patterning as exemplified in Navaho Culture", *Language, Culture and Personality*, Menasha, Wis., U.S.A., pp. 109-130, 1941. "Covert Culture and Administrative Problems", *American Anthropologist*, XLV, pp. 213-227, 1943. C. Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly, "The Concept of Culture" in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. by Ralph Linton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944.

signifying special distinction is 'C.F.'. 'D.D.' would, I believe, come second. These are explicit, but there are implicit features of the culture-pattern. Presumably no clergyman is explicitly bound to hold a sacred service to bless a lethal weapon: while some willingly do this, others probably have declined. To many, perhaps to most educated people, the long-standing tendency of our ruling families to put their sons in the Navy, Army or Church, often in this order of preference, is known or acknowledged implicitly rather than explicitly. The custom, up to 1939, that great armament firms appointed to their boards of directors combatant officers of high rank immediately upon their retirement, is implicit to many people; but explicit to students of the international arms trade. The present-day link-up of many physical and biological scientists with preparations for war is implicit to most men in the street—even to a certain number of social philosophers.

Two kinds of *patterns*, distinguished from *configurations*; to be explained in a moment, are defined by Kluckhohn:

A sanctioned pattern, if described, would convey to the hearer or reader an idea of what, in a defined situation, people would do or say if they conformed completely to ideals accepted in the culture.

For example, in stating an ideal English sanctioned pattern, "more than three people at a bus-stop form a queue", the degree of deviation of actual instances of relevant behaviour from the ideal does not matter, but in a behavioural pattern, the attention is focussed upon some mode of what people in fact do.

The expression in behaviour of a sanctioned pattern is to shoot an enemy in uniform unless he surrenders, but the behavioural pattern of bombing Hiroshima has been described by Group-Leader Chester and Dr. J. Bronowski,¹ and by John Hersey in the famous special edition of the *New Yorker*, 31st August, 1946. And this, though speakers in Parliamentary debates in the House often seem studiously to avoid mentioning it, is likely to be the behavioural pattern in future warfare.

Let us distinguish between *pattern* and *configuration*:

Pattern is 'a structural regularity . . . to which there is some degree of conformance on the part of a number of persons', 'a . . . generalisation of behaviour or of ideals for behaviour'.

¹ *The Listener*, XXXVII, no. 946, 13th March, 1947.

Configurations are Edward Sapir's "unconscious systems of meanings" and Benedict's "unconscious canons of choice". Perhaps 'minimally aware' or 'unverbalised' are better descriptive terms than 'unconscious'. These configurations are not unconscious in everyone and are not necessarily unconscious in the sense used by Freud or Jung, though to explain the attitude of some persons, the action of such mechanisms might be postulated with advantage.

Let us take an example which illustrates all these points, and is now sufficiently 'distanced' in time to be discussed coolly. Between 1930 and 1933, the presence and the activities of the Officers' Training Corps in English schools were matters of active discussion. Critics were not necessarily pacifists—in fact, many supported the League of Nations. Some, quoting published opinions of army officers, said that the Corps was not preparing schoolboys for the next war, and while not criticising the infantry training, cited the absence of instruction in gas warfare, or about tanks, though these were certain to play a great part in any war. Others focussed upon the overt aim of the Corps, to train officers, not soldiers in general, and asserted that if no elementary and few secondary schools had O.T.C.'s, the army would be undemocratic. Some pointed out that unless a public school was powerful enough in numbers, prestige or both, to flout the Head Masters' (self elected) Conference, it would not be recognised as 'public'.

A psychologist who asked his friends for their frank opinions might receive answers like these :

1. If war breaks out, I don't want my son to serve in the ranks.
2. I expect him to be commissioned ; that is one reason why I made sacrifices to send him to a public school.
3. Officers ought to be gentlemen.
4. I wish my boy to be trained to lead others (this often went with an overt assumption that a complementary class existed, fitted to be led, and not attending public schools).

Any or all of these arguments were often combined. It might too have been possible to find an ambitious schoolmaster who said frankly that promotion depended in part upon being

a keen O.T.C. officer, and that therefore this consideration guided him. So anyone who writes a social-psychological account of British officer-selection between 1927 and 1947 might usefully draw a distinction between pattern and configuration. In 1940 this distinction might have been easier to explain to some generals than to others. As our configurations turn into patterns we become sophisticated.

What is modern warfare, regarded from the social psychologist's point of view? We may begin with Professor Lasswell's "Violence directed against people outside the community, justified in the name of the community, and accepted by the community".¹ One may ask "Who and what is the Community?" If Mass-Observers had recorded what thousands of people in this country said at 11 a.m. on 3rd September, 1939, would this, even if the sample had been 'representative', have really represented the community? Would it have corresponded entirely with what its members thought? And since no plebiscite was held, how could the community have nullified or rejected the Cabinet's decision? Certainly different levels of Public and Private opinion² might be distinguished in one and the same person. A definition of war becomes even more difficult if we ask whether the present events in Palestine (April, 1947) are to be called war, for the soldier there feels that the absence of rules causes many conflicts in deciding how to behave.

We pass to the definition of Doctors E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bowlby:³ "War is organised fighting between large groups of adult human beings". Yet World War II blurred distinctions between adults and non-adults. In many countries, children helped valuably in the war. Our own Government spoke of 'men' of eighteen, but considered them too immature to vote, and in law they were 'infants'. When a handful of uniformed adults dropped an atom bomb, devised by civilians, which annihilated tens of thousands of adults and children, was this warfare or did it symbolise the end of war as historians and

¹ *World Politics and Social Insecurity*, 1935.

² Cf. Tom Harrisson, "What is Public Opinion?" *Political Quarterly*, XI, 1946.

³ *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, Kegan Paul, 1939.

lawyers knew it? In any case, a definition which includes the term 'fighting' is only with difficulty applicable to conflicts in which atomic bombs and bacteria may be used, since the counter-attack, if any, is not made by the persons attacked, and bacteria will probably harm both sides.

As recently as 1941, Professor D. W. Harding wrote ¹ "A surprising feature of much social violence, including war, is its moderation (p. 13). There is in fact extraordinarily little cool extermination of other people" (p. 15). So even recent definitions of warfare require re-phrasing.

What are the rules of warfare to-day? Do they exist anywhere, codified and accepted even by the Great Powers? Could students like ourselves ascertain these rules if we tried? Some American physicists who worked upon the atom-bomb disagreed with both President Truman and the Navy about the way in which the bomb was to be employed. It is relevant to mention that the chief argument put forward for its use was that it would shorten the war against Japan, not that it was allowable by the rules of warfare. Matters had already got past even that stage of mental tidiness.

A definition to which we shall return to is that of Emery Reves: ² "War takes place whenever and wherever non-integrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact".

Is there any agreed definition of Peace other than the purely negative one of absence of war? By many the absence of such a positive concept is tacitly accepted, yet to a peace-lover it would seem that just as the absence of a satisfactory agreed definition of love does not prevent him from experiencing and knowing that he experiences it, so there can be positive experience of peace, even if it "passeth understanding". That such mental conditions may bore some people is beside the point. But the war-lover may ask "How do people behave peacefully?" The answer is that people are behaving peacefully most of the time.

Dr. Lewis F. Richardson ³ has suggested as a criticism of a

¹ *The Impulse to Dominate*, Allen and Unwin, 1941.

² *The Anatomy of Peace*, Penguin Books, 1947.

³ "Generalised Foreign Politics", *British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplement*, no. 23, 1939.

peaceful attitude *vis à vis* another group, "proved readiness to co-operate". We may leave the matter there: towards people who say they don't know what peace is, I feel like the professor of philosophy who in anguish of spirit said to an unusually persistent questioner "You know damned well what the mind is, so shut up!"

Let us look at a few recent contributions from specialists on the subject of war.

A monumental pair of volumes by Professor Quincy Wright on *The Causes of War*¹ have recently appeared. He classifies and summarises recent contributions.

Biologists emphasise the impropriety of analogies between animal and human warfare. The chief contribution to our knowledge of the causes of modern war have been made by psychologists, particularly the analysts and the attitude-measurers. All consider war to be a function of social customs and institutions.

Anthropologists emphasise the conventional and customary nature of war, and regard it as an invention, widely diffused in the world.

While the older sociologists assumed the correctness of the analogy between international conflict and the biological struggle for existence, and therefore tended to regard war as 'necessary' for human progress, their successors regard it as a species of the genus conflict, applicable to strife between classes, in industry, in the family and civil strife. (The attitude of the social psychologist makes him doubt the usefulness of calling these war.) All the above investigators tend to insist that the factors causing war are extremely complex but inherently controllable.

Wright asserts that most publications about the 'economic causes' or determinants of war have been by historians or publicists rather than by professional economists. He says that in textbooks of economics studied at present, war hardly figures at all. Thorstein Veblen in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* and the Marxists mention and discuss war.

He is optimistic about the contributions of those social psychologists who employ the concepts of personality and culture,

¹ Cambridge University Press, 1942.

combining the data of psychology, sociology and anthropology. They, he thinks, may be able to suggest cures.

It is not irrelevant to interpolate the suggestion that since for centuries it has been easy to make a profession of writing about war (the ability has been known to run in distinguished political families) and after every war leaders usually write their memoirs, war themes form a powerful vested interest. Writing about peace is less esteemed socially, less popular, less lucrative—and less easy. Such facts may deter the spread of thinking about peace.

A point made by Wright is that the waging of war by the political leaders occurs in a highly symbolic form. Until recently, they and the masses led had no acquaintance with the actual conditions of war 'behind' the symbols, and this is still true of many Americans. Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister declared "We shall not sheathe the sword" before entering upon a war in which probably nobody who mattered, including himself, believed that the sword would be used. Blockade and propaganda were in fact the knock-out blows of World War I. The orators employ easily understood symbols, or abstractions which are not understood. Both these forms of expression may be seriously misleading, and not always by accident. Yet as Wright puts it, the muscle-movements which actually declare war "must occur in a context of verbal legitimacy".

He suggests that the concepts of psycho-analysis and of relativity have helped to promote a general feeling of insecurity in the post-war world.

Much remains to be done by psychologists if they wish to reduce the threat of war for, as he says :

Arguments which influence opinion often have little support in social science, and truths affirmed by social scientists often have little influence upon the movements of opinion in contemporary societies. This suggests that little should be expected from studies of the statistics of populations, commerce, finance and armaments or the technicalities of law and procedure in explaining war. It is only as such matters affect opinion that they cause war, and opinion is moved by symbols of such vague meaning that no precise correlation with statistical series or refined analyses is to be expected. The causes of wars must be studied directly from indices of opinion, not indirectly from indices of conditions, even though the two have an overlapping vocabulary.

This points to the necessity of studying to-day's channels of communication, particularly the Press, radio and films, to see how this state of affairs can be improved. As an example may be quoted the publicity given by the B.B.C. to Hersey's account of Hiroshima, and a whole week's broadcasts upon the uses and abuses of atomic energy.

Wright points out that while, in the past, small wars had localised effects, like small eruptions on the skin, the events of the last two wars have been comparable to the outbreak of a general fever, seriously involving the whole organism, i.e. the whole world.

Perhaps it is now unnecessary to spend much time in refuting the belief that war is a biological necessity, a universal law of Nature, though the assertion, in one of its many forms, that war is 'due to human instincts' needs more consideration. Yet it should be noted that recently throughout a whole week, experts tried to explain on the radio how the next war might be fought. And it is hard to conceive anything less instinctive than the behaviour of the atomic scientists and of their thousands of helpers who telescoped fifty years into four as the result of super-human efforts of thinking, experimenting and organisation at the very highest level. Yet we still read certain 'explanations' of warfare by writers who seem not to have noticed even the last stages of World War I.

In his article "The Nature of War and the Myth of Nature" ¹ reprinted as a chapter of his book *Man's Most Dangerous Fallacy: the Myth of Races*, Professor M. F. Ashley Montagu points out the very different types of conflict between organisms which some writers term 'fighting'. He writes:

The illegitimate use of such terms as struggle, fighting, force and so on, when applied to plant and animal life, and the deliberate confusion of these terms with war, is too often made and far too often allowed to pass unchallenged. I cannot resist quoting Professor Pollard in this connexion, who entertainingly remarks of this confusion:

The sun and the moon, we suppose, declare war with great regularity because they get into opposition every month. Parties in the House of Commons are perpetually at war because they are opposed. The police wage war because they are a force; for *naturally* if we use force against a criminal, we must needs make

¹ *Scientific Monthly*, LIV, pp. 342-353, 1942.

war upon other communities. War, indeed, will last for ever, because men will never "cease to struggle". So the League of Nations has obviously failed whenever a stern parent is caught chastising a peccant child: and "fighting" will go on without end because drowning men will fight for life, doctors will fight disease and women will fight for places at drapery sales. And this is war! ¹

Professor Bryce is quoted as asserting that until the days of the French Revolution, men never fought to impose their own type of civilisation upon others. Professor Montagu argues that war did not arrive until men reached the agricultural state of development, not more than 20,000 years ago. Then came property, then industry, then wealth, power, ambition and finally the desire to acquire additional property, including slaves, in war. "The modern most potent cause of war is economic rivalry—a purely cultural phenomenon having no biological base whatsoever."

Recently Dr. Ruth Benedict's article "The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations", ² approximates two concepts; one ancient, and, some would say, shaky, the other new, plastic and perhaps untried. The first is National Character, the second, Culture-Pattern.

She says, "Every nation in Europe and Asia has simultaneously denied and boasted that it had a National Character". It has been called a myth in an eloquent book by Mr. Hamilton Fyfe ³ and has been carefully examined from the sociologist's standpoint by Professor Morris Ginsberg ⁴ who shows that much of what is called 'national character' is national reputation. In a slightly different form the valuable concepts, that a community may have a 'modal personality-structure' or 'basic character-structure' have been put forward by Erich Fromm, ⁵ Abram Kardiner, ⁶ and Ernest Beaglehole. ⁷ They are all developed from ideas closely related to those of culture-patterns.

¹ *Vincula*, London, 1925.

² *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, vol. 8, pp. 274-279, June, 1946.

³ *The Illusion of National Character*.

⁴ "National Character", *British Journal of Psychology*, XXXII, pp. 183-204, 1942.

⁵ *The Fear of Freedom*, Kegan Paul.

⁶ *The Individual and Society, and Psychological Frontiers of Society*, Columbia University Press, 1945.

⁷ "Character Structure", *Psychiatry*, VII, no. 2, 1944.

To the anthropologist, the study of national character is a study of learned cultural behaviour. For several decades before the war, anthropologists had done pioneer work, in this field, in compact primitive communities. During the last decade, theoretical points made by anthropologists about cultural conditioning had been widely accepted. Anthropologists had presented their case convincingly enough so that there was wide agreement that social arrangements are of fundamental importance in shaping any people's tenets about life, whether they are assumptions about the function of the State, economic motivations, relations between the sexes, or dependence upon the supernatural. The forms these tenets take in our own cultural background were no longer generally considered to be direct consequences of human biology, and 'human nature' was no longer considered as a sufficient explanation of them. Behaviour, even in civilised nations, was increasingly understood as ways of acting and thinking which developed in the special kind of social environment characteristic of that part of the world.

Dr. Benedict makes the point that an anthropologist, asked to describe a *primitive* society, will focus upon certain features which he has been trained to regard as especially important, yet so far few or no European nations have been studied in this way.

Habit formation in a special social environment; the rewards and punishments bestowed by society; the praise allotted to certain kinds of achievement; the connotations given to exercise of authority, and to submission to it, in day-by-day living; the degree to which responsibility for his own conduct was entrusted to the individual—all such questions had been regarded as essential in cultural investigations of behaviour in primitive societies, and had hardly been raised in studies of European nations. In classic studies of civilised countries, the approach is, ordinarily, either historical or economic, or political.

Such segmental approaches are valuable and necessary, yet they need much supplementation. Let us look at the questions which an ethnologist might ask about a simple community, and suggest examples bearing upon war and peace in our own English culture-pattern.

1. *Habit formation.* Consider the public school and the elementary schools. How far do they respectively induce in later life, anxiety to find and then to follow a leader, a readiness to lead or a love of independence? Are early habits of obedience implanted in the home—if so, is this done by parents or nurses? Or in schools for the young; if so, in nursery schools or 'prep.' schools? Are some habits of obedience to verbal commands or precepts grafted on to earlier conditionings, connected with feeding, weaning and elimination, and therefore possibly supported by intense unconscious feelings of guilt? Professor Kimball

Young's *Handbook of Social Psychology*¹ gives a set of tables comparing the early education of various nations, e.g. the Americans, Marquesans, Balinese, the Nazis, Japanese, etc.

2. *Social rewards and punishments.* What is the social and financial value attached to rewards for prowess in war and in peace respectively? Note, for example, in our country the surprise with which some older M.P.'s greeted Parliament's recent decision not to reward the leaders in World War II with money, and the differences of opinion, possibly following an 'age-line', concerning the cessation of the nation's pension to the Nelson family. Compare this with the present difficulty in finding incentives for certain kinds of necessary or dangerous work like house-building, coal mining and nursing.

3. *Degrees of individual responsibility for one's conduct.* In peace-time it might be said that the individual is held completely responsible; in war, as Professor J. C. Flugel says,² he may delegate his conscience, unless he is a conscientious objector. The position was not always clear here, but it was far simpler than in Nazi Germany. Whether the majority in a country thinks war to be 'natural' or not depends largely upon such facts, as dictators know well.

One may ask whether civilised nations are not too complicated to study by methods which may be sufficient for small communities. Dr. Ruth Benedict answers that partly offsetting this defect are certain great advantages; the multiplicity of the facts known and recorded about Western nations; the historical research, the statistics, the many available records of personal experience, the novels and the fact that civilised languages are recorded and ordered in grammatical categories.

4. *Social stratification and attitudes towards property and authority.* There has been little attempt in England to investigate class differentiation and attitudes towards property and authority in the detached way in which they would be approached by an anthropologist studying a primitive tribe.

The relation of warfare to property is strikingly illustrated in this country: note, for example, the willingness to conscript

¹ Kegan Paul, 1946.

² Chapter XIX of *Man, Morals and Society*, Duckworth, 1945.

life but not property, shown in the last ten years. The attitude to property depends only in part upon whether one is rich or poor. Dr. Benedict says :¹

Property may be, as in Holland, something which is an almost inseparable part of one's own self-esteem, something to be added to, kept immaculately, and never spent carelessly. This is true, whether the individual belongs to court circles or can only say in the words of a proverbial expression : " If it's only a penny a year, lay it by ". Alternatively, the attitude toward property may be quite different, as in Roumania. An upper-class person may be, or become, a pensioner of a wealthy man, without loss of status or self-confidence ; his property, he says, is not ' himself '. And the poor peasant argues that, being poor, it is futile for him to lay anything by : " he would ", he says, " if he were rich ". The well-to-do increase their possessions by other means than thrift, and the traditional attitude toward property differences associate wealth with luck or exploitation, rather than with assured position as in Holland. In each of these countries, as in other European nations, many of which have deeply embedded special attitudes toward property, the specific nature of these assumptions can be greatly clarified by study of what is required of the child in his handling and ownership of property, and under what sanctions and conditions expanding opportunities are allowed in adolescence, and at his induction into full adult status.

I leave to experts the task of framing answers to Dr. Benedict. As a social psychologist, I anticipate that to be valuable, these replies should be thought out with particular reference to the sub-culture pattern of the writer. For example, the relation of warfare to social stratification is complex but its importance is undoubted. And many historians themselves are part of a fairly homogeneous social stratum. The theory of Elliot Smith and Perry,² relating the early cause of war to social stratification has not been properly discussed. (See also J. Cohen.³)

Let us turn to the definition of warfare already given by Emery Reves in his book *The Anatomy of Peace*. Presumably it will be criticised on the ground that Reves, like so many of his predecessors, attributes war to one cause only. Yet probably few will disagree with his tenet that to-day the main stumbling-block to world peace is national sovereignty.

Can insistence upon national sovereignty, and the actions which accompany it, be regarded as derived from a

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² W. J. Perry, *The Growth of Civilisation*, Methuen, 1926 ; G. Elliot Smith, *Human History*, Cape, 1934.

³ *Human Nature, War and Society*, Watts, 1946.

culture-pattern which dominates and integrates almost all other designs for living? It is clear that belief in national sovereignty does not arise out of original 'Human Nature', but is a very recent development.

Without mentioning the culture-pattern theory, so far as I can ascertain, Reves gives some excellent examples. He mentions that educated people have abandoned the idea that their planet is the centre and the most important part of the universe, and that the Copernican theory is generally accepted by them. Yet

Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the centre of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Yet this is the only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national governments of our world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our Press and radio. All the conclusions, principles and policies of the peoples are necessarily drawn from the warped picture of the world obtained by so primitive a method of observation.

Within such a contorted system of assumed fixed points, it is easy to demonstrate that the view taken from each point corresponds to reality. If we admit and apply this method, the viewpoint of every single nation appears indisputably correct and wholly justified. But we arrive at a hopelessly confused and grotesque over-all picture of the world.

Our Government and all the other national governments construct round our own centre a mental pattern which we regard as the only 'real' ones. So Reves quotes, in ways which in turn would be supremely irritating to an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, etc., different national accounts of international events between the two world wars, looked at from some of the major national vantage-points.

The Englishman may read about America's point of view, which perhaps he has never seen stated as a whole, with some sympathy, some scepticism and, as he reads further, with not a little irritation. The same twenty years looked at from the fixed point of the British Isles is described (p. 15) in a way which will seem only natural and right to a British reader, but reassuring in a queer way which might suggest a few problems to a questioning mind. The account from the point of view of France may stun him. The Italian apologia will annoy and the German infuriate him. From "the vantage point of Moscow" comes a summary

of 'events' which may split his mind. The Swiss, the Swedish, the Japanese accounts are not given. Whom should you choose to write the Spanish one?

The dramatic and strange events between the two world wars could be just as well described from the point of view of any other nation, large or small. From Tokyo or Warsaw, from Riga or Rome, from Prague or Budapest, each picture will be entirely different and, from the fixed national point of observation, it will always be indisputably and unchallengeably correct. And the citizens of every country will be at all times convinced—and rightly so—of the infallibility of their views and the objectivity of their conclusions.

It is surely obvious that agreement, or common understanding between different nations, basing their relations on such a primitive method of judgment, is an absolute impossibility. A picture of the world pieced together like a mosaic from its various national components is a picture that never and under no circumstances can have any relation to reality, unless we deny that such a thing as reality exists.

The world and history cannot be as they appear to the different nations, unless we disavow objectivity, reason and scientific methods of research.

But if we believe that man is, to a certain degree, different from the animal and that he is endowed with a capacity for phenomenological thinking, then the time has come to realise that our inherited method of observation in political and social matters is childishly primitive, hopelessly inadequate and thoroughly wrong. If we want to try to create at least the beginning of orderly relations between nations, we must try to arrive at a more scientific, more objective method of observation, without which we shall never be able to see social and political problems as they really are, nor to perceive their incidence. And without a correct diagnosis of the disease, there is no hope for a cure.

So Reves argues, there are different patterns in the minds of observers in different countries. To make or to alter such patterns is the aim of the modern propagandist, who is immensely powerful in these days of the Press, films and radio. But the concept of national sovereignty dominates all these patterns, and seriously menaces the continuance of civilisation. Perhaps President Truman, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Molotov would not agree. Yet how can there be World Peace if there are eighty different national sovereignties?

Only a few years ago it was common to hear "What has World Peace to do with psychologists?" Now the question seems oftener to be "How can psychologists help to make World Peace a reality?" Probably no serious psychologists doubt that great psychological issues are involved, whatever can be done about them, now or later.

It might be useful for those of us who are connected with universities to ascertain if recently there has been a closer link between scientists' activities and considerations of national 'welfare'.

After any victorious war many people feel a strong upsurge of national sentiment, for a variety of reasons. It is, however, obvious that this is likely to happen in the defeated countries too. But while between the wars we used often to hear "Science is international", in 1947 we hear with increasing frequency that in the 'national interest' (not 'in the interests of national security', the phrase during the war) this or that ought to be done. And whether the action in any particular instance is morally desirable or not, the fact of the increase in the nationalisation of science is a matter of special psychological interest, in that it has now spread to psychology itself. We frequently read of psychological reforms urged to increase our national prosperity.

A considerable part in forming this nationalistic-intellectual culture-pattern is played by scientists of different kinds. The activities of scientists will be considered instead of 'Science' a misleading word, which can even be used deliberately to mislead unphilosophical thinkers. But, for reasons not difficult to discover, though seldom sought, it is impossible to trace and record all the behaviour of present-day scientists in a scientifically satisfactory way. Not only is there deliberate concealment, or a ban by "M.I. 5" upon knowing what is done: there is also the difficulty that some of the scientists' researches—atomic energy perhaps being the most overt—are being developed simultaneously for both peaceful and warlike purposes. It is no secret that an important task of the American scientists in the last year of the War, as well as to-day, was to 'handle' psychologically and administratively, their military colleagues. This and many other signs show that scientists are deeply involved in the military machine. Many physical scientists may now be working in an organisation for whose members the immediate prospects of national strife seem much more probable than those of even long-distant international peace.

Is this position of being 'caught up', however, peculiar to the physical scientists? Is not some important bacteriological

research governed entirely by considerations of unrestricted germ-warfare? Moreover a few psychological writings seem coloured by similar assumptions. I am merely recording this fact in the positive, i.e. non-normative, manner that psychologists desire.

The title of an oft-quoted book is *The "Fight for Our National Intelligence"* (Professor Pollard might wish to add this to his list of uses of the word 'fight'). In a recent article its author remarks: "The greatest amount of work on intelligence tests has been done with school children, *but fortunately the needs of the Services during the war* (italics mine) have greatly stimulated the development of intelligence tests appropriate for adults". The article quotes a psychologist as saying (in March, 1939) in an address to educationalists "This part of the nation's capital (i.e. highly intelligent children) must not be wasted by failing to provide education for those able to profit by it. In the fierce competition of to-day between national groups, no nation can hope to survive if it persistently ignores these considerations". One nation, which perhaps before 1939 ignored them less than we did, was Germany. Still, she ignored others much more important, and paid for it.

The possibility that a branch of psychology may be developed and used by the British as a means of fighting for their national intelligence, or upholding it against all comers, is fairly new. Yet why try to increase the use of our national intelligence unless one of its most important functions will be to preserve a state of affairs in which intelligent people of all nations can co-operate to prevent the destruction of civilised man? Half a dozen atom bombs dropped upon the English cities would render the intelligence of most inhabitants useless.

The statement sometimes made, both here and in the U.S.A., that World War II put psychology and ethnology on the map might suggest that some who helped in this operation are illustrating the functional autonomy of untransformed motives. A demonstration of this possibility appears in Chapter XIV of Professor Kimball Young's *Handbook of Social Psychology* (1946). Though entitled "The Psychology of War and of Military Moral" the chapter opens at the point where war is

supposed to have been declared: "We shall begin with the selection and training of military personnel". Professor Young then proceeds to describe in detail what psychologists, under direction from the Government, do. Yet this may cast little more light upon the really important and difficult question, why wars occur nowadays, than would accounts of the activities in wartime, of manufacturers of uniforms or of patriotic songs—for these practitioners, too, are put on the map by wars. There is really little about the causes of war in Professor Young's book.

With a closely reasoned argument Dr. R. H. Thouless, in his *General and Social Psychology*,¹ attributes warfare, at least, perhaps, as we knew it up to about say 1930, to our aggressive-acquisitive culture-pattern, coming into conflict with rather similar ones. Were this a discussion at a popular level, I might be strongly tempted to assent, probably with approval from very many professional colleagues. A book often quoted is Durbin and Bowlby's *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, which, however, has been criticised by Dr. J. M. Blackburn in his *Psychology and the Social Pattern*.²

Criticism of their explanation of war in terms of human aggressiveness is chiefly along the lines that though their book contains much (usually uncritically quoted from the Freudians) about human aggressiveness, there is in it little about war, as it actually happened, even in 1914-1918.

I should like, however, to begin my examination of this view of aggressiveness by going back farther than is customary. The subject-matter of science is of two kinds: phenomena or 'appearances' (not to sight only) and concepts, or patterns in someone's mind, made in order to subsume the experiences into comprehensible schemes. You and I may have no doubt that light is falling upon this desk, yet the concepts introduced to explain 'light' will vary with the progress of physics, often usually becoming more complicated and difficult to grasp as the science progresses.

We begin with phenomena to which the name 'aggressive action' is given. It will conduce to clearness if we confine

¹ University Tutorial Press, London.

² Kegan Paul, 1945.

ourselves at present to recordable acts and postpone the consideration of alleged or imputed experiences. Let us then speak of acts of aggression rather than of 'aggressiveness'.

What does aggression mean? A dictionary, citing as sources of its derivation *ad* and *gressus*, suggests that it means "taking a step towards". With what purpose, it may be asked? One human being (and it is human aggressiveness we are considering) might take the first step towards another with intent either to help or to injure. Perhaps any behaviour, whether consciously or unconsciously motivated, which alters or interferes with another person's complete freedom of action, thought or feeling, is aggressive in this 'pure' sense. Yet, does a parent who succours a child commit an act of aggression?

To write like this is not to indulge in quibbles or mere word-spinning; a phrase occasionally used by people who dislike having their verbal habits upset. Apparently, for some psychologists, if A does anything which modifies what B was doing or intending to do, since A "takes a step towards", his action is aggressive. He may touch your arm to deter you from walking into the traffic, or save you from a fit of depression by offering a loan—is this aggressive? A phrase sometimes used in psychological writings is 'aggressive love-making'. Apart from the possible and frequent confusion, common in these writings, of love with sexual desire, the consideration may be omitted that any expression of love for another involves taking a step towards him or her, literally or metaphorically.

If, however, we allow that aggression nowadays means 'step-taking with intent to hurt', we now come up against the problem "Is aggressiveness a human instinct?" I have discussed this at length in a previous Rylands lecture,¹ and will not repeat the argument here. But since the word 'instinct' may have been ambiguous from the start, and many years have been necessary to tease out all the possible meanings of Freud's term 'sexuality'—if indeed the task is yet complete—so perhaps 'aggressiveness' will be analysed into simpler concepts. It is not irrelevant to mention that if its use by English-speaking psychologists

¹ "Are there Human Instincts?", BULLETIN OF THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, XXVII, 1942.

owes anything to the fact that it arrived in our textbooks via German and Latin, the circumstance that both these languages belonged to culture-patterns in which militarism or intent-to-hurt were dominant, might be taken into account. It would be interesting to know the number and range of synonyms for aggressiveness in the languages of gentler peoples who yet take steps towards others.

Clearly too, Gordon W. Allport's theory¹ that motives may be transformed, especially through fusion with others, and that these transformed motives may become functionally autonomous, may alter the whole picture. The best type of school prefect who seeks for and enjoys taking responsibility is aggressive in a loose sense, but his aggressiveness can be very complex and subtle.

It is difficult to decide whether to spend much time upon the next hypothesis, but since it seems to be accepted by many psychologists (certainly not by all) it should be mentioned. It is that we possess a reservoir of unconscious hatred and destructive impulses, constantly replenished. What, we may ask, is the evidence, except that some leading thinker said so? This is not the place to argue in detail the view that Freud's use of pictorial analogies, obviously useful and perhaps necessary in developing an entirely new concept, has retarded progress in psychological thinking. As a constant visualiser, I must confess that I find the greatest difficulty in imagining both the reservoir and its contents. I constantly ask myself "Does this assumption make sense, psychologically, physiologically, neurologically or metaphysically? Many psychologists including some, like Professor Flügel, deeply influenced by psychoanalysis, are far from dogmatic about this. They, with Professors W. McDougall² and J. Drever,³ point with much more justification to the fact that whether a human tendency towards aggression, pugnacity or self-assertion (for they use different terms) is innate or not, it will have plenty of chances to arise during life as a result of the thwarting of other impulses, either by the physical environment

¹ *Personality*, Constable, and Henry Holt, New York.

² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Methuen.

³ *Instinct in Man*, Cambridge University Press.

or by other people. Professor Dollard and others ¹ have studied extensively the conditions of such thwarting and the different types of behaviour which result from it. This naturally leads to psychoanalytic explanations, e.g. often the aggressive impulse is repressed into the unconscious or the repressed person is ambivalent, i.e. feels emotions of opposite tendency towards the thwarting cause.

Perhaps a little re-examination is allowable. In particular one wishes to know if this concept of ambivalence is believed to be applicable to all love. Is there no perfect love, free from any admixture of hate? Fortunate people who believe this are unlikely to seek the professional services of psychoanalysts, or indeed of psychotherapists at all.

It is fair to speculate, as Dr. J. Cohen does in his unusually penetrating analysis of this subject in reference to warfare, that inferences are possible from the fact that Freud developed his later ideas of human aggressiveness and hatred during the most depressing time in Vienna. He never rose mentally above the sub-culture-pattern in which he lived, and as Professor Harding suggests, Freud's ideas on Government were not far removed from Hitler's. Writers like Christopher Caudwell, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm have made this point. It is time that social psychologists defined their attitude towards such criticism of what by some Freudians seem to be regarded as axioms, and in doing so, assessed the significance of the possibility that at least for a short time, they may expect professional advancement in a society which puts hatred and malice before friendliness, dominance before co-operation. Until recently almost all doctors made their living from disease and disability, not from health, yet the concept of social medicine is rapidly developing.

Nobody will deny that aggressiveness played a great part in waging the last war—even to write this might seem a blasphemous use of understatement—but while in wars centuries ago a very high percentage of the armies was aggressive, and the civilians kept out of the fighting, it cannot be emphasised too often that in World War II a high percentage of people participated

unaggressively, including many in uniform. It is perhaps significant that recently an otherwise undistinguished examination script contained the not entirely muddled query " If this war is due to instinct, why must we have a large Pay Corps ? "

Recent criticism of the aggressiveness theory of war is along the following lines. It fails to distinguish between the aggressiveness of the war-makers, which can be very real indeed (though frequently personal greed, still socially disapproved if found out, masquerades as socially approved aggressiveness) and the attitudes of the general population, many of whom may not know of the impending war, of the combatant, semi-combatant, and non-combatant soldiers, and of the victims. In a war involving more than half the population of the world, a vast number of people who had nothing to do with declaring war suffered passively. Often aggressiveness had to be stirred up and intensified even in the fighters (we have recently read about the experimental army 'hate schools', abolished as a result of psychiatrists' reports), in the uniformed sections many people of both sexes lived an unaggressive life and yet helped to win the war, 'back-room boys' and scientists are unlikely to have done their best thinking if viscerally stirred; 'beating the enemy' cannot have been a constant day-and-night goal giving incentive to all non-combatants, as the excellent book *War-Factory*¹ among others, showed. Primitive aggressiveness—if one can use such a term, would probably become transformed and fused with other 'drives'. As a result, the fusion may be more correctly described by another name and perhaps by that of another drive with which it has become fused. A man might have enlisted to beat the enemy, then have become fascinated by a new mechanical means of doing so, have found that he could improve it and conduct important research, rewarded by promotion, and eventually have enjoyed ordering people about. His final experience will be far removed from primitive aggressiveness.

Yet if the kind of culture-pattern in which Freud, we, and many Americans have been brought up is to be described as 'aggressive-acquisitive', and if we assume that this fact has played a great part in causing wars in the past, the main thesis

¹ By Mass Observation, Gollancz.

of this lecture is unaffected—that war is the expression of a culture pattern.

Positive criticism of the culture-pattern theory has taken directions like the following :

1. Is the pattern which one observer 'perceives' in a community (the verb is used vaguely) likely to be 'perceived' by others, expert and inexperienced? An account of 'the Germans' by someone who is at present on the Continent primarily as a soldier in the army of occupation, and speaks little German, would obviously differ from that by an English observer who spoke German fluently and had lived there between the World Wars. Such a person is Lord Vansittart, though in his accounts of the Germans he seldom or never mentions that he had talked to, to say nothing of sympathising with, German working-men and women. Elsewhere I have pointed out the tendency, at one time, for writers and speakers to be content with comparing the alleged mentality of nations with the alleged mentality of animals—dogs (preferably mad), bees, wolves, vampires. Later, perhaps, came the custom of applying one adjective to a whole nation—at the moment the fashionable one, both in politics and in psychology, appears to be 'aggressive'.

Is it completely fatuous to apply an adjective to the observed behaviour of a social group? Perhaps not, if the group is small enough to be really observable, if all reporters attach the same meaning to the word and if translated from one language to another, this fact is stated, together with some indication whether the word 'dates' in the first language. Lastly, it would be good if users of the borrowed term really understood both languages.

Here the distinction between 'pattern' and 'configuration' is useful. The number of instances in which the pattern was observed, and their statistical significance, should be stated.

People who have lived all their lives in England, with its very striking varieties of behaviour characterising different geographical areas, its distinctions between urban-residential, urban-industrial and rural life, and its complicated and ever-present social stratification, occasionally raise a quizzical eyebrow when our national character is confidently described by

the stranger within our gates. But the English ought to admit that their own views of other nations are open to the same criticism.

Perhaps the comment has not been made often enough, that several different patterns may be perceived in the same culture, by people especially prone through temperament, training or education to notice them, and again the 'pattern-configuration distinction' should be remembered here. Very complex patterns appear to be perceptible at present in the French nation (cf. Phyllis Bottome's *Individual Countries*¹ and *Faith in France*,² with preface by Professor D. W. Brogan) I offer a concrete example. English people who have merely spent holidays in France sometimes ask "How can a nation claim to lead the World's culture when one goes about its country in imminent risk of contracting typhoid fever?" The answer that culture must not be confused with plumbing comes readily to the intellectual's tongue, yet I remember the look of baffled amusement with which it was received by members of an American Air Force Unit stationed in England.

It might be possible to employ another method of investigation, to enquire into the factors 'beneath' the culture-pattern which so to speak, push up one piece of the fabric as in a relief, or (to mix metaphors) may stain parts of it so that the pattern is more easily visible. Perhaps, too, antagonistic sets of forces may be discovered tending to make different patterns—themselves antagonistic.

Little has been written about how it feels to be part of a well-marked culture-pattern; though presumably a good deal of the work carried out under the titles of 'mass-observation', and 'participant observation' might be re-examined with this in view. Certain autobiographies might also be studied. Dr. Marie Jahoda once suggested to me that social psychologists in training might undertake a 'social analysis' of themselves and their colleagues. This would be different from Freudian psychoanalysis, which seems sometimes to create a special culture-pattern grafted on to Freud's.

¹ Allen and Unwin, 1947.

² *Faith in France*, Sherratt and Sons, Manchester, 1947.

Let us consider a way in which this might be attempted. After preliminary talks and discussions, and reading of books by writers like Margaret Mead's *Growing Up in New Guinea*¹ and *Coming of Age in Samoa*,² articles by Marie Jahoda³ and Florence Kluckhohn⁴ and selected publications of 'Mass-Observation', the investigator-in-training might be asked to write an account of his or her own Growing up in Great Britain, with special reference to social stratum, religious and political affiliations and the attitudes inculcated towards parents, siblings and the opposite sex. Certain parts might be marked 'Confidential', to be read only by selected persons. As a result of comparing the accounts in class discussion, a picture of the general culture-pattern and of its sub-patterns might be drawn. Help could be obtained from schemes of investigation used by Kardiner, Beaglehole and from studies made by Dr. J. A. Waites.⁵

Of particular interest might be a detailed account of the 'subject's' attitude to parents, to authority in general, to religion (both as experience and as a formal frame for behaviour) and to social strata 'above' and 'below' him, with special reference to the degree to which he 'knows his place' and accepts it, considers himself movable or immovable in the social scale of his own country, or estimates that he would be socially happier in another.

It might be possible to study by questionnaires and interviews the nature and the relative strength of sentiments connected with parents, religion, social stratum and country, to see how their relative strength compares in different people of apparently the same culture-pattern. Protestants, Catholics and Jews living

¹ Penguin Books.

² Penguin Books.

³ "Some Ideas on Social and Psychological Research", *Sociological Review*, XXX, 1, pp. 63-80, 1938. "Incentives to Work", *Occupational Psychology*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, pp. 20-30, January, 1942.

⁴ "The Participant Observer Technique in Small Communities", *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, No. 3, November, 1940.

⁵ "An Inquiry into the Attitudes of Adults towards Property in a Lancashire Urban Area", *British Journal of Psychology*, XXXVI, pp. 33-42, 1945. Also "Attitudes towards Property", and "Property: A Study in Social Psychology", theses deposited in Manchester University.

in the same town and of similar economic status might be compared. The mutual relationships of sentiments might be studied. To what extent are certain types of sentiment bound up with each other, and has the degree of intimate interlocking varied as years went on? In parts of England there is a strong tendency for land-owners to be Church of England and Conservative, and in the Fens at least, agricultural workers tend to be non-conformist and non-Conservative. Attitude measurement and factor analysis may throw light upon this (a possibility suggested in an unpublished paper read by Dr. H. J. Eysenck to the British Psychological Society on 11th April, 1947).

Since sentiments are more easily developed around persons and things than around ideas, it might be possible to examine whether there is a significant correlation between lack of 'intellectual' education, and the tendency to think of abstract political and moral issues primarily in terms of persons (leader, Führer). Does the person of the Archbishop of Canterbury, for example, exert such an influence on the Church of England as that of the Pope on the Church of Rome? Can workers for peace hope to weave a sentiment around any living leader comparable to that which existed for 'Monty' in the war? If not, what can be done?

The investigator's complexes, both in the psychoanalytic sense and in the sense of 'untidy' or unformed sentiments should also be studied. 'Uprooted' or 'displaced' persons are unlikely to be free from complexes about both their native country and the land or lands in which they are guests.

But if, as seems possible, a sentiment in its early formative stages may resemble a complex, in its 'untidiness' and lack of understandable inner structure, that this too may be true of the late stages of its decay and that repression may also occur in the formation of a sentiment, these possibilities seem important in the study of one's own culture-pattern.

In this connexion, the recent rapid development of methods and channels of communication (Press, radio, film)¹ is very important. By presenting ideas visually to millions who cannot

¹Footnote of *Made for Millions* (ed. F. Laws) 1947, London. Contact Publisher.

read or write (cf. the early film instruction methods of the U.S.S.R.) or even to those who can, but 'only just' (cf. many films shown in Great Britain and America) a powerful impression can be made, and quickly. So a new culture-pattern can be built up, perhaps deliberately 'contrived' out of an old one. And the films and radio have made the phrase the 'inevitability of gradualness' almost obsolete.

Many questions remain. Do the various uses of the term 'culture-pattern' mean the same thing? I doubt it; further agreement about terminology is urgently desirable. Is a culture pattern judged by reference to the common people, to their leaders, especially those who speak and write with authority, to their heroes or to their ideal personalities? Presumably different judges may employ any or all of these criteria, and this is a source of ambiguity.

But upon one thing students of culture patterns all seem agreed: modern warfare is not due to simple instincts, nor is it inevitable.

A PTOLEMAIC VINEYARD LEASE.

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AMONG the papyri belonging to the John Rylands Library now being prepared for publication in the fourth volume of the *Catalogue of Greek Papyri* are a number of interesting Ptolemaic documents. An outstanding instance is the text which is published here, which is of considerable intrinsic interest and incidentally of importance to historians because of its date. Because of this it has seemed desirable to anticipate the appearance of the definitive publication, and I gladly accept the invitation of Dr. H. Guppy to print it in the BULLETIN.

Its date is 12th November, 170 B.C., and provenance, from internal evidence, Philadelphia.¹ It consists of a lease for a year by Nicomachus of Halicarnassus of a vineyard near Philadelphia belonging to another settler in Egypt, Crates of Arsinoe in Lycia, to Apollonius characterized as Persian of the Epigone. The vineyard, 6 arourae in extent, is described as sandy (*ὑφάμμος*), but seems to have been in working order. The terms of the lease are written out in great detail, contain several new words and are of interest for the light thrown on viticulture in the Ptolemaic period, for which few such leases are extant.² The rent is a *pars quota* of the produce reckoned in wine (must), of which the lessor is to have two-thirds, the lessee one-third, after certain specified deductions have been made. These deductions are the *καθήκονσα ἀπόμοιρα*, wages for the treaders at the vintage (though pay for any labourers engaged in the day

¹ A number of important papyri from Philadelphia belonging to the early second century B.C. are listed by F. M. Heichelheim in *Aegyptus* 1937, 62, n. 2. Heichelheim considers they come from an official archive.

² None are to be found in the list of such leases given by T. Kalén, introd. to *P. Berl. Leihgabe* 23, cf., however, *P. Teb.* 120, col. viii; 137; 815 fr. 6, col. ii, 31 ff. and 815 fr. 10, col. iii, which are in summary form or fragmentary. *S.B.* 7188, a second century B.C. lease of a *παράδεισος*, has a number of provisions similar to those of the present lease and has been of some use in restorations.

to day work of the vineyard is to be found by the lessee), hire of wine press, and a ἡμικάδιον of wine as *pourboire* to the local agricultural guild. Each party is to provide his own wine jars and his proportion of those required to contain the ἀπομοίρα. The duties of the lessee, the ἔργα, are then carefully particularized and include arrangements for watering and guarding the vineyard, payment of wages, pruning and attention to young plants, cleaning of trenches and conduits and repair of fences, etc.

The lease is a ἐξαμάρτυρος συγγραφή and is written as a double document, on the recto but across the fibres of a piece of papyrus cut from a roll. It is preserved in two fragments, and in the publication the foot of fragment i is assumed to have touched the top of fragment ii; but there is no certitude in this arrangement, and there may have been a gap of one or more lines between the fragments. The second portion is broken at the foot and there is no absolute control of the length of the document. Before mutilation it was over 50 cm. in height, and about 28-30 cm. in width. After writing it was folded in antiquity both vertically and laterally (fragm. ii was folded 13 times laterally), while fragm. i, the 'inner' text was sealed, and attested on the verso. The hand of the inner text¹ is a thickly written minute cursive, closely resembling that of *P. Amherst* 43 (*P. Amh.* II, Pl. VIII), difficult to read, especially in the places where the surface is damaged. Fortunately it can for the most part be controlled by the readings of hand three, the writer of the outer text, but its last eight lines which are much mutilated have been abandoned as illegible. At the foot of this text stood four lines in the hand of the συγγραφοφύλαξ Stelias in a medium-sized characterless cursive. The outer text which follows was written in a larger, more upright and more regular cursive. On the verso are the seal attestations of Stelias and the five other witnesses, and a mutilated docket.

The date of this lease is of very considerable interest for the chronology of Antiochus' intervention in Egypt. Walter Otto's treatment of the reign of Philometor in *Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemäers* (*Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akad., Philhist.*

¹ See accompanying Plate.

Abt. N.F. 11, 1934) places the first campaign of Antiochus in the spring of 169 B.C.¹ But unless the writers of this lease were working throughout on a false impression and mean 'year 2' everywhere that they wrote 'year one' (a hypothesis that has not much to commend it²), Otto's view and consequent reconstruction of events must be abandoned, and Antiochus' invasion of Egypt placed at the latest in spring 170 B.C. For this papyrus shows that by Phaophi 9 = 12th November, 170 B.C., the joint reign of Philometor, his younger brother Euergetes and his sister-wife Cleopatra was recognized in the Fayûm; the institution of the joint reign is intelligible only inside the general historical framework of Antiochus' invasion, and therefore the whole sequence of events (elevation of Euergetes to the throne by the Alexandrians and reconciliation of Euergetes and Philometor, presumably after the withdrawal of Antiochus from Egypt), which Otto tentatively places (*l.c.* p. 61) not later than summer, 169 B.C., must now be recognized as completed at latest by or shortly after Thoth 1 = 5th October, 170 B.C. The date can in fact be carried back to at least 18th September, 170 B.C. on the basis of P. British Museum Eg. 10591, verso col. ii, ll. 5-6 (Sir Herbert Thompson, *A Family Archive from Siut from Papyri in the British Museum*, p. 51, n. 22³), which mentions 'temple rites in honour of the reigning sovereigns', the Pharaoh and his divine sister and brother. The first year of this reconstituted monarchy is counted, however, from Thoth 1 = 5th October, 170 B.C. and not earlier. Whether or not Euergetes began counting his own regnal years from the moment of his independent elevation as king in Alexandria, it is clear that the new arrangement of the monarchy, based on the reconciliation of the brothers, did not take over such a provisional dating but made a fresh start. It is worth noting, as against

¹ Otto's imaginative study has evoked a whole literature of criticism and reconsideration into which I do not here go. A bibliography is given in the most recent treatment at the time of writing, that by Joseph Ward Swain in *Cl. Phil.* 39 (1944), 73 ff.

² Apart from the prescript cf. ll. 6 and 47, εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ἔτος; l. 81, τοῦ πρῶτου ἔτους.

³ Whose findings were firmly rejected by Otto, *op. cit.* p. 134, but are now vindicated.

Otto's views (*l.c.* p. 60; cf. the protests of Bell and Skeat in *JEA* 21 (1935), p. 263), that Cleopatra is associated right from the start with her husband and brother in the new monarchy, and that Wilcken's description of it (*UPZ* I, p. 489) as the joint reign of 'der 3 Geschwister' is justified. It would seem as though the political motive for refounding the kingship was to emphasize the legitimate descent of the three rulers, τῶν Πτολεμαίου καὶ Κλεοπάτρας θεῶν Ἐπιφανῶν, in contrast to the pretensions of Antiochus, and to fortify the youth and inexperience of Epiphanes' heirs by putting the monarchy into commission.

It was already known that Philometor's twelfth year as sole sovereign was equated with the first year of the remodelled kingship, and the novelty of this document is in putting the change so early in the year. A number of texts show that in Upper Egypt and the Thebaid dating by Philometor's twelfth year persisted down to September 169 B.C. Whether this was due to a temporary refusal in the Thebaid to recognize the new joint kingship,¹ to the severance of upper and lower Egypt by civil war, to a fear lest year 1 should be interpreted as year 1 of Antiochus (cf. *P. Teb.* 698) or to other causes we have not the data to decide. The texts in question are:² Mond and Myers, *The Bucheum*, II, pp. 5-6, no. 8 (hieroglyphic text of inscription for a Buchis bull) 'There was an attack by many foreign countries against Egypt in the year 12, and great civil strife broke out in Egypt. The great wall of Thebes was manned by foreigners. Thereupon the burghers of Hermonthis came to Thebes the mighty'; Tait, *Gk. Ostraca*, O. Bodl. 48 (Year 12, Pharmouthi 30) and O. Bodl. 355 (Year 12, Mesore 21); Thompson, *Family Archive from Siut l.c.*, P.B.M.Eg. 10599 and 10600 (Year 12, Pharmouthi 15) and 10591 verso, col. iv, probably 'year 12, sometime after Mesore 29 or Thoth of year 13, when festivals of epagomenal days were over'.

¹ In P.B.M.Eg. 10591 verso, col. ii, l. 5, cited above, the fact of the joint reign seems to be known, but the older dating scheme (Year 11, Mesore 19) is adhered to.

² Dubious is *P. Teb.* 909, Hathyr 6 of the twelfth year which the editors date in 170 B.C. (= 9th Dec.), while remarking "an earlier date is possible but less likely".

Fragment i (1st hand):

[Βασιλευόντων Πτολεμαίου καὶ Π]τολεμαίου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ [καὶ] Κλεο-
πάτρας [τ]ῶν Πτολεμαίου καὶ Κλεοπάτρας θεῶν Ἐπιφανῶν ἔτους
πρώτου ἔφ' ἱερέως τοῦ [ὄντος ἐν Ἀλεξ-]

[νδρεῖαι Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ θεῶν Σω]τήρων καὶ θεῶν Ἀδ[ελ]φῶν καὶ
θεῶν Εὐεργετῶν καὶ θεῶν Φιλοπ[ατό]ρων καὶ θεῶν Ἐπιφανῶν
καὶ θεῶν Φιλομητόρων [καὶ ἀθλοφόρου]

[Βερενίκης Εὐεργέτιδος κανηφόρο]ν Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου [ιερ]είας
Ἀρσινῶ[ς] Φιλοπάτορο[ς τ]ῶν [οὐς]ῶν ἐν Ἀ[λεξ]α[ν]δρεῖαι,
μηνὸς Ξανδικοῦ ἐνάτη, Φαῶφι ἐνάτη[ι ἐν Φιλαδε-]

[λφείαι τοῦ Ἀρσινόετου. ἐμίσθ]ω[σ]εν Νικόμαχος Φ[....]αδου
Ἀπολλωνίου

Ἀλικαρ]νασσεὺς διάδοχος τ[ο]ῦ πατρ[ικο]ῦ κλήρου τὸν ὑπάρχοντα
Ἀπολλωνίου Πέρση τῆς ἐπιγον[ῆς]

Κράτῃτι Φειδίμου Ἀρσι[νοεῖτι]

5 [ἀπὸ Λυκίας τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς Παμ]φύλων τακτομί[σθω] [[Ἀ[π]ολ-
[λωνι]ῳ Ἀπολλωνίου [Π]έρση τῆς ἐπιγονῆς τὸν ὑπάρχοντα
αὐτῷ]] ἀμπελῶνα ὑφάμμ[ον περὶ τὴν]

[αὐτὴν Φιλαδέλφειαν ὅς ἐστιν ἀρο]υρῶν ἐξ ἧ ὅσαι ἐὰν ὦ[σιν] εἰς τὸ
πρῶ[τ]ον ἔτος ἐπὶ μέρει τρίτῳ τῶν ἐσομένων ἐν τῷ ἀμπελῶνι
τούτῳ καρπῶν [πάντων καὶ]

[γενημάτων ἐφ' ὧι οἰνοποιηθέντων] π[άντων τ]ῶν καρπῶν καὶ ἀφαιρε-
θείσης τῆς καθη<κ>ούσης ἀπομοίρας εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ
πατηταῖς καὶ μισθοῦ ληνοῦ καὶ κατὰ]

[μῆνα τῆς ὁπώρας ἀποδιδομένου] εἰς τὸν γεωργικὸν θίασον ἡμικαδίου
τὸ καταλειπόμενον γλεῦκος διελό[μενοι] μέρη τρία λήψεται τὰ
μὲν δύο μέρη Ν[ικόμαχος, τὸ]

[δὲ τρίτον Ἀπολλώνιος, κέραμον δὲ] ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ χορηγείτω καὶ
τὸν εἰς τὴν ἀπόμοιραν καθήκοντα κατὰ [τὸ ἐ]πιβάλλον μέρος
τῆς μισθώσεω[ς, τὸν δὲ κέραμον]

10 [ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ κατα verb c. 8]. τὴν ληνὸν καὶ τὸ γλεῦκος ἕκαστος
ἐαυτῷ ἀναφερέτω, τὴν δὲ ἀπομο[ίρα]ν α[...].αρ[...].[...].
.τ.ωι[...]. [11-13]

[24-28] κομισάμενος . . ν . [.] α[.] ο παρὰ ληνοῦ αὐτὸς . . . γραψάτ[ω],
τὴν [...] . . [.] . . [.] καὶ εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν ἐκ τοῦ ιδί[ο]υ 11-13]

[24-28] ν . ν π ε [.] . . [. . .] . τ η ς κ λ η [. .] . . ω ρ ι ς α . ι τ η ν καὶ τοὺς
καθήκοντας ποτισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν κ[α]ρπῶν 7-9]

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a historical document or manuscript. The text is written in a dark ink on a light-colored paper. The script is dense and fills most of the page. The text is written in a cursive script, likely a historical document or manuscript. The text is written in a dark ink on a light-colored paper. The script is dense and fills most of the page. The text is written in a cursive script, likely a historical document or manuscript. The text is written in a dark ink on a light-colored paper. The script is dense and fills most of the page.

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- [24-28]. δος ἐπιμήνιον ἐπιτελεί[τ]ω Ἀ[πολλώ]νιος ἀπὸ τοῦ προγεγραμμένου χρόνου μέχρι τοῦ [ἀ]ποκαταστήσασθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀναλώμασιν ὡς συμφέρει τῷ
- [τε ἐδάφει καὶ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ, τὴν τομ]ὴν τῆς ἀμπέλου πο[ι]οῦμενος μέσσην καὶ δικαίαν καὶ τὰ ἀμπελικά τῶν νέων ἐργασάσθω ὡς καθήκει καὶ παρεχέ[σθω τὸ ἔδαφος τοῦ χω-]
- ῖ [ρίου καθαρὸν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ θ]ρύου καὶ καλάμου καὶ ἀγρώστεως καὶ κιναίου καλάμου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης δίσσης ἐκ ρίζων πλὴν τῆς χέρσου τῆς ἐντὸς τῆς ἀπ[οσκαφῆς(?) καὶ]
- [παρεχέσθω τὰς ἀποσκαφὰς διωρυγμ]ένας καὶ καθαρὰς καὶ περιπεφραγμένον τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἀναψάτω τοὺς ὀμβριστήρας καὶ τὴν ἄφεςιν φραξάτω πρὸς τὸν σ. [c. 11]
- [καὶ εἰσαγέτω(?) αὐτὴν πρὸς τοὺς] ποτισμοὺς τοῦ τε κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν χρόνου διελθόντος παραδειξάτω τὸ ἔδαφος τοῦ χωρίου καθαρὸν καὶ ἀποσκαφ[ὰς καθαρὰς κα-]
- [θὰ διασεσάφηται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρ]αδείξῃ ἢ μὴ ἐπιτε[λ]ῇ ἕκαστα τ[ῶ]ν ἔρ[γων] κατὰ καιρὸν ἢ λίπῃ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἀποτεισάτω τῶν μὲν ἔργων ὧν ἂν [μ]ὴ ἐ[πιτελῇ κατὰ]
- [καιρὸν τὸν στοκαθησόμενον]ν ἔσεσθαι μισθὸν ἡμιόλιον καὶ τὸ βλάβος ὃ ἂν καταβλάβῃ κατὰ τὸν [χρόν]ον τοῦ λείπειν τὴν μίσθωσιν ἐπίτιμον ἀργυρί[ου τάλαντα δύο.]
- 20 [μεταβαλεῖν δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ἐ]ν τοῖς διαψίλοις με[τ]όρρα πεντήκοντα τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀναλώμασιν καὶ μεταφυτ[ε]υσάτω ἐν τῷ αὐτ[ῷ] ἔτει ἐ[ν τῷ κα]θήκ[οντι 11-13]
- [c. 18 ὅταν δυ]ναταὶ ὦσιν Νικομ[ά]χου ν. . . αὐτ. . [.] τὸν ὀλοκάλαμον. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μεταβάλῃ ἀποτε[ισ]άτω ἐκάστου [μετορχίου] ὅταν [μὴ σ 8-10]
- [c. 18 με]ταφυτ[εῦσ]αι δραχμὰς χιλίας. . ν δὲ Ἀπολλώ^{ης}[νι]ος ὧν ἐὰν μὴ στ[c. 7]λ[c. 7]πο[ι]
- [c. 18 ταξάσθω Ἀπολλώνι]ος ἐ[κ τοῦ ἰδίου.] ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τάξηται ἀποτεισ[άτω ἡμιόλιον
- [c. 33 Νικομά]χου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ἀπολλωνίου ἐ[κάστου
- ῖ [c. 40 φύλ]ακα ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν [...]. [
- [c. 40 κ]αθήκοντα ἔργα καθότι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ κα[ταμήνιοι
- [c. 35 δόντος] Νικομάχου ἀμὴν εἰς τὰ ἔργα τοῦ χωρίου [
- [c. 35 ἀποτει]σάτω αὐτῆς τιμὴν ἣν ἂν κατομόσῃ [Νικόμαχος
- [] μηνὶ φαιν[ε]

Fragment ii

Seven further fragmentary and illegible lines, followed by five further lines, mainly illegible in 2nd hand, perhaps summary of the contract, and names of witnesses, with signature of Στηλίας συγγραφοφύλαξ at end.

(3rd hand):

[Βασιλευνόντων Πτολεμαίου καὶ] Πτολε[μαίου] τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ Κλεο-
πάτρας τῶν Πτ[ολ]εμαίου καὶ Κλεοπάτρας θεῶν Ἐπι-
[φανῶν] ἔτους πρώτου ἐφ' ἱερέως τοῦ ὄντος [ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείαι Ἀ]λεξάν-
δρου καὶ θεῶν Σωτ[ήρων] καὶ θεῶν Ἀδελφῶν καὶ θεῶν
[Εὐεργετῶν καὶ θεῶν Φιλοπατόρων κα]ὶ θεῶν Ἐπιφανῶν καὶ θεῶν
[Φι]λομητόρ[ων ἐπ'] ἀθλοφόρου Βερ[ενίκης Εὐεργε]τιδος κανη-
φόρου

45 [Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου ἱερείας Ἀρσινό]ης Φιλοπάτορος τῶν οὐσῶν
ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείαι μηνὸς Ξανδικοῦ ἐνάτηι, Φαῶφι ἐνάτηι ἔ[ν] Φι-
[λαδελφείαι τοῦ Ἀρσινοείτου. ἐμί]σθωσεν Νικόμαχος Φ[.]... αδου
Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς διάδοχος τοῦ πατρικοῦ κλήρου Ἀπολλω[νίου
Ἀπολλωνίου Πέρση τῆς ἐπιγο]νῆς τὸν ὑπά[ρ]χοντα Κράτητι
Φειδίμου Ἀρσινοείτης ἀπὸ Λυκίας τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς Παμφύλ[ων
τακτομίσθωι ἀμπελῶνα ὕφα]μμο[ν] περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν Φιλαδελφειαν ὅς
[ἐστ]ιν ἀρουρῶν ἐξ ἧ ὅσαι ἂν ὦσιν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ἔτος
[ἐπὶ μέρει τρίτῳ τῶν ἐσομένων ἐν τῷ]ι [ἀμπελ]ῶνι το[ύ]τῳ καρπῶν
πάντων καὶ γενημάτων ἐφ' ὧ οἰνοποιηθέντων

50 [τῶν καρπῶν καὶ ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς κα]θηκ[ο]ύ[σ]ης ἀπ[ο]μοίρας εἰς
τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ πατηταῖς καὶ μισθοῦ ληνοῦ καὶ κατὰ μῆ-
[να τῆς ὁπώρας ἀποδοιδομένου εἰς τὸν γε]ωργικὸν θίασον ἡμ[ι]καδίου
τὸ καταλειπόμενον γλεῦκος διελόμενοι μέρη τρία
[λήψεται τὰ μὲν δύο μέρη Νικόμαχος, τὸ] δὲ τρίτον [Ἀπ]ολλώνιος,
κέραμον δὲ ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ χορηγέτω καὶ τὸν εἰς
[τὴν ἀπομοίραν καθήκοντα κατὰ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον μέρος τ]ῆς μισθώσεως,
τὸν δ[ὲ] κ[ε]ράμον [ἐ]κ[α]στος ἐαυ[τ]ῷ κατα-
[c. 8-9 τὴν λήνον καὶ τὸ γλεῦκος ἕκαστος] ἐα[υτῷ] ἀναφερέτω, τὴν
δὲ] ἀπομ[οίραν c. 27

55 [c. 35]ιλ[

[c. 35]ς ἀ[πὸ τ]οῦ π[ρ]ογεγραμμένου χ[ρόνου c. 27

[c. 35] τοὺς ποτισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φυλ[ακὴν] τῶν [καρ]πῶν . αρ[.....]

. [c. 9-12

- [c. 28 ἐπιμήνιον] ἐπιτελείτω Ἀπολλώνιος ἀπὸ τοῦ προγεγραμμένου χρόνου μέχρι
- [τοῦ ἀποκαταστήσασθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνα]λώμασι[ν] ὥς συμφέρει τῷ τε ἑδάφει καὶ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ, τὴν τομὴν τῆς ἀμπέ[λου]
- 60 [ποιούμενος μέσην καὶ δικαίαν κ]αὶ [τὰ] ἀμ[πελ]ικ[ὰ] τῶν νέων
 ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος
 ἐργασάσθω ὡς καθήκει καὶ παρεχέσθω τὸ ἔδαφος
 [τοῦ χωρίου καθαρὸν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ θ]ρύ[ου κ]αὶ καλάμου καὶ ἀγρώσ τεως καὶ κιναίου κα[λ]άμου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
 [δίσσης ἐκ ῥιζῶν πλην τῆς χέρσου τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ]..[.]ενω[ι ὕ]ποδοχίῳ,
 τὸν ἐντὸς τῆς ἀποσκαφῆς
 τὸν δὲ θίνα μεταβαλέτω καὶ παρεχέσθω τὰς ἀποσκα-
 [φὰς διωρυγμένας καὶ καθαρὰς] καὶ [περι]πεφραγμένον τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἀναψάτω τοὺς ὀμβριστήρας καὶ τὴν ἄφεςιν
 [φραξάτω πρὸς τὸν 12]..[καὶ εἰσα]γέτω αὐτὴν πρὸς τοὺς ποτισμοὺς τοῦ τε κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν χρόνου
- 65 [διελθόντος παραδειξάτω τὸ ἔδ]αφος τοῦ χωρίου καθαρὸν καὶ τὰς ἀποσκαφὰς καθαρὰς καθὰ διασεσάφηται. εἰάν δὲ
 [μὴ παραδείξει ἢ μὴ ἐπιτελῇ] ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων κατὰ καιρὸν ἢ λίπῃ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἀποτεισάτω τῶν μὲν ἔργων
 [ῶν ἂν μὴ ἐπιτελῇ κατὰ κα]ιρὸν τὸν στοκαθησόμενον ἔσεσθαι μισθὸν ἡμιόλιον καὶ τὸ βλάβος ὃ ἂν καταβλάβῃ κατὰ
 [τὸν χρόνον τοῦ λείπειν τὴν μ]ίσθωσιν ἐπίτιμον ἀρχ[υρ]ίου τάλαντα δύο. μ]εταβαλεῖν δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ἐν τοῖς δια-
 [ψίλοις μετόρχια πεντήκοντα τ]ο[ῖς] ἰδίοις ἀνα[λ]ώμ[ασιν καὶ μετα]-
 φ[υτ]ευ[σ]άτω ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτει ἐν τῷ καθήκοντι
- 70 [c. 22] ὅταν δυναταὶ ᾧσιν [N]ικ[ομάχου c. 6 τὸν ὁ]λοκάλαμον. εἰ[ν δ]ὲ μὴ μεταβάλῃ
 [ἀποτεισάτω ἐκάστου μετ]ορχίου ὅταν μὴ σ.[c. 20]το ω[.]..[.]ν
 μ[ε]τα[φυ]τεῦσαι δραχμὰς[ς]
 [χιλίας 15-16 εἰ]ὰν μὴ στησ[.]νι[....δ]ραχμὰς [εἰ]κο[σι 10]
 ἐγλελογευμένον ὑπὲρ τῆς λη-
 [νοῦ 11 ταξάσθω Ἀ]πολλώνιος ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου. εἰάν δὲ μὴ τ[άξ]ηται ἀποτε[ισάτω] ἡμιόλιον τῇσδε καὶ τὰ λα-
 [3-4 εἰάν δὲ ἦι οἶνος ἀπὸ ἀστα]φίδος καὶ δευτέ[ριος], ἔστω τὰ μὲν
 [δύ]ο μέρη Νικομάχου, τὸ δ[ὲ] τρίτον Ἀπολλωνίου ἐκάσ-
- 75 [του 17] τὰ δὲ ξύλα ἀκαλι[.]α δησάτω Ἀπολλώνιος. εἰάν δὲ βούληται Νικόμαχος φύλακα ἐμβαλεῖν

[15 τῶν κα]ρπῶν ἐξέστω αὐτῶ[ι], τό τε ὁψώνιον δώσει αὐτῶι Ἀπολ-
λώνιος ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου ἐργαζομένου αὐ-

[τοῦ τὰ καθήκοντα ἔργα κ]αθότι καὶ οἱ λο[ι]ποὶ κ[ατ]αμήνιοι. ἐὰν
δὲ μὴ εὐτάκτηι Ἀπολλώνιος [τὸ] ὁψώνιον ἀποτεισάτω

[20] ἔχει δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος δ[ό]ν[τος Νικ]ομάχο[ν] ἀμὴν εἰς τὰ ἔργα
^{ἣν καὶ παρείχεν}
παρὰ [το]ῦ Ἡράτητος
τοῦ χωρίου τούτου ἦν καὶ παραδότης

[c. 15 ἐὰν δὲ] ἐπειδὰν ἀπόβηι ἀπὸ τῆς [μισθώσεως μ]ὴ παράδωι
ἀποτεισάτω [α]ὐτ[ῇ]ς τιμὴν ἣν ἂν κα-

80 [τομόσῃ Νικομάχος. ἐὰν] δὲ συ. κινήι ἐπιβάλοι εγ[9-10]ιου
ταξά[σ]θω πάντων φόρον Νικομάχῳι χαλκοῦ δρα[χμὰς]

[17 ἀπ]ομοίρ[α]ν τοῦ πρώτου ἔτους. [ἐὰν δὲ μ]ὴ τάξῃται, ἀποτεισάτω
αὐτὰς ἡμιολίους, τὸν δὲ [7

[17 με]τὰ τῆς Ν[ι]κομάχου ἡ το[ῦ ὑπὲρ α]ὐτοῦ γνώμης ὅταν καιρὸς
ῇ. ἐὰν δέ τινες εὐρεθῶσι [5

[19]ων ἐπιθέσθω ἕω[ς....] ἑκατὸν τεσσαράκοντα ἀνυπόλογοι
ἔστωσαν, τῶν δὲ πλείονω[ν]

[19].ς ἑκατ[ό]ν ἀπὸ το[ῦ 15]νι. [5 χ]αλκοῦ δραχμὰς εἴκοσι.
βεβαιούτω

85 [δὲ τὴν μίσθωσιν ταύτην Νικό]μαχ[ος Ἀπολλ]ωνίῳ [14] τη[c. 20
ἀκο]λουθῶς .. [

[c. 45]αρ[c. 36]..λο[

[c. 45].[

Broken off

Verso, in 2nd hand, at foot of inner document :

Στηλίου . υμνον Κλέωνος

... [] ... οιοῦ Ζωπύρου

Below, traces of 4 short lines, probably docket. Line 2 perhaps:

Ἀπο]λλωνίῳ

‘ In the first year of the reign of Ptolemy and Ptolemy the brother and Cleopatra, children of Ptolemy and Cleopatra, gods Epiphaneis, the priest at Alexandria of Alexander and the gods Soteris and the gods Adelphi and the gods Euergetae and the gods Philopatores and the gods Epiphaneis and the gods Philometores, the athlophorus of Berenice Euergetis, the cane-phorus of Arsinoe Philadelphus, the priestess of Arsinoe Philopator, being those in office at Alexandria, on the 9th of the month

Xandikos, 9th Phaophi, in Philadelphia in the Arsinoite nome. Nicomachus, son of Phades of Halicarnassus, successor to his father's holding, has leased to Apollonius son of Apollonius, Persian of the Epigone, the somewhat sandy vineyard situated near the same Philadelphia, being of 6 arourae or such as it may be, belonging to Crates, son of Pheidimus of Arsinoe in Lycia, tactomisthus of the Pamphylians in their command, for the first year for a rent of two-thirds of all the fruits and produce that grow in this vineyard ; viz., when all fruits have been turned into wine and deductions made for the apomoira due to the Treasury, wages for the treaders, hire of winepress and a contribution (in the month of the vintage ?) of a half kados to the agricultural guild, the must remaining shall be divided into three portions, of which Nicomachus shall take two and Apollonius one. Each shall provide jars for himself and as required for the apomoira according to the proportions of his lease, and the jars shall be . . . by each for himself (at the time of ?) the vintage, and each shall keep his own account of the must, while the apomoira

13-20 'monthly wages (?) are to be paid at his own expense by Apollonius from the time stated until termination of the lease, as is best for the land and the vine ; Apollonius is to prune the vine moderately and exactly, to attend properly to the dressing of the young vines, to keep the ground of the property clear of weedy growth and rush and reed and quake grass and kinaios reed and all other tangle of roots except for the ground inside the cross-trench, and is to maintain the cross-trenches dug and clean and the property fenced ; he is to clear out the drains and fence the conduit facing the . . . and lead it through for the watering ; and when the lease has expired, he is to deliver the ground of the property in clean condition and the cross-trenches clean, as is presently stated. If he fail to deliver it or to perform each of the tasks at the proper time, or if he abandon the lease, he is to pay the assessed wage with 50 per cent. surcharge for every task he fails to perform, and a fine of two silver talents for any damage that may be due to the time of his abandoning the lease. Apollonius is to shift 50 rows of vines to the uncultivated ground at his own expense and to transplant in the same year at the proper (time)'

1. [Βασιλευόντων κτλ.] : for the titulature cf. *P. Teb.* 811, 1 ff.

4. διάδοχος τ[ο]ῦ ἀτρ[ικο]ῦ κλήρου : cf. BGU 1738, 11 ; 1739, 7.

Ἀπολλωνίωι : the scribe at first wrote (in the next line) Ἀπολλωνίωι etc. followed by τὸν ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῶι (viz. Nicomachus) and corrected it by underlining Ἀπολλωνίωι to αὐτῶι in l. 5 and writing Ἀπολλωνίωι etc. above the line in l. 4.

Ἀρσι[νοείτη ἀπὸ Λυκίας] : cf. l. 47, where Ἀρσινοείτης is a mistake for Ἀρσινοείτη. Patara in Lycia was renamed Arsinoe by Philadelphus, but the new name did not last, cf. Strabo xiv, C 366, A. H. M. Jones, *Cities of Eastern Roman Provinces*, p. 100.

5. τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς Παμ]φύλων, cf. l. 47. The use of καθ' αὐτοὺς is strange, but cf. BGU 1121, 24 (5 B.C.) τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ποτάμους (= 'concerned in this lease').

6. ἐπὶ μέρει τρίτῳι : explicitly set out, l. 7 ff., as $\frac{2}{3}$ to lessor, $\frac{1}{3}$ to lessee. Cf. *P. Lond.* 163, 12 ; *CPR* 244 ; *Stud. Pal.* XX, 70, 19 etc.

καρπῶν πάντων καὶ γενημάτων : cf. *SB* 7188, 8, and often, e.g. *P. Harris* 137, 10.

7. οἰνοποιηθέντῳι, cf. l. 49 : in all previously known instances (*Rev. Laws* 25, 4, 7 ; 26, 1, 11 ; *P. Cairo Zeno* 59236, 7) the verb οἰνοποιέω is used absolutely = 'make wine'.

πατηταῖς : treaders for the wine-press, cf. Schnebel, *Landwirtschaft*, 282, n. 4. The construction is loose, strict syntax demanding, e.g., μισθοῦ πατητῶν.

ληνός : here presumably in sense of wine-press, cf. Schnebel *l.c.* 283, and 286 f. μισθός suggests the procedure illustrated in *P. Teb.* 1058.

[κατὰ μῆνα τῆς ὁπώρας ἀποδοιζομένου κ.τ.λ.] : unauthorized restoration, cf. ll. 50-51, but made on the assumption that a *pourboire* of wine would not be granted every month. The circumstances of the grant suggest that the γεωργικὸς θίασος is also to some extent a professional guild, for which San Nicolo, *Aegypt. Vereinswesen* provides no precise parallels.

8. γλεῦκος : must, cf. Schnebel *l.c.* 285, n. 4. The division of produce takes place after the completion of the preliminary operations in the manufacture of wine.

10. ἀναφερέτω : 'book to his account'.

12.]ν. νπε[: or]π. ππε[.

For τοὺς καθήκοντας ποτισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν cf. Schnebel l.c. 273, n. 4 and 277 f., and *infra*.

13. ἐπιμήνιον perhaps sc. μισθόν, for any labourers whom Apollonius may care to employ.

[ἀ]ποκαταστήσασθαι : cf. SB 7188, 34, μέχρι τοῦ ἀποκα(τασ)τήσασθαι τὰ δύο ἐ[δάφη, technical term for restoring property on expiry of a lease.

ὡς συμφέρει κ.τ.λ. : cf. l. 59, SB 7188, 14.

14. τομ]ήν ... μέσσην καὶ δικαίαν : cf. P. Lond. 163, 20-21, τὴν ἀμπέλου τομὴν μέσσην καὶ δικαίαν, μῆ[τ' ἀ]κρ[ο]τομῶν.

τά ἀμπελικὰ τῶν νέων sc. ἀμπέλων : the phrase is unusual and unparalleled, but the reading is certain, cf. l. 60. It is tempting to accent νεῶν, i.e., 'vinedressing of the fallow lands', but the parallels for νεός (νειός, νέα) are hardly adequate.

15. ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν : unauthorized restoration, but cf. SB 7188, 25. Contrast ἀνατολήν (= 'sprouting of the crops') in P. Teb. 703, 51 and note *ad loc*.

κιναίου καλάμου : κιναίου appears certain, being attested also in l. 61. Not in LSJ or Preisigke, Wörterbuch, and what species of reed is intended must remain uncertain.

δίσης ἐκ ῥιζῶν (ῥέκριζῶν) ; same phrase should be restored in SB 7188, 25 τῆς ἄλλης δίσης ἐκ ῥ[ι]ζῶν

πλήν τῆς χέρσου κ.τ.λ. : the two copies differ at this point, and it looks as though the scribe had omitted something from the inner copy between τῆς χέρσου and ἐντὸς τῆς ἀποσκαφῆς. In l. 62 τῆς χέρσου is probably defined further, and there is an additional clause about shifting the silt (θίνα) inside the cross-trench.

ἀποσκαφῆς : 'cross-trench', cf. l. 17 *ad fin.*, 62 (bis) and 65, where the reading is beyond dispute. ἀποσκαφή is not attested in the Lexica, but cf. σκαφή, σκαφητός and ἀποσκάπτω.

16. περιπεφραγμένον : cf. Schnebel l.c. 243-4.

τοὺς ὀμβριστήρας : the compound ἐξομβριστήρες occurs in P. Oxy. 2146, 6, 'conduits for carrying off rain water'. The word suggests a precaution in use in countries subject to sudden

rain-storms to prevent the vines being waterlogged, and perhaps a part of Greek traditional viticulture.

ἄφεις, 'conduit' of the main water supply. Cf. Calderini, *Aegyptus* I, p. 192.

20. μεταβαλεῖν: cf. l. 68. The change from imperative to infinitive (with nominative) is noteworthy. με[τ]όρχια cannot be taken as entirely certain, but is hard to escape, cf.]ορχίου in l. 71. According to *LSJ*, the word is attested only in Aristophanes, *Pax* 568 (and fr. 120), where it stands for the space between rows of vines, Columella's *interordinium* (Col. iii, 13 etc.). 'To shift 50 interlinear spaces' appears to be a periphrasis for 'transplant 50 rows of vines into uncultivated ground'.

21. δυ]ναταὶ ὄσιν: δυναταί (sc. ἄμπελοι?) in sense of 'suitable', as e.g. *P. Magd.* 3, 5 and 7 γῇ δυνατὴ σπαρῆναι. After Νικομάχου apparently not δόντος. ὀλοκάλαμον, cf. *BGU* 1529, 10, stalk made of a single reed, for staking purposes. μονοκάλαμον which would have the same sense is a less likely reading.

25. Hardly εἰς τῇν [φυλα]κὴν.

28. Possibly μηνὶ Φαρμ[οῦθι.

The remainder of the terms (from ll. 21 ff.) may be summarized as follows from the outer copy:

ll. 70-72. Penalties for failure to shift the rows and transplant.

72-73. Apollonius is to agree to pay any exaction for the wine press, and penalties are prescribed for failure to do so. Perhaps restore [ἐὰν δέ τι τύχη] ἐκλελογευμένον after [εἴ]κο[σι]. ἐκλογεύω is not found in Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, but is cited by *LSJ* from *IG* 5 (1), 1390, 47 (Andania), and cf. ἐκλογεύς and ἐκλογή. It is not clear whether this is a governmental tax on the wine press (for possible tax on wine presses in the Roman period, cf. Wallace, *Taxation* 75) or some exaction of first fruits for cult reasons. The penalty is ἡμιόλιον τῆσδε, i.e. ὑπὲρ τῆς ληνοῦ. At end of line τάλα[ντα x is possible, but seems an excessive penalty.

74. If there is any raisin wine or 'seconds', it is to be divided between Nicomachus and Apollonius in the same proportion as the must. For οἶνος ἀπὸ ἀστα]φίδος cf. Plato, *Laws*, 845b;

δευτε[ριος], or perhaps δευτε[ρίας], i.e. with οἶνος, *LSJ* s.v. None of these terms have so far been found in papyri, but cf. Schnebel l.c. 361, on the δευτερόχυτος of *P. Flor.* II, 178, 2.

75. τὰ] δὲ ξύλα : seems to suggest a perquisite for Apollonius, and contracts of this type often contain a provision for enjoyment of cut or fallen timber. After ξύλα ἀκάνθ[ιν]α is possible, but not very likely. Perhaps ἀγκαλι[στ]ά (not otherwise attested, but cf. ἀγκαλισμός and Schnebel l.c. 260)?

75-77 : Nicomachus has the right to put in his own guard. Apollonius is to pay him an ὀψώνιον for work he may do in the vineyard just like other workmen engaged by the month. Penalties specified for failure to pay the ὀψώνιον. In l. 76 a possible restoration is [εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν κα]ρπῶν, but it does not seem possible to read this in l. 25. For καταμήνιοι cf. *P. Oxy.* 2155, 8, and for εὐτακτεῖν τὸ ὀψώνιον *PSI* 350, 2.

77-79. Nicomachus has provided a shovel (actually the property of Crates) which is to be returned, or else the price sworn to by Nicomachus is to be paid.

80. From second half of sentence φόρον . . . δρ[αχμὰς | x καὶ τὴν ἀπ]όμοιρ[α]ν and l. 81 one might infer that this clause deals with planting of some other fruit tree on which Apollonius is to pay (1) rent to Nicomachus, (2) ἀπόμοιρα to the government. But reading and syntax have so far defied reconstruction. Owing to displacement of fibres, it is not possible to decide whether or not a letter is lost between συ and κ in συ. κινῆι (e.g. συ[γ]κίνηι?); ν in that word might also be γ, τ, λ or π. In εγ[, γ might also be π, ν, or even σ.

Addendum : Prof. A. Cameron, to whom I am grateful for reading the proofs, suggests in line 10 (cf. ll. 54-5) [ἔκαστος ἑαυτῷ καταφερέτω εἰς τὴν ληνὸν. The following ἀναφερέτω will then have the literal sense 'convey back'.

THE ZU BIRD.¹

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ABOUT three thousand years ago there was current in Mesopotamia a tale to the effect that the god Zu became for a time the Lord of the World by a theft, as bold as it was easy, of the symbols of power from the god Enlil to whom they properly belonged. We shall have more to say about that story later. Meanwhile it suggests a few thoughts. First, it is one of those stories, of which there are many, which have no parallel in the Old Testament or in other Semitic traditions; just as in Mesopotamian literature there are no parallels to the Biblical stories of the Temptation of Eve, the Garden of Eden, the Tower of Babel. This detail has its own contribution to make to the discussion of Mesopotamian influence on the cultures of other Semites. Second: since Zu is usually described as "the Zu bird" some may be tempted to class it with other stories of birds, beasts and animals so frequent in the folk-lore of peoples. But the story here is not a nature myth such as is found among less developed peoples; there are no such stories extant from Mesopotamia. Nor is it of the kind of story known in the "higher mythologies" wherein "such bird and beast stories frequently lose their nature-colouring entirely and become frankly and powerfully human and even pseudo-historical".² The truth is that it cannot be properly called a bird story at all, for Zu was more than a bird. It will be proposed later in this paper that Zu really belongs to that dusty underworld where the living dead have wings like birds.

Bilingual texts, in Sumerian and Accadian, of the first mil-

¹ A lecture given in the John Rylands Library on the 12th November, 1947.

² Cp. L. R. Farnell, *Value and Methods of Mythologic Study* in *Proc. Brit. Ac.*, vol. ix.); he cites the collection of legends called "The Transformations" by Antoninus Liberalis.

lenium, identify the god known to the Semites in Mesopotamia as Zu with the god known to the Sumerians of the third millennium as the "divine Im-dugud bird", i.e. bird of the "heavy storm". We must therefore begin our investigations in the third millennium B.C., using as our sources material of the Sumerian age, both literary and artistic.

We take first the account of a dream ¹ which Gudea, prince of Lagash, had, c. 2300 B.C. He saw a man of giant size, wearing a crown such as a god would wear. The man was, in fact, the high deity of Lagash, Ningirsu. As Gudea saw him he was attended by "the divine storm bird at his side, the storm at his feet, and a lion on his right and on his left".

For the moment we shall defer the description of Im-dugud which third-millennium artistic remains provide, and keep to literary material. From before Gudea's time we have to hand only onomastic ² material, from Ur, Shuruppak and Lagash. From this we learn that Im-dugud is, in writing, defined as a god and as a bird; that there were temples of Im-dugud at Shuruppak and Lagash, and that Im-dugud was an element of theophorous names. Onomastic material after Gudea's time, of the third Dynasty of Ur, is consonant with earlier material. But thereafter the name Im-dugud is not found on texts other than the two epics of Lugalbanda and Gilgamesh.

The Epic of Lugalbanda dates back to the Sumerian age though the purely Sumerian version we have to hand cannot be earlier than the end of the third millennium. All that we need say of that epic here is that it opens with an account of the encounter of Lugalbanda with Im-dugud and his wife, his son and his young, in a place described as "a mountain in a far-off land".

This Epic mentions one detail which is instructive. It says that Im-dugud "lifted up *am* (Semitic *rēmu*) whilst still alive, with his hands, and carried it on his back when it was dead".³

¹ Gudea, *Cyl. A.*, iv. 14-vi. 13.

² For Fara texts, see Deimel and Jestin; for Ur, see Burrows, *Archaic Texts*; for Ur III texts, Schneider, *Götternamen*. No point in giving details here.

³ Chiera, *Sumerian Epics and Myths*, no. 1, col. ii, ll. 4-5; CT. 15, plate 43, ll. 5-10.

Am is usually translated wild bull,¹ but bison² and rhinoceros³ have been suggested. Whichever translation is adopted, there can be no doubt of the great strength attributed to the divine storm-bird.

From the other Epic of Sumerian origin of which a fragment of the Sumerian version exists, the Epic of Gilgamesh, we have this: it is said that Gilgamesh cuts down a tree of which it is said "at its foot the serpent had made its nest; at its top the divine Im-dugud bird had put his young, and in the midst Lilith had built a house".⁴ Gilgamesh slew the serpent, but Lilith escapes and Im-dugud goes away to "the mountain" taking his young with him. Here we need note only the company which Im-dugud so to say, keeps. This recalls another line⁵ in Gudea texts in which Im-dugud and the serpent are associated.

From texts we now pass to artistic representations of Im-dugud in the Sumerian period. Some of these have long been known, others have been discovered more recently.⁶ They have been found at various sites in Lower Mesopotamia: Lagash, al Ubaid, Khafaja, Abu Kemal, Tell Asmar; and at Susa, chief city of ancient Elam. On panels, vases, statues, pendants, and as figurines, the Im-dugud bird is shown alone, or grasping an animal (lion or gazelle) by either talon, or with wings outstretched over animals (stags or lions). Everywhere the Im-dugud bird

¹ Of the strength of the wild bull and of its place in religion, see Gilbert Murray's *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, c. 1. In Mesopotamian literature the *am rēmu* is often a term of comparison; for example: the god Enlil like a furious *rēmu*; Gilgamesh fastened himself on his people like a *rēmu*; Humbaba raged like a wounded *rēmu*, etc., etc.

² Thureau Dangin, *RA.*, xxiv, p. 200; bison remains found, see Contenau *Manuel d'Archéologie Orientale*, vol. i, p. 48.

³ G. A. Barton in *Journal of the Society of Oriental Research*, 1926, p. 92.

⁴ Gadd, *RA.*, xxx (1933), p. 130; see Kramer, *Sumerian Mythology*, pp. 33 f. There is no foundation for Langdon's view (*JRAS*, 1932, p. 937, n. 3) that there existed a myth of Gilgamesh and Zu.

⁵ Gudea, *Cyl. A.*, 27, 19; *SAK*, p. 118. But how translate? For a Semitic text linking Zu with a serpent cp. *CT.* xxii plate 48, obverse 5.

⁶ H. Frankfort, *l.c.*, *infra*, and Iraq, no. 1. Reproductions of Im-dugud figure also in King's *History of Sumer and Accad*, and Hall's *A season's work at Ur*, p. 258.

is shown as having wings like those of an eagle, and a head like that of a lion. And it is usual to describe him by some such phrase as "lion-headed eagle".¹ Later I shall give my reasons for questioning this description in respect of Zu.

At first, when the only artistic representation of the divine Im-dugud bird known was that found at Lagash, and rightly connected with mention of him in the dream of the ruler of Lagash, Gudea, it was thought that the divine storm-bird was a symbol peculiar to the god Ningirsu and his city of Lagash. But now that the symbol has been found elsewhere associated with other gods that view has been abandoned. The present opinion is that Ningirsu and the other deities are forms of a fertility deity.²

Were it not that the Semites in Mesopotamia identified the

¹ Perhaps we may here recall that Daniel's "head upon his bed" had visions of "four great beasts," of which the first "was like a lion and had eagle's wings," which commentators have identified as "the winged lion from Nimrud and Babylon, and the type of the lordliest of creatures". Gudea (see *supra*), in his dream, saw the divine Im-dugud bird which, we know, had eagle's wings, and a head that looks like that of a lion. Not that Daniel had a vision of the divine storm-bird. But maybe something less unlike than the winged lion which commentators have preferred. In any case the phrase "lordliest of creatures" may not unjustly be described as an anachronism.

² Cp. Thureau-Dangin, *RA.*, xxiv. 119. H. Frankfort writes: "a pre-Sargonid god of fertility, worshipped throughout the land, under a variety of epithets, was everywhere represented in his war-like aspect by the lion-headed eagle" (Early Dynastic Sculptured Maceheads, in *Miscellanea Orientalia*, Rome, 1935, p. 118). As to that, I can't help asking why it is assumed here that the lion-headed eagle is a symbol of a war-like character? If Ningirsu is to be associated with fertility, and so the giving of life, the following from Egypt is suggestive. In ancient Egypt in scenes depicted in tomb and coffin we find a human headed bird with human arms "hovering over the mummy and extending to its nostrils in one hand the figure of a swelling sail, the hieroglyph for wind or breath, and in the other, the so-called crux ansata, or symbol of life", Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 55 f. There may be nothing in this, but it seems to me that a bird hovering, even a bird touching animals, is a tame expression of warlike character, and, in some representations, the "victims" (?) seem quite unconcerned. By the way, in China birds embody vital breath, and the great Taoist, Lu Puh-wei says "Collected in birds, it enables them to fly and soar" (J. J. M. de Groot, *Religion in China*, p. 159). I owe these fragments of possibly irrelevant learning to the late Professor Maurice Canney, of Manchester University. The use of the divine Im-dugud bird for pendants and figurines would fit in with the fertility idea, though there is a way out of that too.


divine Im-dugud bird with Zu, it is not likely that we should have identified them. For the material concerning the divine storm-bird which has been preserved to us from the Sumerian third millennium, in no detail corresponds to or even suggests the activities of Zu as they are recorded or hinted at in later Semitic literature. And, in respect of art, there is not a single representation which recalls unmistakably the figure of the divine Im-dugud bird which was so well known during the Sumerian age. We must not make too much of that fact which may be explained by the accident that the desired Sumerian texts or Semitic art pieces still lie buried and await a lucky spade. But at present the matter stands as I have said just now. The Sumerian divine Im-dugud bird gives no hint of the Semitic Zu bird. Yet the Semites identified the two.

The Semites described Zu as "doer of evil, the one who raises the head of evil". No other divine being is so described, so it would seem that Zu's characteristic feature, if not his nature, is evil. To describe him as maleficent merely would seem to be an understatement.

The only evil which Zu did, to our knowledge, is described in the story ¹ to which I referred at the beginning of this paper. What happened was this: once, when in attendance on the god Enlil, Zu sees the tokens of Enlil's power: his crown of sovereignty, his robe of divinity, and the tablets of destiny; and seeing, covets what they signify, saying: "I'll take those tablets of fate of the gods, get hold of the oracles of all the gods, set up my throne and be lord of decrees, and be ruler of all the Igigi (the gods of the upper world)". It was the dawn, and Enlil, minus his crown, is pouring out pure water. Zu, who had been waiting at the entrance of the god's rest-room, took the Tablets of Destiny, Enlil's sovereignty, and the power to make decrees, and fled away to "his mountain".


In substance this is an old story: the temporary triumph of the forces of disorder. It is the burden of several other stories of which the *Enuma Eliš* or Creation Story is the most

¹ CT, xv, plates 39-41. There are occasional references to Zu in Semitic literature but they throw no light on our subject and need not be listed here.



1. TOP LEFT: THE DIVINE IM-DUGUD BIRD. BAS-RELIEF.
MIDDLE 3RD MILLENNIUM, FROM LAGASH.

Louvre, Paris.



2. BRONZE PLATE. PR-ZU-ZU DEMON OVERLOOKS UNDERWORLD BEINGS ATTENDING A DECEASED PERSON (MIDDLE REGISTER).



3. A DEMON.

British Museum

familiar.¹ There also the ensuing war is a battle for supremacy. Here a usurper has seized power over the gods. But sovereignty and all authority was not something to be seized; it was something to be conferred, for example, as a reward, as in the case of Marduk, by the gods.

The theft is a *casus belli*. But who shall engage the divine Zu in battle? Obviously not a man, for the agent and the lawlessness belong to a sphere not accessible to mankind and therefore man has no part in the vindication of right in heavenly places. Nor does Enlil, from whom sovereignty has been stolen, himself engage Zu in conflict. It is always the case, in instances of this kind, that the chief god seeks some other god, and inferior, to fight for him.²

In this instance, Enlil does not seem to have a word to say. It is Anu the heaven god who calls for volunteers, but first one and then another, when called upon, declines in spite of the offer of promotion above their brother gods. They have too much respect for Zu's might. The Mesopotamian version is damaged at this point and so hides from us the identity of the champion. But the Susa version³ perhaps supports the view that he was Marduk, who, in a hymn of Aššurbanipal to Marduk, is called the one "who smashed in pieces the skull of Zu".⁴

¹ Schorr has suggested that late in the second millenium B.C., the priestly class, offended by the impiety of some traditional stories, got some of them dropped. Of the War-of-the-Gods type they perpetuated only those in which the gods as guardians of World Order fought against the primeval powers of Chaos, as in the story of Zu (ZDMG, 1935, pp. 155 ff.). This suggestion fits in with Schorr's belief that local moral ideas improved as time went on. It may be so. But concerning this particular story about Zu, there is as yet no evidence that it was in circulation at the end of the second millenium. Its own intrinsic interest was probably its main justification and there is no need to assume that the priests were fussy or revolted when the imagination of the story tellers pictured, for example, the gods, stupid with drink, creating human monsters.

² Again the best known example is the so-called Creation Story. But much of the literature arouses a suspicion that the local belief in the hierarchy of deities included something similar to the belief found elsewhere that the highest of the gods kept himself, so to say, unspotted from the world.

³ Scheil, *R.A.*, xxxv, 14 ff.

⁴ Cp. *ZA.*, iv, 246 ff.; v, 77 ff. The opinion that the champion was Ninurta is widely current but the evidence cited is far from conclusive and is sometimes fictitious, e.g. Langdon, *Semitic Mythology*, p. 102; there is nothing in the Lugabanda text as we have it to justify Langdon's reconstruction.

Palis ¹ has made the story of Zu's defeat—he says, by Ninurta—part of the story read at the New Year Festival. Whether or no it was so, the Zu story does exalt Marduk and by enhancing his prestige as custodian of law and order would serve to increase popular confidence in the god. After all, the knowledge that destiny is in the hands of one's own god whom one could influence by prayer and offerings would mean much to king and people.

So far our material has yielded results which even a superficial handling of it would support. From now on we shall try to discover whether that material can tell us more about the Zu bird than the fact that he was the divine storm bird who outwitted the great god Enlil and made disorder reign in the world of gods and men.

Zu, like his alleged Sumerian original, the divine Im-dugud bird, is always the god Zu. In the Semitic story the deities speak of him as a god when they say to Enlil: "Who is like unto Zu among the gods thy sons?" His wife, Ninguenta, and his son, Enna, are also designated in writing, as deities. Yet, if, as seems certain, Zu, like Im-dugud, is the storm bird, why is he deified?

We know that the winds were personified. We are told that the great storms are from heaven, and that they are the offspring of Anu the god of heaven. Incidentally this may explain why it is Anu who calls for volunteers among the deities to avenge Enlil. Anu may have felt some responsibility for the conduct of one of her offspring. Be that as it may, the winds are also demons.

We know also that the demon winds belong to the underworld; they are its offspring. Now the Sumerian word for underworld is, amongst others, *kur* (Semitic *šadû*) mountain; also *é-kur*, house of the mountain.

Reference back to what has been said in connection with the Lugalbanda Epic, the Gilgamesh Epic, and the Semitic story, will show that Im-dugud and Zu are connected with "mountain". Especially interesting is the opening line of the

¹ *The Babylonian Akitu Festival*, p. 156.

Lugalbanda Epic which speaks of Lugalbanda going (?) to *kur ki-su-ud-da* (Semitic: *ana šad-i a-šar ru-u-ki*). We know that *kur* and *ki-sud*, for "mountain" and "far-off land" respectively, were names of the underworld.¹ It may then be conjectured that Lugalbanda's meeting with Im-dugud or Zu took place in the underworld.²

In the Semitic story, Zu steals sovereignty from Enlil. This high-god is often called "great mountain", "wind mountain", "whose top reaches to heaven and whose foundation is in the pure-water deeps". From his house (*é-kur*, above mentioned as a name for the underworld) come forth evil spirits and to his house they return. Hence we may conclude that Enlil is a god of the underworld, and not of the upper world only, and that demon winds inhabit his house, *é-kur*. The further point that the tablets of destiny which Zu stole belong to the *é-kur* seems to be implied in the Susa version³ of the theft and the ensuing battle, where it is said: "May the destinies return to *é-kur*, to the father who begat thee". We know that the tablets of destiny were written in the *Ubšukinna*, the assembly room, in Enlil's abode,⁴ when the gods were assembled for the New Year. From this concatenation of bits of evidence I hazard the guess that the story of Zu and Enlil is an underworld story.

What was Zu like in appearance? Years ago, George Smith,⁵ who was the first to publish the Zu text wrote "Zu is called the cloud or the storm bird, the flesh-eating bird, the lion or giant bird, the bird of prey, the bird with the sharp beak". By whom Zu was so called he does not say. If we keep to the evidence of literature and art there is enough first-hand information for at least the beginnings of an answer to our question.

¹ Cp. Tallquist, *Sumerisch-Akkadische Namen der Totenwelt*, p. 16.

² True, the text goes on to speak of a mountain called Sabu. But this mountain is apparently fabulous. The Sabu mountain mentioned in Aššurnasirpal's Annals as lying east of the Tigris has no claim to be identified with the one named in the Epic.

³ Scheil, *RA.* xxxv, 14 f., Tablet 3, Reverse, line 8; cp. also Craig, *RTT.* i. 39, 15.

⁴ Note that Im-dugud is associated with Ningirsu (see *supra*) who was "Lord of the storm of Enlil" (*SAK*, 100, 10, 2). The wife of Zu, Ninguenna, is "Utukku (a demon) of the *e-kur-ra* (Deimel, *Pantheon Bab.*, no. 2459).

⁵ *Chaldean Account of Genesis* (1876), p. 119.

It was noted earlier that it is customary to speak of the divine Im-dugud bird as the "lion-headed eagle", a description which I promised to question. I am assuming that this Sumerian object is the Semitic Zu. Now we have a text, in the Accadian language, which purports to relate what a king experienced when, in a dream, he descended into Hades. There he saw beings with human hands, and feet of serpent; another with a lion's head, and four hands and two feet of men; another with the head of a bird, wings outstretched, and hands and feet of men.

Amongst the monsters whom he saw there, were Humuttabal, the boatman of the underworld, whose head was the head of Zu, but hands and feet were human; the wicked Utukku whose head was the head of a lion, but his hands and feet were those of Zu; and a god whose name the prince could not recall, with head, hands and feet of Zu. From this it is clear that the head, the hands and the feet of Zu were distinctive of Zu; that they were not human; and that the head was not that of a lion or, as appears from descriptions of other monsters in that place, the head of bird or bull. Hence, even though the description "lion-headed" may be true of the Sumerian artistic representations of the divine Im-dugud bird, it is more or less inaccurate if used of Zu. The natives would have agreed.

The same text makes special mention of Zu's countenance for there is reference to a man exceptional, whose "body was black as pitch, and his countenance that of Zu".¹

To go further than this and attempt to identify Zu with other artistic representations is perhaps rash. But there is one representation which challenges discretion. It is the head of the "god Pazuzu,² son of the god Hanpa, lord of the wind-demons (*lilē*), the wicked god who rages violently from the mountains". Note the wicked god, or god of evil, and compare that with the phrase already quoted which describes Zu as the

¹ The entire text was first published by Ebeling in his *Tod und Leben*, 1931, pp. 1 ff.; the relevant lines are found on p. 5. Von Soden improved on Ebeling's effort in *ZA.*, 1936, *NF.* ix. (xliii.), pp. 1-31.

² If we may take the name Pa-zu-zu to pieces we may translate it: the wise or crafty wind (*PA. zikiku*; zu-zu, enku).

“doer of evil, the one who raises the head of evil”. And in appearance the head is not very unlike that of Im-dugud which we know from the third millennium. The complete picture is that of “the four-winged demon of the winds; half-human, half canine head; wide grinning mouth; the hands of a savage wild animal; the legs terminate in the talons of a bird of prey and are covered with feathers; the tail is that of a scorpion”. But, as I have admitted already, this is guess work.¹

To sum up: Zu, the divine storm bird, was identified by the Semites with the god whom the Sumerians called the Im-dugud bird. That identification must be accepted but the evidence which we have to date from the Sumerian side contains nothing like to the story which the Semites told of Zu in the first millennium. Indeed Im-dugud is nowhere described as maleficent by the Sumerians but maleficence belongs naturally to a heavy storm wind. The Divine Im-dugud/Zu belongs, as do all wind demons, to the underworld. It was there that Enlil abode and kept the Tablets of Destiny which Zu stole from him. But Zu's distinction is not that he is hostile to men and to gods, but that by his cleverness he once became Lord of the World and could be overthrown only by a battle planned by the gods, executed by the great Marduk, with the help of a hurricane according to the Susa version. Like Milton's devil Zu captures the imagination more than does the god he outwits or the god by whom he is vanquished.²

¹ The head with the inscription on it is given in *RA*. vii. 21 ff.; cp. also more heads in *RA*. xviii., pp. 191 f. Langdon has interesting material concerning Pazuzu in *Semitic Mythology*, pp. 371 f.

² I hope, as early as possible, to publish the Lugalbanda Epic in transliteration and translation.

